1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

that Sinkiang was placed under a form of administration com- 175
parable to that of other Chinese provinces. In 1884 it ceased to
be a possession, and became a Chinese province.

Under the Chinese Republic, since 1911, Sinkiang has contin- 175
ued to be nominally a province like any other province; but in
actuality the tendency of governors of the province has always 186
been to rule as independent war lords. Sometimes this independ- 668
ence has been carried so far that governors have conducted their
own foreign relations with Russia and India and have even ●
treated the National Government of China almost as if it were a foreign power. China's present problem in Sinkiang is how to deal with the relations between the Chinese provincial authorities and the national government, the relations of both the provincial authorities and the national government with Russia and India, especially Russia, and the effort of both provincial and national Chinese authorities to maintain themselves in the face of the nationalist demands of the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang.

Nationalism in Sinkiang is a modern outgrowth of traditional 186
Mohammedan and tribal rebellions against Chinese rule. It began
to take newer forms in the 1930's, when Sinkiang fell under the 668
rule of a Chinese military adventurer named Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Since Sheng could not call on China for military reinforcements for fear of being supplanted, he followed a new policy of seeking support from each subject nationality separately, while at the same time preventing any coalition of nationalities. He also increased trade with the Soviet Union, obtained Soviet loans, and sent Uighur and other students to the Soviet Union for technical training. In 1943 he broke with the Russians and came to terms with the National Government of China. A policy of "firmness" toward the non-Chinese peoples was then reasserted; but in the meantime political nationalism had taken root.

There are now two major nationalist movements in Sinkiang. One follows a policy of "Sinkiang for the Uighurs." It seeks to win autonomy from the Chinese and at the same time to assert

186 Uighur domination over the other peoples of Sinkiang. The second movement is the "coalition nationalism," whose stronghold is
668 at Kuija. It seeks to unite all nationalities in Sinkiang; it is as friendly to the Soviet Union as was the Azerbaijan nationalist movement in Iran, and some of its leaders were born or educated in Soviet territory.

Forces Converging on the Center of Gravity

000 China's colonial problems in Inner Asia are enclosed in a framework of great power politics. The political interests of America and Britain are sensitive to changes in the area in which the territorial frontiers of China and Russia meet in Inner Asia.

Until the Age of Columbus the movement of man within the land mass between the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the Polar Sea, was more important than his enterprises on salt water. Coastal voyages were made, and early navigators crossed the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, and perhaps even the Pacific; certainly the Pacific Islands were reached from Asia; but the major interaction of cultures and the building of the great civilizations took place within the Eurasian land mass and in North Africa.

With the great voyages of navigation and circumnavigation at the end of the fifteenth century, a new mode of history began. The peopling of North America, the colonizing of Central and South America, and the conquest of India and Southeast Asia were the work of Western European man, moving across the oceans. Inner Asia, once a crossroads of the world, became a stagnant area of secondary commercial and strategic importance.

Then there came a period of fifty years, from 1580 to 1630, in which the histories of different parts of the world began to flow together as components of a true world history. In 1580 Yermak began the Russian drive into Siberia, sponsored by merchants interested in the expansion of the fur trade. After 1595, when Boris Godunov founded a gun-making industry at Tula, the eastward

*563
631 Moslems because such scholarly incentives as exist among them
212 consist mainly of acquiring a modicum of ability to read the
Koran in Arabic.

*563 The influence of Islam on the status of women appears to be
562 somewhat less baleful. Sinkiang Moslem women generally enjoy
779 more freedom than their sisters in Islamic countries of the Near
East, and those who belong to the Chinese Moslem community rank high in this respect. The institution of purdah, for example, does not exist among them.

*563 The most marked influence of Islam among the Chinese has
779 been as a political force, to unite those of Moslem faith against
186 Chinese not of the faith. Chinese Moslem society is even stronger
● 668 in patriarchal authority and clan loyalty than "heathen" Chinese
[602] society. The principle that well-to-do members of a clan have a responsibility for the welfare of their poorer distant relatives, as well as advantages over them, is given a heightened authority among Moslem Chinese by the feeling that they form a minority which must keep its ranks closed; whereas among non-Moslem Chinese, the precept is often honored but not conscientiously observed. In times of civil war and peasant rebellion, especially, Moslem war lord armies normally combine military discipline and community loyalty: they are not merely troops and officers, but clansmen and chieftains. Even in periods of widespread peasant unrest, therefore, the leaders of the Chinese Moslem communities are usually able to lead Moslem peasants against both non-Moslem peasants and non-Moslem landlords. Often what starts as a Moslem peasant revolt is taken over by Moslem landlords and converted into a movement to expand the whole Moslem community against the non-Moslem community, and to prevent the Moslem community from being infiltrated either by Chinese nationalism or by ideas of social revolution.

*563 The essentially nonreligious character of the internecine wars
578 among the two main groups of Chinese in Sinkiang, however, in
186 spite of the appeal to Islam in closing the ranks of the Chinese
Moslems, is indicated by the failure of the Moslem Chinese to establish anything more than temporary alliances with their co-

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1
Chinese

*563 578 669 Uighurs were regarded as only political rebels. When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not only political rebels but traitors to the Chinese blood.

*563 701 668 Since the end of the war against Japan the Chinese reinforcements sent to Sinkiang have been principally non-Moslem troops of the National Government, though crack Moslem cavalry have been stationed on the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in the disputed Baitik Bogda area. The great Moslem war lords of Northwest China have been fully engaged in the militarily difficult and politically delicate dual operation of preventing the Chinese Communists from expanding into their satrapies, while at the same time consolidating in those satrapies an autonomous power sufficiently strong to refuse to allow the National Government either to send in garrisons or to collect taxes. They have had no forces to spare for independent adventures in Sinkiang. In compensation the National Government, while losing authority over the Moslems of Northwest China, gained the upper hand over them in Sinkiang. Playing on the social conservatism of the Chinese Moslems, they were for a time at least able to align them against Turkic nationalism and still more against the more revolutionary "coalition nationalism" of the Kulja movement.

x563 701 648 Backed by over 100,000 National Government troops with relatively good training and American equipment, and with the Moslem Chinese unable to dispute the ascendancy of the non-Moslems, the position of the Chinese as a whole in Sinkiang, in the last years of Kuomintang rule, was curious. Their troops gave them formidable striking power against an insurrection at almost any one point, but not the decisive power to crush, as a whole, the nationalism which increasingly pervaded the entire province. Political and military decisions lay in the hands of high Chinese officials almost none of whom were natives of the province. As individuals, they were not engaged in the defense of old vested interests but, all too often, in the acquisition of new personal interests.

648 macists of the provincial pharmacy, and instructors for the provincial Military Officers Academy and for the provincial Air Force have come from Soviet Russia. But, he inquires, does that mean Sinkiang has gone "Red"? Did not Soviet Russia, at the beginning of her national reconstruction, get assistance "from thousands upon tens of thousands" of "capitalist" experts? Yet wouldn't it be difficult to say Soviet Russia is "White"? According to Tu, there has never been Soviet political control in Sinkiang. If Soviet Russia had "controlled" Sinkiang politically, would she have tolerated the White Russians who still remained there? Have not the Three People's Principles textbooks of Sinkiang been identical with those elsewhere in Nationalist China? Are not the military and administrative authority of Sinkiang still in the hands of China?

"Kinship to Sovietism" and Chinese Nationalism

668 It appears that up to Sheng Shih-ts'ai's accession to power, Sinkiang's concern with the Chinese National Revolution and its *San Min Chu-i* (The "Three People's Principles" of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood) was not too serious. Sinkiang was geographically and economically a great distance from most other Chinese provinces, her leaders were devoted almost exclusively to selfish acquisition of wealth, and the Chinese Republic's then existing national political structure was not mature in Sinkiang. Since 1933, however, the year of the "Four-Twelve" Affair, Sheng Shih-ts'ai has altered this. As politics have taken on national stature elsewhere in China, Sheng Shih-ts'ai's background and interests have carried Chinese political organization and support of the Three People's Principles in a new way into the far Northwest. Remembering Japan's invasion of his Manchurian homeland in 1931, Sheng Shih-ts'ai has also warmly supported China's resistance to the aggressor; and having seen the needs of his own administrative region, he has particularly devoted himself to its reconstruction. Thus his work has fitted neatly into both the basic revolutionary program of the Three People's Principles and the wartime program of *K'ang-chan Chien-kuo* or "Resistance and Reconstruction." True, Sinkiang's Six Great Policies of Anti-imperialism, Kinship to Sovietism,

Racial Equality, Clean Government, Peace, and Reconstruction are 668 unique. But they are not so strange to the ideals of China that they do not keep within the bounds of Nationalist principles, of Chinese political unity, of successful resistance to Japan, and of freedom from Soviet Russian domination.

This view is further supported by a brief glance at the manner in which Sinkiang's interprovincial and international record has evolved since 1934.

Sinkiang and World Affairs, 1934-1943

It was largely Soviet help which enabled Sheng Shih-ts'ai to gain 648 mastery of Sinkiang, but in 1934 Chinese authorities from Nanking still had been able to attempt negotiation of the civil war and formation of a compromise administration. Since Soviet troops had operated with the White Russian forces already in Sinkiang, it is obvious that their restoration of order had been a "coalition measure" and not an attempt at immediate Soviet annexation. Soviet military aid is, in fact, said to have been withdrawn as soon as order began to appear though "Kinship to Sovietism" remained important in Sinkiang affairs. By 1936 Sheng Shih-ts'ai had established a "unified" government in all Sinkiang.

Outbreak of open Sino-Japanese hostilities in July, 1937, made Sinkiang an obvious region for Chinese-Soviet compromise. The treaty signed by both Governments in August, 1937, guaranteed there would be no Russian aggression against China; and a through overland truck and air route, between eastern China and Soviet Russia, through Sinkiang, was thereby made practicable. Sinkiang's three-year plan of reconstruction was instituted with Soviet advices in the same year. By the fall of 1938, when China had been forced to retreat from Hankow into the west, Sinkiang's new truck highways provided assurance that China would not be internationally isolated in her Northwest. At that time Tihwa even telegraphed a resolution to that effect, pledging that the province would keep open China's international communication lines, would intensify efforts to help fulfill the national Resistance and Reconstruction program, and would work with the rest of China to-

S
N
311 The newest
development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang,
is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the
sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates,
S salt, and, as recently reported, uranium.

N The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only
563 outnumbered but also outweighed in economic and political
respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have
been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as
Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they
never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier
areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum
of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the
lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or
S governors and their bureaucracy.

N The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking
175 was to make use of the existing form of governmental institu-
642 tions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-
177 Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang,"
631 i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had
S existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The
[171] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols
were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental
institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners
S ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in
N Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks
[668] and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist
[565] China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

The Muslimic communities were fuled by Büks with various
175 ranks: the Ak'im Bük, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bük,
631 "assistant governor"; the Shang Bük, "collector of revenue";
795 the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bük, "superintend-
647 ant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi,
657 "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Büks were appointed by
the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon
the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor,
although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang,
Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the
S province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

N Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese
175 military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi,
631 Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc.
647 Relay stations provided communication between the government
[202] in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness
of the means of communications was an important duty of
000 Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

S N 489 496 648 668 175 [491]

Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation with Soviet Russia, are building the first Inner Asiatic railway, linking Alma-Ata with Lan-chou. This railway will, without doubt, speed up the Sinification of the frontier areas, and above all add industrialization to agriculture and pastoral nomadism.

S N 631 563 657 175

As far as Chinhai was concerned, the Western Mongols (the Oirats) were also locally ruled by dzasaks, the leaders of banners. Unlike the banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, however, they did not combine banners to form leagues or to elect one of their tribal leaders as the captain-general of the league. The Chinese governor- with his seat in Sining - functioned as captain-general. In regard to the no[illegible]c Tibetans, the Chinese government appointed chieftains [illegible] dzasak-lamas and gave them the rights and the privileges which this office involves. The sedentary Tibetans were ruled by t'u-ssus, also appointees of the Peking government. By and large, this governmental pattern existed until the Communists came into power.

S N 563 657 175

The form of governing non-Chinese peoples changed in the course of time in various ways, but one thing never changed: the aim of the Peking government to rule, to suppress, to exploit, and to sinify them.

S 631 635 175

Unlike the eighteen provinces in China proper, the province of Sinkiang (after 1884) and the Eastern Three Provinces, (after 1907) the areas comprising Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan, although occupying more space than China proper, were administrated by a quite different type of governmental system.

S 631 657 175 647

Political subdivisions of the Chinese Empire such as Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet were usually referred to as dependencies. This is however an inaccurate translation of the Chinese term "fan," which really means "the barbarian west." Since the cultural, ethnic and historical background in these areas was very different from the rest of the Empire, these regions required, and in practice had, a very particular type of governmental control. All these frontier territories were administered by the"Department of Dependencies" in Peking. This department was subdivided into the following bureaus:

a. Inner Mongolian bureau, that administered frontier boundaries, titles of nobility, appointment of officials, military affairs, league conferences, and finally organization of banner units of Inner Mongolia.

b. "Reception bureau" for Inner Mongolia nobility, that was responsible for the payments and allowances to the Inner Mongolian aristocracy.

c. Eastern Turkestan bureau, that was in charge of Moslem affairs in Eastern Turkestan.

S
631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge
of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian
S N inhabitants in general.

175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking,
the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
S N minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
175 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
657 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
563 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784,
669 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times
they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bäk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

S N
175

II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode of Economy of the Minorities.

631 Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic con-
619 glomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and
always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
S N political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
175 again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
631 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the
668 Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
178 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-
619 Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road,
648 Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's
cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bäk's policy

S
N
175 towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion
631 created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian
● 668 Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that
created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet
178 through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the
619 four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small
648 degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one
administrative unit.

S The Eastern Turks:

563 The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is
241 based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational
complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through
S the organized use of water. The family organization among the
563 Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain
596 level of productivity can only be reached through collective
labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason
S the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern
[312] is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount
[241] of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational
systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water
is therefore provided for their land.

The Internal structure of the family system is not based
S upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed
[622] by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself
[634] whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by
S Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists.
563 A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed
S by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form
[441] "guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

S
K Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

563 Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition
614 of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the
S K Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted
563 in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among
233 these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose
361 most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The trans-
[177] ition to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists
[668] insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent
winter camp site, since this facilitates better political
S control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site
K still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz
[622] and Kazakhs are ruled by "biks," or "manaps" (elders)
S responsible to the Chinese officials.

N
563 The Mongols: general remarks.

[233] Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The
[594] basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

S
N A group of patrilineally
563 related families forms the basic economic (i.e., migrational)
621 unit in Mongol society. Pastures are distributed among such
S units. The structure of the society itself dictates a certain
N collectivistic working concept. Mongol social groupings are
[622] led by tribal chieftains, who are directly responsible to the
563 district Chinese official. Mongol society, unlike other North-
177 western societies, has not undergone great changes under
668 Communist influences. Their basic pattern of life has remained
the same as it was under the Manchu and Republican regimes.
S
563 The Oirats (or Western Mongols:
233 The Oirats of the Northwest are primarily pastoral nomads.
Their chief source of income is cattle, horses, sheep and
[434] goats. Because they live in a desert-steppe area they move
[131] around in larger or smaller groups depending upon the available resources.
S
563 The designation for these small economic and migrational
621 units or camps is "xotn" which includes a group of nuclear
[594] families patrilineally related - tracing descent from a common
[613] ancestor in the third, fourth, or fifth generation.
Membership in this group can be gained by adoption, by
[597] attachment of a daughter's husband in the case of a man
with no sons and of poor unrelated families or poor related
families on the paternal side. Although some poorer families
remained apart from these "xotn" it usually is more worthwhile to add their few cattle, etc., to that of the larger
group and render services in return for the benefits gained
S thereby.
[613] Among the Oirats the closer an individual's relationship
to the ancestor, the greater prestige and status he enjoys in
[554] this group.
S
563 The headman or elder ("axalaci") dwells in a tent situated in
361 the front of the encampment facing south. The remainder of
[622] the group is arranged according to the age of the male members
S in a circle behind the dwelling of the elder. The dependent
[613] families are situated in the rear of the circle but still according
[554] to the closeness of their relation to the ancestor.
563 Wives of members of these extended families are also
affected by the social set-up; their position and status varies
621 directly with that of their husbands, although a wife's position
593 as far as respect patterns go was never equal to her husband's.
562 A wife observes strict respect for her husband's kinsmen who
possess, by reason of age and relationship, a higher position
than that of her husband. Very often she will not even pronounce
the names of any of these elder gentlemen out of respect for
them. The status of the wife grows with that of her husband
during his lifetime. When he dies, she can either remain
living with his kinsmen, in which case she holds the same
position socially that he had during his lifetime, or she can

SN 563 182 The Chinese, fully aware of their old culture and history, continued up to our times to consider Mongols, Turks and Tibetans if not as barbarians, at least as inferior peoples. This attitude of the Chinese caused, perhaps as an understandably psychological reaction, the superiority-complex behaviour of some minorities. In addition, the higher efficiency and diligence of the average Chinese peasant in comparison with the average non-Chinese did not help mutual understanding and esteem.

SN 563 668 [641] Constitutionally, for the first time in centuries, the minorities are not only considered by the present Communistic regime as absolutely equal to any other racial or ethnic group but they are also treated with consideration. The Communists do everything in order to avoid hurting the SN [177] nationalistic feeling of the minorities. The price the minorities have to pay for a certain degree of local self-determination, independence and self-government is the thorough acceptance of the party line with all its consequences, above all, collectivization, which certainly means an incredible change of the traditional economic pattern, because eight ninths of the total population are peasants and only the remaining one ninth are pastoral nomads, whose livestock - collectivization is yet to come.

SN 563 829 Since the overwhelming majority of the population of the Northwest consists of Chinese, the attitude toward the state in general is positive. Natural recognition of the government lies in the traditional line of Chinese behavior. The deep-rooted respect for "magistracy" and officialdom implies this basic recognition.

SN 563 668 578 669 The relationship between Chinese Communist rulers and ruled Chinese (whether Communist or not) might be described as less frictional than that between the non-Chinese minorities and the Chinese Communist rulers, that is, a certain tension and uneasiness between the Uighur Autonomous Region and the government has occurred several times during the last five years, and also between the Tibetans of Chinghai and the Communist authorities, and the recent uprisings of Tibetans (July 1956) seem to be of major significance.

SN 829 Generally speaking, the average Chinese in the Northwest has neither a sense of common destiny or any sense of mission. SN 829 571 The average Chinese peasant's life is concerned with one main and urgent problem: livelihood. Quite different is the situation among the intelligentsia, who are culture conscious to such a degree that it often results in a feeling of superiority over other peoples. Among those intellectuals there is a strong feeling and conviction that China has a grand mission in Asia - cultural and political leadership.

S N 668 Based on our experience with Soviet Russia, there can be
186 little doubt that the Chinese Communist propaganda has been,
or will be, successful in building up a tremendous feeling
for nation and nationality, an artificial and overemphasized
S N pride for everything which is China or Chinese. The Chinese society
[182] in the Northwest might be described as stable and united because
of its common history, common language, common beliefs,
common pattern of living (agriculture by means of irrigation
accounting for ninety-five percent) and common fate. We do not
refer to the artificial stability and unity enforced by secret
police and military garrisons which might turn into a genuine
stability like that in Russia after a long period of propaganda.
Training of the younger generation and making propagandistic
use of political mistakes committed by other powers, like
Hitler's lost war against Russia, which was the last step in
S N developing a final and real unity among Russians.

Turning back to the minorities, we can say that the Turks
563 and the Chinese Muslims do have a sense of mission in
795 regard to their religion. For centuries the Muslim has been
797 taught to fight and to convert the "non-believers" to the "only
668 true faith on earth": Islam (Mohammedanism). How strong
their feeling is in regard to their religion may be seen from
the fact that the Communist regime avoids carefully interference
in religious matters and even permits every religious activity
to continue, including the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of course,
the average Muslim is hardly aware of the fact that the top
S level Muslim leadership is under complete control of the Com-
munist regime. As a religious group the Turks (Eastern
563 Türks, Salars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and some small islamized
795 Tibetan clans) and the Dungans (Chinese Muslims) are united
to a certain degree and they do have a sense of common
destiny, repeatedly brought forward, when political events
showed that they considered themselves one single group,
imbued with common fate, which culminated in their idea
and highest aim: the attempt to erect their own Islamic
Empire and realm, an attempt which cost hecatombs of blood
but never came true. Their perception and conviction that
the support of their highest spiritual leaders, first the Caliph
of Baghdad, then the Sultan of Constantinople and finally the
Great Mufti of Jerusalem (in spite of Stalin's and Ata Turk's
discouraging denoucement of any Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic
movement) developed their group feeling and group conscious-
S N ness.

563 As far as the Mongols of the Northwest are concerned, it
can be stated that because of their geographical separation
S N (see map of ethnic groups) political disunion was inevitable.
[795] However, as an ethnic and religious group (the Mongols are

S N 563 [795] all Buddhists) they have a strong feeling of belonging together. Nevertheless the Mongols are fully aware that their former power is declining more and more every decade and that their pastures are constantly diminishing because of the encroachment of agriculture and Chinese migration pressure. The establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (to which the Edzin Gol and Alashan areas have recently been added) and the organization of several autonomous chou for the Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinghai, might restore to a small degree the hope for recovery of their lost strength and political power, a hope which has been stimulated during the Sino-Japanese war. In addition, the organization of those autonomies will certainly raise their feeling of security, and might east the widespread desperation of Mongolian leaders who have anticipated the final decline of the Mongols as an ethnic group and a linguistic unit because of rapid sinification
S N 563 • 668 177 and loss of pasture land, and therefore loss of cattle, the only life resource of the average Mongol. It is difficult to say what effect the Communist regime will have on the ethnic group of the Mongols. So far, the Mongolian indigenous culture has been fostered by the Communist regime, but there is little doubt that, when it comes, the complete transition of the Mongolian society into a Communistic society will not be carried out without resistance and ensuing hatred. It is unthinkable that the average Mongol, who for centuries has adhered to the simple pattern of nomadic life (owning cattle *individually* and only *pastures collectively*) will agree with the policy of bolshevization. It can be easily conceived that deprivation of their cattle will mean the end of the nomadic Mongolian society as such. What has been said about the Mongols may very well be true also for the Kazakhs and Kirghiz.

S N 181

IV. Dominant Social Motives.

The dominant social motive of the average citizen of the Northwest depends largely on his ethnic group affiliation. Starting with the majority, the Chinese, it should be repeated that they are diligent and industrious farmers whose whole energies must be used in order to maintain their families, who
S N 181 771 [769] cooperatively toil in the fields and earn just enough to live on. In such a setup little room is left for cultural and religious ambitions; although ancestor worship is sincerely practiced it is difficult to say whether this kind of worship is a true religious phenomenon or only a reflection of the traditional respect toward elders and parents. The religious behavior

S N
181 of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering
771 Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In
general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious
matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked
askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods,
S N but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion.
181 The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes
to be ordered around and governed, he ardently defends his
own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious.
Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities
and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready
to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency
found especially within the extended family, which as a rule
feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc.,
of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically
anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional
attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the
last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese
proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from
good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace,
to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom
he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and
S government, can be described as the average conception of
N the "good life." The average Chinese of the Northwest lives
342 in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area,
35 caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor
S N altar being almost the only furniture.
517 Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by
571 the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course,
565 the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to
423 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable
part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the
S frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money-
N 565 minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials
571 and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time
423 holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a
178 class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia,
668 became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China,
showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the
Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep
S N inclination towards Communism.
563 In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghiz,
233 Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives
are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a
religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the
nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

S N 563 233 [423] [476]

V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

K S 563 181

N S 563 181

As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirgh~~iz,~~ Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

S N 563 181 771 114

N 563 792

Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

S N 563 668 233 [361]

There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

S N 563 668 233 deprivation of livestock and the progressing industrialization are certain to be the source of increasing discontent among the nomads.

S N 563 181 In summing up, the nomads are extremely freedom-conscious. Freedom of the individual is expressed by the everlasting dream of every nomad which finds its expression in the conception of the free rider who recognizes nothing but "the eternal power of the eternal heaven" (Mongolian saying), and who possesses nothing but his felt tent, his highly esteemed and valued horses and his herds. But, no doubt, the Communists will succeed as they did in Soviet Russia in destroying the picture of the independent rider of the steppes of Central Asia, the cradle of so many different peoples and magnificent cultures.

Within their own social structure and social units, the S N [668] Nomads combine harmoniously individualistic and collectivistic trends of their pattern of life. Communistic collectivization can be imposed upon them by force, of course, but they will hardly accept it in their minds.

S N

VI. Approach to Individual and National Problems

563 181 153 The nomads of the Northwest work hard for their existence. It is easily understood that they need their whole energy for maintaining such a life, which is a constant struggle against the hardships of land, weather and against the centuries-old S N 563 153 577 uncertain political environment. Under such circumstances the nomads developed very realistic minds. A realistic mind is implicitly logical in regard to political or daily matters of life, although the realization of the unpredictable inclemencies or favors of surrounding Nature gave rise to an illogical or, in terms of Jung's depth philosophy, a translogical conception of the relationship between man and Nature, whose favorable or unfavorable phenomena were brought into connection with their "good andbad" deeds, whereby "good and bad" do not have the same connotation as they do in our society; polygamy in the case of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Eastern Turks, polyandry in the case of the Tibetans, or murder of a personal dependent in the case of Kazakhs, for example, are never considered as "bad" deeds, but killing a louse, in the case of a Mongol, or killing of a yak calf (even if it is sick or hurt) in the case of Tibetans, are considered "bad" deeds.

S N 563 153 779 155 The nomadic Muslims (Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Salars and some Islamized Tibetan clans) as well as the sedentary Muslims (New-Uighurs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Tajiks, Chinese Muslims or Dungans) have on account of their religion a rather doctrinal

175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was Yüan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of Yüan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of Yüan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

175 1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

159 635 669 The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt, but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

159 175 635 575 668 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

159 635 175 648 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

159 635 175 185 631 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen.' Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

175 669 648 assistance to the Ili rebels. Later, however, when the Chinese Communists came to power, there were profuse statements thanking the Soviet Government for its unstinted aid and support. Soviet support to the Ili rebels was more apparent on the diplomatic plane. The Soviet consul-general at Urumchi was openly friendly to the rebels. He gave them every encouragement, while he played his game as intermediary between Kazakh insurgents and the Chinese authorities.

175 669 The negotiations between the Ili regime and the Chinese government delegates headed by Chang Chih-chung lasted from October, 1945, to June, 1946. The insurgents were willing to abandon their independence if the Chinese government would grant them autonomy. The Chinese negotiators were willing to permit the Ili regime to retain its armed forces as a peace preservation corps if the Chinese could have top military command and full authority in Sinkiang's diplomatic affairs.

Finally a settlement was reached in the summer of 1946. An agreement was signed providing for a reconciliation between the Chinese authorities and the rebel leaders. Attached to the agreement were two codicils concerning the reform of the provincial government and reorganization of the armed forces. The terms of the settlement also contained provisions for the election of district officials by adult suffrage and for the formation of a provincial government composed of men, some of whom were appointed by the Chinese government and some nominated by the provincial delegates. The use of the Uighur and Kazakh languages was permitted in schools and in the army. To implement the agreement, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as governor. Burkhan Shahidi, a Uighur, and Akhmejan Kasimi, a Kazakh, were appointed vice-chairmen of the provincial administration. A determined effort was made to improve the government and to give the local people a greater voice in political affairs.

175 668 669 578 563 However, realization of these agreements, which would have given the non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang a large measure of self-government, was delayed and hamstrung by distrust and hostility on both sides. The military commanders and the diehard Kuomintang party members were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives to the native leaders; the extremist native leaders were impatient and uncompromising. In February, 1947, the more contentious elements, led by Akhmejan Kasimi, issued a statement, known as the Kulja Declaration. It denounced the supremacy of one nationality (the Chinese) over the other nationalities of Sinkiang, and called for the unification of all the races of Sinkiang under a native government. Adopting a moderate attitude, Chang Chih-chung issued a statement declaring that, while Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic government, the pattern of the government should be based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen rather than on Soviet ideas.

175 563 578 [635] The pressure on Chang Chih-chung from both sides became so intense that in May, 1947, he resigned and was succeeded by a Uighur, Maksud(Masud) Sabri. Maksud's appointment accentuated the clash of interest between rival factions in Sinkiang. The Uighur people generally supported him since he was one of them although he had spent many years of his life abroad. However, some of the more articulate popular groups denounced him vociferously and a majority of the members in the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing his nomination. In July, shortly after confirmation of his appointment, the Kulja delegation, headed by vice-chairman Akmejan Kasimi, withdrew. However, in a statement from Kulja (released in November) they denied that they had any intention of seceding from China and declared that they would return if their demands, including the removal of Maksud, were met. Since to dismiss Maksud so soon after his appointment in order to please the Kazakhs, would alienate the Uighurs, the National Government procrastinated and a deadlock resulted.

175 578 648 Meanwhile the Kulja faction itself was split by dissensions. Osman Batur defected. He and his men were incorporated into the Nationalist Army and stationed at Pei-ta-shan (Baitik Bogdo) close to the border of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, claiming this region as its own, invaded in 1948 and penetrated a hundred miles into Chinese territory until they were checked by Osman Batur who was acclaimed as a hero throughout China. The dispute finally reached the United Nations without a satisfactory settlement.

175 578 669 668 [635] By December, 1948, matters in Sinkiang had reached such an impasse that Maksud Sabri was removed and the governorship of Sinkiang was given to Burkhan Shahidi, another Uighur, who was vice-chairman of the provincial government and a middle-of-the-roader. During the first part of 1949 the Communist advance in China itself turned the attention of the National Government away from Sinkiang. In September, Saifuddin Azizi, a leader of the Kulja coalition, went to the Communist capital as a delegate to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and he brought word of the submission of the Ili faction to the Chinese Communists. Chang Chih-chung, whom the National Government sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists, also surrended and exerted his influence to persuade the officials in Sinkiang to join the Communist bandwagon. By the end of September, when Communist troops under Wang Chen pushed through the Kansu Corridor, the governor of Sinkiang, Burkhan, and the military commander, T'ao Chih-yueh, in separate telegrams, offered their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Government. A few days later, Communist troops reached and occupied Urumchi.

1:: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

S N

B. Population Problems

563 578 669 648 175

1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

Of the many problems in regard to the population of Northwest China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems and the Chinese, together with its international complications, is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia - both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the 1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley, west of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial, political and economic demands in the provinces, i.e., free trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

S 648 Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and China. (See Foreign Relations).

S

2. The Uighur Autonomy

642 177 [668] Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

S 167 708 466 A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction program and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands, are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border areas. (See: Labor).

S 642 668 177 "Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang, the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955). Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955, seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

642 668 177 it was announced that altogether 1,000 officials from the same offices (the majority of them Party and Youth Corps members of whom one tenth are higher officials), will be transferred to Sinkiang to serve in the Regional County and Ch'ü offices and in the Economic Projects. (People's Daily, August 21, 1955).

The politico-economical development of Sinkiang follows the same pattern as that of the interior of China. All the detailed facts of using Chinese in party meetings, introducing a new currency in place of Sinkiang currency, etc., show that Autonomous Sinkiang is an integral part of China. The sufferers in the whole process are the aboriginal inhabitants of Sinkiang for they are expected to make the greatest sacrifices, greater even than those of the population of the rest of China, for the economic and military strengthening of the Communist world.

668 631 177 162 At the beginning of the new regime in 1949, Sinkiang was called (as it had been under the Nationalist Government) a province - divided into ten special districts and these were subdivided into seventy-nine counties. In 1954, Five Autonomous "Chou" were established. Four of them were established in July, 1954. They contain three counties each, while the former special Districts contained, on an average, ten counties each. The population of three of these Autonomous "Chou" is 57,000, 98,000 and 135,000. Three of the Autonomous "Chou" were Mongolian and the other two were Moslem. In November, 1954, the largest Autonomous "Chou" was established in the Ili Valley, called the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Area with a population of 70,000 (P.D. December 6, 1954, or NCNA December 2, 1954).

On September 20, 1955, it was stated that the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was to replace "Sinkiang Province." It was also announced that the establishment of the smaller Autonomous "Chou" within Sinkiang had now been concluded with the establishment of five Autonomous Chou and six Autonomous Counties (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 14, 1955).

In fact, however, the population in these Autonomous Chou and Autonomous Counties does not exceed 500,000, which is less than one tenth of the total population of Sinkiang which is officially set at 4,780,000 people. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 15, 1955). Thus the extension of autonomous rule is limited - a sign that the erection of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Area itself has only a token significance in spite of the fact that the Uighurs number 3.6 million constituting seventy to eighty percent of the total population of the province.

631 131 668 177 The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is not an easily accessible area. In the past, its geographical isolation has been aggravated by the seclusion policy of the Communist regime for

S
631 political and military reasons. After the last British Consulate
131 of Kashgar was closed, the curtain has become even more
668 impenetrable there than in any other part of China. Not even
172 Chinese are allowed to travel into Sinkiang without special
(648) permits.

N F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation
167 The Northwest Region has been long regarded by the Chinese
185 as one of the major outlet areas for China's overpopulation. Once the plans to conserve water and soil are completed - especially along the Yellow River in Shensi and Kansu - arable land will be considerably extended. But water and soil conservancy will involve a lot of problems before the land is actually made productive - not to mention that its sustaining capacity is limited. Therefore the Northwest as an outlet for China's overpopulation is tentative and should only be regarded as a
N partial and temporary solution.

311 1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy
185 According to plan the irrigated area in the mid-Yellow River Basin will grow from 12,717,000 acres at present to some 19,105,000 acres. Agricultural output in the irrigated area will more than double. Annual grain output will increase by 6,741,000 long tons and cotton by 590,000 long gons. The loess regions with their barren mountains and desolate gullies covering 143,000 square miles, will become a land of plenty. Most of the land for irrigation development under the project will be in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. ("China's Sorrow" Will Be No More - The Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, by Li Jui, People's China, August 6, 1955, p. 9-15).

S The area of arable land in Sinkiang has also been extended,
311 but it is not easy to ascertain by how much or by what means.
185 In 1953 it had reached twenty million mou, 4,100,000 more than in 1949 (PD. August 28, 1955); in 1954 more than 5,000,000 mou above 1949, i.e. a total of 21 million mou (KM. September 15, 1955; by 1955 22 million mou (PD. October 31, 1955).

According to the above figures, the increase between 1949 and 1955 would be six million mou. But there appear some discrepancies with other information. The difficulty is that the 1950 data for the extension of arable land in Sinkiang was not 16 million but 18.195 million mou (Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, p. 25, 1950). Thus if the present data are reliable, the 1949-55 increase would be three million mou instead of six million, of which 1,100,000 mou are due to the labor of the Army Agrarian Production Troops.

S According to official reports, in 1953, 1.6 million tons of
433 food stuffs were produced in Sinkiang (PD. August 28, 1955). About the production in 1954, it is known that there was an

II. The Turkic People of the Northwest

563 A. The New Uighurs (or Eastern Turks)

101 The Turks of Sinkiang call themselves after the cities where
they live, e.g. Kashgarlik, Turfanlik, Kuchalik, etc.... After
[668] the Communist Revolution the Communists introduced the term
Uighurs for the Eastern Turks, living in the Ili District. The term
563 later was adopted by the Chinese.

1. Physical characteristics

144 In one sense the Eastern Turks are the descendants of the old
[167] Uighurs who migrated to present day Sinkiang during the ninth cen-
[175] tury A.D., Later they had mixed with Indo-european tribes and
other Turkish tribes of the Chagatai Ulus (empire) and to a small
degree also with the Mongols. Thus, in the terminology employed
by E. Frhr. von Eickstedt, "Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der
Menschheit, Stuttgart, 1934, the Eastern Turks show many europid
and some turanid racial characteristics, and only a slight degree
of mongoloid traits.

142 A more detailed description of the average physical type of
Eastern Turkestan is as follows: dark hair and eyes, (sometimes
141 lighter occasionally blue eyes), white or yellowish skin with some-
563 times a slight inclination to brown, middle or tall stature, on the
average 1680-1700 mm., with a tendency toward obesity. The
head is definitely brachycephalic with a length-width index of 85-
87, a longish-oval face, with wide cheek-bones, a straight and
rather prominent nose, eyes lacking the mongoloid fold, and everted
lips.

2. Economy

433 The main occupations of the Eastern Turks are horticulture,
563 agriculture and animal husbandry. The Eastern Turks breed camels,
horses, sheep, and goats. They are famous for their fertile fruit-
orchards, which are mostly artificially irrigated. Handicraft is
fairly developed, but has no economic significance.

3. Religion

771 The Eastern Turks are Moslems, adherents of the Sun sect.
563 However, they display an attitude towards religion. This does
[793] not refer to the leading religious clergy who form a kind of a gen-
try together with the nobility of the rich landowners.

4. Social organization

178 In contrast to the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, the Eastern
614 Turks have lost their clan system and tribal organization com-
563 pletely. There is no antagonism between the Eastern Turks and
186 the remaining Turkic tribes, although the nomadic Turkic tribes
563 exhibit some contempt of the Eastern Turks. However, there is
an old and remarkable hatred between the Turks and the Chinese,
due partly to the greater efficiency and industriousness of the Chi-
nese.

212 5. Literature

563 a. literacy

The Eastern Turks still use the Arabic script. Until recently
[668] there was at least 95 per cent illiteracy. The Communist regime
apparently has successfuly attempted to fight illiteracy.

b. literature and folklore

538 Since Chagatai times the Eastern Turks have been the bearers
178 of an amazing literature and folklore. For over a hundred years,
563 this intellectual life has been declining. Now nothing remains but
primitive samples of that literature which was so famous and influential upon various Turkic peoples.

101 B. The Taranchis

The Taranchis are ethnically, linguistically, culturally and
563 genetically the same as the Eastern Turks. Those New-Uighurs
175 who were defeated by the Chinese at the middle of the 18th century
and fled to the Russian part of the Ili Area, the Russians called
Taranchi, a name that has remained ever since.

C. The Kazakhs

1. Origin and physical characteristics

Prior to the Russian Revolution the Kazakhs were called Kirghiz. Many times they are referred to as Kazakh-Kirghiz, or Kirghiz-Kazakhs or Kirghiz-Kaisaks. The original homeland of the Kazakhs was southern Siberia between the Yenisei River and the Ob River. According to Abulgazi and Rashideddin the Kazakhs were a very small tribe which expanded after the Mongolian conquest and after frequent mergings with Mongolian clans. This
[144] explains why the Kazakhs resemble the Mongols so much. In fact
80 per cent of the anthropological features of the Kazakhs are
[142] mongoloid, i.e. a strong and square-built trunk with relatively
short legs, wide and round heads; in profile only a slight curvature of the occiput (back part of the head) can be seen; the face is wide and flat, high cheek-bones, and typical mongolian eyelid, the nose is flat, hair and eyes are black or brown, the lower jaw is wide and strongly built.

2. Social organization

a. the khanate

563 The Kazakh hordes first belonged to the Chagatai Empire and
175 later to the Golden Horde. During the sixteenth century they formed
619 their own Kazakh Khanate.

b. the tribes

563 The Kazakhs living in Sinkiang belong mostly to the Orta Dzhuz
619 (middle horde), consisting of the following five main tribes: (1) Atagni, (2) Naiman, (3) Argin, (4) Uvak-Girei and (5) Kipchak.

c. the clans

[614] The clan organization among the Kazakhs is very well preserved.

563 summer comes, they take their cattle way up on the pastures of
361 the mountains. The winter forces them to descend and to spend
233 some months in the more protected valleys.

4. Religion

563 The Kirghiz are Moslems of the Sunna Sect. Their script is
771 Arabic and is known only by noblemen or clergy. The only Moslem
[212] rule which is strictly observed is that of abstaining from eating
[262] pork.

5. Changes under Chinese Communist rule

563 In order to fight illiteracy the new Chinese Communist Govern-
871 ment erected schools for the Turks of Sinkiang in almost all villages,
668 towns and cities. The Chinese claim also that the process of making
177 them sedentary has brought remarkable progress to the Kirghiz.

E. The Uzbeks

563
1. Physical characteristics

[369] Only a few thousand Uzbeks live in Sinkiang, and they live ex-
clusively in the cities. Outwardly they are utterly different from
[142] the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, since they represent the alpine,
europide and Iranian type of Turk. They show long, narrow faces,
[141] heavy hair growth, brown, sometimes blue, eyes, no Mongolian
fold, sharp prominent noses, white skin, body height 1700 to
1840 mm. Mongoloid features rarely can be found. In most cases
Uzbek are the same physical type as the peasants of the European
Alps.

2. Economic activities

[463] The Uzbeks live as merchants, inn-owners, and craftsmen in
[369] Sinkiang cities. They are more educated than any other Turkish
[871] tribe of Central Asia, since they have absorbed a great deal of
Persian culture. Many Uzbeks speak Persian as a second language;
[191] and Chinese as a third (like the Eastern Turks), while Kirghiz and
Kazakhs know only their mother tongue.

3. Religion

[771] The Uzbeks are Moslems of the Sunna sect. Kirghiz and Kazakhs
call the Uzbeks Sart, which simply means Turks who broke away
from their nomadic way of life and became merchants.

4. Origin and linguistic affiliation

The Uzbeks, living in Sinkiang came from Soviet Uzbekistan.
[101] They received their name from Ozbek, a fourteenth century Khan
of the Golden Horde.

[197] The Uzbek language can be considered as the direct descendant
of the Chagatai written language. Even today the difference between
written Uzbek and the Chagatai language is very small.

F. The Salars

[131]
1. Physical characteristics

The Salars live in Hsun-hua-t'ing on the right bank of the

212 177 In 1940 the Taranchis of the Ili valley, especially those living in Russian territory, abandoned Latin script in favor of Russian script. There is no doubt that in several years Russian script will have replaced Arabic script among the Turks of Sinkiang. This statement is based upon three reasons: 1) in 1917, at the time of the Soviet revolution the Eastern Turks of Soviet territory established a new literary language, the so-called New Uighur literary language. Soviet scholars in Moscow determined the final form of the grammar, vocabulary, and orthography of the new language and also determined the type of literature which could be published. Undoubtedly this will influence the literature of the [668] Eastern Turks. 2) The forthcoming Turkish nationalism will consider any achievement in this direction as a national aim rather than as an element of secondary sovietization. 3) The Chinese Communist government is contemplating the replacement of the Mongolian and the Arabic alphabets by the Russian.

104 114

F. Tables of Transcriptions

Table I. The scientific systems of transcription for Eastern Turkish used by Radloff, Le Coq, Hartmann, Kunos, Raquette, and the API (Association Phonetique Internationale)

Radloff [illegible]	Le Coq	Hartmann	Kunos	Raquette	API
i	i	i [illegible]	i, e	i	i
ü	ü	ü [illegible]	ü	ü	ü
e [illegible]	e [illegible]	e [illegible]	e [illegible]	e	e
ö	ö	[illegible]	ö	ö	ö
ä [illegible]	ä [illegible]	ä	ä	ä	[illegible]
a	a	a	a	a	a
—	[illegible]	ı, ė, y, i	ı, ė	[illegible]	ı
—	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
u	—	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
u	u	u	u	u	u
o	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	o [illegible]	o ɔ
				[illegible]	[illegible]
—	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
				—	[illegible]

S
563 In administering the khoshun, the khoshun-u jasak appoints an aide
631 who is called tusalakchi taiji. The administration of the military
affairs of a khoshun rests in the hands of the jakirokchi and his
aide who is called meiren-i janggin. After the death of the khoshun-
S u jasak his eldest son inherits the title and position. The aristo-
[565] cracy and the clergy are highly respected by the kara kümün. The
members of the Oirat aristocracy belong to very old Mongolian
clans "otoks" which repeatedly had intermarried with Manchu or
S Tibetan aristocratic clans.

• [668] The Communist Governm ent in Peking has abolished the rights
[565] and titles of the Mongol aristocracy of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu.
[177]

C. The Nomadic Tibetans

N
*563 In terms of race, religion, language and origin, the nomadic
and the sedentary Tibetans are fundamentally one people. Yet the
184 great difference in subsistance economy has produced too many
distinctive cultural traits to permit discussion of the Chinghai
Tibetans as a whole. In recognition of this cleavage, the seden-
tary Tibetans will be discussed separately as part of the general
sedentary population.

N
*563 The basic unit of social organization is the encampment or
"tent-circle" comprising a group of households from five to eighty
621 or more, who band together for cooperation and protection. Within
[592] the encampment the households may represent related families
but this is not necessarily the case. Frequently the encampment's
population will have been augmented by sedentary Tibetans who
have chosen life in the steppes. Moreover, changes in affiliation
do occur, so that one or more tents from one group may secede
N and join another encampment. According to Ekvall (1939) most
[622] frequently the actual authority rests in the hands of the rgan-po
(elders), who are men of substance and influence. There also is
an individual titular head, formally selected, who acts as spokes-
man for the group.

N
*563 Membership in the individual black tent consists of the man,
his wife and their offspring. If the sons are married, they and
592 their wives sometimes are included as members of the tent.
Occasionally also the husband of a daughter will live with his wife's
people. However, a statistical survey by Yü Hsiang-wen revealed
that 38 per cent of the tents housed a nuclear family. In addition
to those linked by birth and marriage, the tent's members may
include one or several servants or hanger-on who help in the work
in return for the protection and hospitality of the tent. Perhaps
N it would be more accurate to say that the tent's inhabitants con-
[562] sist of the woman and her husband because the wife is the master
[422] of the tent and of its contents, just as she is the master of the
products of the herds, although the husband owns the tent and the
000 herds. In those cases where a man has more than one wife, each

S /The New Uighurs/

563 individual and the community. Natural resources to not seem
178 to be of prime importance in Sinkiang. However, their exploita-
[31] tion through free or forced labor will further break down Uighur
S kinship ties and thereby alter the social structure. In recent
[464] times large numbers of non-Uighur laborers have been intro-
duced into the area, further augmenting alien cultural elements.

S
563 Uighurs participating in small-scale home industries and
438 handicrafts are organized under the leadership of a Chong-usta.
622 Unlike the merchant's "guild" aqsaqal, he is not a public official.

S Under the Manchu system the Bäks (communal leaders) were
563 classed in five degrees of rank, ranging from the third to the
554 seventh degree of the Chinese official scale. 1. Ak'im Bäk -
[631] local governor; 2. Ishkhan Bäk - Assistant Governor; 3. Shang
[647] Bäk - Collector of Revenue; 4. Katsanatch'i Bäk - same as
[692] above; 5. 'Hatze Bäk - Judge; 6. Mirabu Bäk - Superintendent
of Agriculture.

S As discussed previously, the Mirabu Bäk was also the offi-
[312] cial having authority over water rights and water distribution.
In practice the Manchu Amban, highest Manchu official in a given area, chose the Ak'im Bäk who, in turn, chose his own subordinates.

S
563 Farm units were organized as follows: Ten such units were
241 lead by an On-bashi, fifty by an Illik-bashi, one hundred by an
554 Yüz-bashi. The duties of the Bäks and Yüz-bashis mainly con-
sisted of keeping and collecting registers and taxes. This governmental organization was abolished officially by the Chinese Revolution in 1911. However, traces of this structure are still found today.

S
563 The whole Uighur social structure certainly will undergo
far-reaching changes under the Communist government. How-
● 668 ever, at this time only hypotheses about these changes can be
177 advanced. As new cultural and political structures are imposed on the society, kinship ties will be further loosened. The Uighur communisty and its structure will take on new characteristics, as old institutions disappear and new ones are introduced. Except, perhaps, for the nuclear family, social groupings will be brought more and more into accordance with the new ideals of the society. G

N ~~B.~~ The Sedentary Tibetans

*563 Much that has been said about the nomadic Tibetans holds
equally true for their sedentary counterparts. Again the basic
[592] unit is the group of families living together. In the sedentary
[361] community, the village may be composed of from a dozen to
seventy, eighty or even more houses arranged adjacent to
N each other. The roofs of the normally two-storied buildings
[342] are close enough to form a pathway, and are used as such.

S N 563 763 769

making of a will, the giving of alms, rites at the grave, and the recitation of prayers and giving of alms on certain days after death, and on the first, second and third anniversaries.

S N 563 764

The Moslems have their own burial grounds. The mounds raised over the graves are rectangular, not round as in the case of the Chinese. The top of the filled grave must be at least five inches (half a Chinese foot) above the surrounding earth, lest the location be forgotten. A stone may be erected in front of the grave, but the name of the deceased may not be engraved upon it.

S N 563 796

e. Festivals and holidays

Many of the religious festivals are more pagan than Moslem, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar. Their celebrations are merely popular gatherings for feasting and enjoyment.

The Moslem New Year (Yengi Yil) celebrates the breaking of the Ramadan fast. The festival takes place during the first three days of the tenth month by the Moslem calendar. Special services are held in the mosques. The people bathe and dress in their best clothes. It is a time of greeting, well-wishing, feasting, visiting and gift-giving. For the Moslems and the Chinese alike, the New Year celebration is the greatest holiday of the year.

S N 563 795 668 177

5. Present day conditions

According to a speech delivered by Burkhan, chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the China Islamic Association, at the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, on October 18, 1952, the Islam religion as well as the customs and habits of its followers are fully respected by the Communist regime. Chinese Moslems are free to practice their faith without interference. It is also said that official circulars from Peking have ordered the people to continue the observance of their important festivals. The tax on the slaughter of cattle for Moslem consumption is abolished, and official holidays are granted on Moslem holidays.

S N [423]

In accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, the mosques may retain their land holdings if the local populace so desire. It is also reported that when the land reform movement was carried out in the Northwest, the land of the mosques was in most cases left untouched. There was also a report of an organized Hajji to Mecca in 1952, which for reasons unknown failed to reach its goal. Special government regulations give Moslem workers in public organizations and educational institutions time off on the more important religious festival days. In military units, factories and schools, consideration is also given to the habits and customs of cadres, soldiers, workers and students of the Moslem faith.

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

I. The Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang

563 A. General Introduction

517 The artistic and intellectual expressions of the peoples of
Sinkiang vary greatly from those of the people of China proper.
The culture of the Eastern Turkis is influenced greatly by
Islamic civilization, and constitutes a culturally integral part
of Turkestan as a whole.

563 The artistic and intellectual creative achievements are con-
tained in the vast written and oral literature of the Turkic
517 people, in their extensive folklore, folk music and dance. The
53 arts of painting and sculpture are a tradition of the past, and
545 have scarcely been practiced since the conversion of the Turkic
people to Islam. Turkic theatre, with the exception of shadow
[177] theatre, was virtually unknown in Sinkiang prior to the Com-
[268] munist era. The Communists have introduced dramatic art into
Eastern Turkestan, the modern theatrical productions being on
the Soviet model for drama among national minorities.

563 "Unfortunately, contact with Europe and the natural inter-
course with the neighboring state of Russia are gradually de-
517 stroying these beautiful arts and crafts which have been pre-
53 served here from earlier times" (Le Coq, Albert von, Buried
177 Treasures of Eastern Turkestan, p. 41). Most of the various
forms of art and intellectual expression of the people of Sinkiang
are today in a state of decline. The contact with industrialized
Russia and the intellectual atmosphere created by the Commun-
ist regime have produced unfavorable circumstances for the
further development of the Eastern Turki artistic and intellec-
tual expression. The important works of art are to be found in
the already accumulated artistic creations.

B. Turkic Literature and Oral Art

563 The literary heritage of Eastern Turkestan is not limited
538 alone to the works produced in this geographical area, but en-
compasses also much of the Turkic literature produced in other
parts of Inner Asia as well as much of the Islamic literature.
Little of the Eastern Turki literature is completely original and
particular to this area alone; most of it being the common heri-
tage of the Turks as a whole and some of it common to the
other believers in Islam.

The earliest important literary achievements known to us in
[175] Eastern Turkestan were written in the Uighur language and date
back to pre-Islamic times. These literary documents are re-

563 the Kazakh Khanate, its disintegration, and the struggles
538 against other national groups. The epos is carried from generation to generation orally, mostly by the traveling bards.

The Kirghiz have recently collected many of their epic poems to constitute a huge national epos. The most popular epos in this collection is Manas, which is primarily concerned with the struggle of the Kirghiz against the Kalmuks in the seventeenth century. It has strong Moslem elements, and the struggle for freedom is depicted largely as a religious battle between the believers and the infidels.

563 C. Novel and Drama under the Communists
538 The Western forms of the novel and drama have been intro-
177 duced to Sinkiang since the Communist conquest. The new fic-
668 tion produced and published in the area does not differ much from that of China proper, except in such minor details as place names or names of persons. The literature at the present time follows the definite "party lines" decided upon in Peking. It attacks all ideas which are foreign to the party ideology, and familiarizes the readers with the new concepts of Communist ideology. The tasks set for the cultural work in Peking are as follows: ". . . to develop positively the struggle against the mistaken thought of the bourgeoisie on the cultural front, to reorganize systematically the ranks of the cultural workers, to strengthen the study of political and art theories, to elevate the ideological and art levels of the cultural workers, to develop creation further. . . to penetrate deep into the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and to bring about the vigorous, over-all and penetrative implementation of the line of simplicity and economy so that cultural work may be made to give better service to the Socialist construction and transformation of the country." (Jen-min jih-pao, March 27, 1955.)

The content and style of literary works follows definite trends established in Moscow and copied by Peking. It is not what is known as "art for art's sake," but the literary expression and creativity are diverted to definite purposes decided upon by the Party. Writers are not free to express what they feel or believe; their subjects are chosen for them, and they must follow patterns set by the Party. "Books on art and literature, as well as literary works, have been translated into minority languages to guide the creative efforts of the numerous minority artists." (China Monthly Review, February, 1952, p. 193). There is no doubt that literary expression has been reduced to mere propaganda. The literature is far from being the true folk art of the people of Sinkiang; it is being written by expert propagandists, familiar with all the current party lines.

Many of the books designed for reading by the masses are

563 produced in Peking. A report from Peking on January 3, 1955,
538 states that "some 200 books in more than 1.64 million copies
177 were put out in 1954 in Peking in the languages of the minority
668 peoples. They were published by the Nationality Publishing
House for use among the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh
[214] and Korean peoples. These books include works on revolutionary theory, novels, and translations of Soviet literature. This total does not include books published by the many printing houses of the various minority areas." (Peking, NCNA, January 5, 1955, 1607 GMT-W.)

D. Artistic Expression

175 The period prior to the introduction of Islam produced the
532 great works of art in Eastern Turkestan. The Shamanistic, Buddhist and Nestorian civilizations which were dominant in Eastern Turkestan in this period encouraged the religious expression through the mediums of painting and sculpture.

175 Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century,
532 European scholars went to Eastern Turkestan to explore the
172 ruined cities which had long been buried under the sands, and which contained many of the pre-Islamic artistic treasures. It is through the efforts of these scholars that we have most of our present information on the subject. Among the best known of these explorers, who carried out extensive expeditions in Sinkiang, were Sir Aurel Stein, Professor Albert Grünwedel and Albert von le Coq of the National Ethnological Museum in Berlin and Paul Pelliot.

Although the Chinese Government was quite tolerant at first
[648] and allowed these archaeological works and expeditions to take place, it later became concerned with the fact that so many cases full of artistic treasures were being shipped out of the country. From then on, the Chinese Government tried to put as many official difficulties in the way of these explorers as they could, and discouraged further efforts in this direction.

532 The important artistic discoveries were made at the follow-
172 ing sites: near Khotan, the past capital of an ancient kingdom, at the oasis of Dandan Oilik, and at Rawak where a Buddhist shrine was found, and also in the twin oases of Turfan and Karakhoja, which proved to be extremely rich in artistic remains.

Most of the remaining structures which were fully or partially preserved are of an obviously religious character. They are usually shrines, temples, burial monuments, or various parts of monastic establishments. Most of them are products of Buddhist religious expression. Some buildings display the remains of Nestorian Christian and Manichaean murals. Manu-
[538] scripts were discovered in these sites which confirmed the simultaneous existence of these religions in the area for several centuries.

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

Khotan is the most famous of the cities in Sinkiang in the
286 production of the famous oriental rugs, in needlework and also
531 in metal works (Kashgar and Yarkand are also important cen-
177 ters of rug weaving). The design of many of the rugs is a most interesting mixture of Persian and Chinese styles. The whole treatment is unmistakeably Persian, though many small details are Chinese. The same blending of the Far with the Near East is found in the beautiful embroidery of Khotan. The stitch chiefly used in the embroidery is the Turkish chain stitch, which is not found in the embroidery in China, but the wave and cloud patterns, the butterflies and some of the flowers are def-
328 initely of Chinese design. Khotan is also famous for its crafts-
531 manship in brass and copper household utensils decorated with
415 elaborate floral designs in pierced metal work.

Kuch in the north has been famous for generations for the
286 gold and silver embroidery on velvet. Women's indoor caps are
294 the chief article of manufacture. The design as a whole is Per-
531 sian, but the use of circular medallions in embroidery on robes
(177) is a Chinese device.

There has been a tremendous decline in all these works of
53 art and articrafts in the present century, mainly because of the
517 availability of factory-manufactured cheap objects of daily use,
177 from both Russia and China proper. Thus, the carpets of
178 Khotan and the surrounding country are slowly disappearing, and their quality has gone down. The expensive handmade items are replaced by the cheap materials provided by modern industry. The class of artists and artisans has declined, since it is impossible for them to compete with new imported products.

The artistic expressions inspired by the new Communist re-
517 gime are totally different from the old indigenous ones. They
532 center around paintings and statues glorifying the present-day
177 leaders, and describing episodes from the life of the newly "li-
668 berated" working class. Nothing could be more foreign to the spirit and traditions of the Eastern Turkis.

E. Music and Dance

533 The taste for music and dance is highly developed in Sin-
527 kiang, and it constitutes the main means of entertainment for important social occasions. There are professional musicians (maghmatchi) organized in bands of three or four individuals, available for hire. At many public feasts, a band is hired for entertainment. The musicians chant as they play their instruments. The tunes are simple, composed primarily for accompaniment to the dance, or, more often, improvised. To the Western-trained ear, both tune and rhythm are monotonous.

534 Most of the musical instruments used in these bands are of
(177) Persian origin. Grenard lists the following instruments:

Doutar—a long guitar with two strings.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

534 Sitar—very similar to the doutar, but has nine strings which are played with a bow.

Tambur—consisting of five strings that are plucked with the fingers.

Rbab—longer than the previously mentioned instruments, a sort of mandolin with five strings along the front of the instrument and five others of different lengths along the side.

Hechtar—a guitar with eight strings.

Ney—a pipe with eight holes.

Surney—a copper trumpet.

Sipay—antelope horn with iron rings.

Dop—a drum.

Kalun—a kind of psaltery (ancient stringed instrument) made of a wooden box on which eighteen pairs of brass wires are strung, supported by wooden pads, regulated by fixed keys at the side. (The Chinese have a similar instrument, and it is possible that the kalun was brought from China.)

535 The dance is performed by both men and women. Each usually dances by himself, although a man and woman may dance together. They sing as they dance. The dance is fiery and rhythmic. The body sways continuously and the arms play a very important part in expressing the mood of the dancer. When a number of women perform together, they usually form a circle and exchange places. They sometimes arrange themselves in a double line or in pairs, each person dancing in her own place. Like the Turkic music, the dance steps seem dull and unvaried to the unaccustomed Western observer.

(174) (114) This form of dance is quite unknown in the Moslem parts of Western Asia, and would be highly frowned upon. Le Coq is of the opinion that these dances were probably inherited from the old pre-Islamic times.

533 535 177 668 The arts of folk dance and music have been promoted by the Communists as part of their program of nationality cultural activities and expressions. The professional teams of dancers and musicians perform often in the different National Festivals in China and also abroad. More than encouraging the performance of the existing folk dances and music, the Communists have been promoting the creation of the new "folk dance" and "folk music," to express the new era of liberation. A sample of the results obtained is to be found in the following excerpts from so-called Uighur folk songs:

[539) "You have made our land a lovely garden, Mao Tse-tung,
You are the inspiration of our life, Mao Tse-tung,
We know you have our welfare at heart, Mao Tse-tung,
You are the saviour of our people, Mao Tse-tung,
Long live Mao Tse-tung!
Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! H-u-r-r-a-h!"

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

S
533 "Play your dunbra, dance and sing,
535 People of different nationalities are now closely knit,
177 Let's sing the praise of Mao Tse-tung,
● 668 Ai, let's sing of Mao Tse-tung!
Our beautiful fields and gardens, our dear native land!"
(Songs of New China, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953.)

II. Artistic and Intellectual Expression among the Tibetans of Northwest China

N A. Introduction

*563 Chinghai is the most heavily Tibetan-populated area in North-west China. Culturally, it is very much a part of Tibet proper,
177 although being a border region, its Tibetan inhabitants have
53 come often into close contact with the Chinese and have been
greatly influenced by them. The most famous of the Tibetan
N cultural centers in the area are the Kumbum and Labrang
[792] monasteries, where much traditional Lamaist literature and art have
been found and are still being produced. The great majority of the Tibetans in the area, however, are members of nomadic tribes, who are largely ignorant of the many cultural treasures of the monasteries. These tribes are the seat of Tibetan folk cultures—song, dance and epic literature. (The distinction between the strictly religious artistic and intellectual expressions and the unwritten folk culture is present through Tibet, and is not peculiar to this area alone.)

N B. Tibetan Literature

*563 Tibetan literature is almost exclusively religious in charac-
538 ter. It centers around the religious Buddhist texts translated
779 from Sanskrit into Tibetan, and attempts to explain them, analyze them, relate the lives of saints, eulogize convents and glorify events which are an expression of religious feelings.
N There are not many secular works, as traditionally the culture
[792] was, and has largely remained, the privilege of the monks. The center of Tibetan culture is to be found in the monasteries, and the scholars are the lamas reared and trained in these institutions.

N The Lamaist scriptures, which are faithful translations
*[175] from Sanskrit texts (Indian, Kashmiri and Nepalese), and a few also from Chinese, were made mostly in the eighth and ninth, eleventh and thirteenth centuries A.D. None of these Tibetan translations, however, seem to have been printed until comparatively recent times.

The Lamaistic scriptures consist of two great collections, the canon and the commentaries (the kah-gyur and the Tan-gyur). The great code, the Kah-gyur, or "The Translated Com-

N
873 874 *668 177
Northwest Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine College, Lanchou, Kansu
Northwest Art College, Sian, Shensi
Northwest Medical College, Sian, Shensi
Northwest Russian Language Junior College
Tihua Russian Language School, Urumchi, Sinkiang
Kansu Industrial Junior College, Lanchou, Kansu

In July, 1952, these institutions held united entrance examinations at Sian and Nan-cheng, in Shensi; Lanchou and T'ien-shui in Kansu; Hsi-ning in Chinghai; Yin-ch'uan (Ninghsia); and Urumchi in Sinkiang. According to regulations, besides graduates from regular middle schools, candidates claiming to have "equivalent educational standards" were also admitted. Cadres were given special priority.

Subjects in the examinations were: Chinese, mathematics, chemistry, Chinese and foreign history and geography, physics, political common sense, biology and a foreign language (Russian or English). Cadres were exempted from the foreign language examination.

In 1952, the Communist government started a system of scholarships for every student in the institutions of higher education. This system was changed in October, 1955, and scholarships are now issued only selectively; children of party cadres and of the minority groups have priority.

S
874 668 177
In April, 1955, the Communists announced the establishment of Sinkiang Medical College at Urumchi. The professors were transferred there from the First Medical School in Shanghai. A New China News Agency report from Urumchi, dated April 19, 1955, reads:

"Sinkiang's new medical college has announced it is ready to enroll 250 students of various nationalities for the coming autumn term. A teaching staff of 100 including professors, lecturers and practicing physicians will arrive here from other parts of the country in June to take up their posts. The medical college is part of a scheme for building a medical center in this provincial capital of Sinkiang, where the inhabitants belong
S
[743]
mostly to national minorities. The project includes a 600-bed hospital and a clinic able to treat 800 patients daily. Construction of this 240,000 square meters medical center was started in July last year. The college authorities have arranged for studies to begin this year while building continues."

N
873 874 *668 177
The second group of schools includes the Yenan University in Yenan, Shensi, which became the Northwest People's Revolutionary University in 1949, and the Northwest School of Political and Legal Sciences in 1953. This kind of school is essentially a training center for cadres. The August First Agricultural College, the establishment of which was reported by Burkhan in

N
873 and Shensi. Of them 342 had attended the college to learn the
*563 spoken and written languages of the Mongols, Tibetans and
*668 Uighurs.

177 Sinkiang Nationality College has a different background. Be-
S
873 fore 1949 it had been a regular college, with about two hundred
563 students, three-fourths of whom were Chinese and the rest
668 minority nationalities. On October 1, 1950, the college was re-
177 named as Sinkiang Nationality College and reorganized into five departments, namely, agriculture and forestry, animal husbandry, education, law and medicine. The number of students doubled, 89.3 per cent being of the minorities. Because of the shortage of faculty and equipment, the two classes of the department of medicine were transferred to Lanchou University and to the Physicians' School of the Provincial Public Health Bureau in 1951. Furthermore, because of the shortage of cadres in every field in Sinkiang, the students still in college were also called out to serve in the various branches of the government.

S
In 1952, the college authorities proposed to add a two-year
[874] curriculum, with the aim of preparing teachers in the secondary schools in Sinkiang. The college was then divided into two parts, the college and the junior college. The college took in students at the level of a regular senior middle school and graduated them in two years. The junior college took in students at the level of a regular junior middle school and graduated them in one year. This included the re-education of middle school teachers already teaching.

This College of Education was organized into five departments, so together with the three original departments, agriculture and forestry, animal husbandry and law, and the newly added art and physical education department, there were now nine departments and thirty-two classes. The number of students increased to 878, including Uighur, Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tartar, Sibo, Solon, Mongol, Chinese, Manchu and Chinese Moslems. Nationality students outnumbered Chinese ten to one.

S
The college library had about fifty thousand volumes. The
873 shortage of faculty was serious. To solve the problem, the col-
217 lege depended upon students to teach students. Textbooks were
563 also a problem, which was partially solved by using textbooks
668 in Uzbek and Kazakh from the Soviet Union, and by re-editing and combining material from old Chinese textbooks and Soviet
177 books. Up to August 1953, this college had graduated more than 250 cadres. In 1955 the college had eight departments and thirteen hundred students. Ninety-six per cent of the students were from the minority nationalities. Among the faculty were 350 Soviet Russians. (NCNA, November 1, 1955.)

N
795 ance toward the Moslems may be as follows:
*668 1. The strong cohesiveness of the Moslems in China. Unlike
177 the followers of other faiths, such as Buddhism and Taoism, who were scattered and disorganized, the Moslems in China and in the border regions are strongly organized and, at times, have presented a united front toward their enemies. This was one of the first lessons learned by the Chinese Communists. For example, early in 1949 when the People's Liberation Army, on entering Peking, wanted to occupy one of the mosques, a crowd of Moslems immediately gathered at the entrance of the mosque, voicing belligerently their determination to defend it. It was only upon the intervention of the Commission of Nationality Affairs that the PLA agreed to drop its demands.

In view of the predominance of the Moslem population in the
N Northwest, especially in Sinkiang which is far from the locus of
795 Chinese Communist power and where Soviet influence was
*668 strong, the Chinese Communists were obliged to adopt a concil-
177 iatory, go-slow policy in order to bring the Moslems in line.

S 2. Instead of outright persecution, the Chinese Communists,
795 recognizing the traditional deference of the Moslems to their
● 668 leaders and their attachment to organizations, sought to control
177 them by winning over their leaders and dominating them indirectly through the agency of mass organizations. Of these mass organizations, two were especially designed for the control of the Moslem peoples as a religious faction: the China Islamic Association and the China Hui Cultural Association, both established in May 1953, and both predominantly staffed by Chinese Moslems (Hui or Dungans) instead of Moslems of other races.
S The chairman of the China Islamic Association is Burkhan,
[635] governor of Sinkiang (now chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region), who is apparently a figurehead. In the executive committee of the China Islamic Association, thirty-one of the forty members are Chinese Moslems and only four including Burkhan are Uighur. The China Hui Cultural Association, headed by Liu Ko-p'ing, is almost exclusively a Chinese Moslem organization.

The purpose of the China Islamic Association, stated Burkhan in a speech in October, 1952, was to assist the government to implement the policy of religious freedom and to include the representative figures of Moslem faith throughout the country. The vice chairmen of the association, Liu Ko-p'ing, Shaikh Nur Mohammad Ta Pu-sheng, Yussuf Ma Yü-huai, Ma Chien and Saifuddin, are all loyal Communist followers. In their speeches at the preparatory meeting of the association, July 27-31, 1952, Chang Hsi-jo, vice chairman of the Financial-Economic Commission of the GAC, and Ulanfu, vice chairman of the National-

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11

N 795 *668 177 ity Affairs Commission, both stressed that the aim of the association was to imbue its members with the love for the fatherland.

S 795 •668 177 In Sinkiang and other concentrations of Moslem population in China, branches of the China Islamic Association and the cultural associations established by the Communists, have supplemented the Islamic church, and the function of the Moslem dignitaries.

N 795 648 *668 177 3. A more important reason for the apparently tolerant attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Islam is the utilization of the Moslem leaders for the purpose of propaganda, both domestic and foreign. In a speech at the third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, October, 1951, Ma Chien declared: "I have received numerous letters from the ahungs in the Northwest and the Southwest regions expressing their desire to study and to reform themselves. In order to assist them to study the revolutionary ideas of Mao Tse-tung as well as to enable these theories to be universally made known to the people of the Middle East and North Africa, we have translated the following documents of the CPPCC: 'On New Democracy,' 'The Chinese Revolution and the CCP,' and the 'Important Documents of the CPPCC.'" (JMJP Nov. 2, 1951.)

The fact that the Chinese Communists intend to use the Moslem leaders to extend Chinese Communist propaganda to their co-religionists in the Middle East may be seen in the statement in the Jen-min jih-pao (June 6, 1952) that the religious leaders of the Northwest were aroused "to boundless sympathy and concern for the people of the Arab countries of the Middle East—Egypt and Iran—in their fight for national liberation and struggle against the United States and British imperialism and to adopt concerted action to support their struggle."

The first act of the preparatory committee of the Chinese Islamic Association was to assist the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Communist government in publicity work in the Arab countries. In August 1952, it organized a Chinese Hajji Mission to visit Mecca, which, for reasons unexplained, turned back upon reaching Pakistan without going on to its destination. However, two months later, many Moslem leaders from Asiatic countries were invited to attend the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Regions, held in Peking, during which Burkhan, chairman of the Association, at a reception to the Moslem delegates, told them that "our religion as well as our customs and habits are fully respected" by the Communist regime. His speech dwelt, however, more on the material benefits than on religious well-being of the people in the Northwest except to say that they were permitted to observe their festivals.

N [793] Deprived of their civil and judicial duties, the Moslem clergy

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

The demands of the natives of Sinkiang for independence were
795 accentuated in the 1930's by the introduction of pan-Islamic
● 668 ideals from India. These ideals for a union of Moslem peoples
which transcends national boundaries, fired the imagination of
the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang and bolstered their nationalistic
aspirations. As they served to mobilize Turkestanian nationalists
to oppose Nationalist rule in the 1940's, so they have inspired
Turkestanian resistance against the Communists since
795 1949. In speeches and in publications, the Communist leaders
668 have vehemently denounced pan-Islam as a major obstacle to the
policy of bringing the native peoples of Turkestan into the "great
177 family of nationalities" of Communist China.

Perhaps, because pan-Islam is still an incohate movement, having attractive and high-sounding goals but not the organization and strength to achieve these goals, the Chinese Communists, despite their denunciation of it, have not regarded it as a great threat in comparison to that of other religions, like, for example, the Roman Catholic Church, which have external ties. Consequently, in the first years of Communist rule,, they proclaimed a policy of benevolence toward the Moslems largely for the propaganda value of such a policy.

A number of Moslem fellow-travelers readily responded, and other Moslem leaders, out of self-interest, also acquiesced to the Communists. Still others hoped to carry on even under the narrow restrictions imposed upon them by the Communist government. The majority of the Moslem peoples of the Northwest, learning from the experience of their co-religionists in Soviet Central Asia, have evolved a way of life which is to live in the Communist world without becoming a part of it. Privately, they still regard themselves as belonging to the Moslem world.

795 A large number of the Moslems in Chinese Turkestan, following
798 the militant tradition of their forefathers, chose to resist
the Communists, and the Communists treated them, not as Moslems,
668 but as counter-revolutionaries. Consequently, while proclaiming
177 their policy of benevolence toward the Moslems, a
policy reserved for only those who submit, the Communists also
carried out a violent program of persecution. As soon as they
entered Sinkiang in 1949, the first act of the Chinese Communists
was to undermine the influence of the Moslem clergy. A
number of religious institutions were closed, and the landed
property of the clergy—the waqf—were confiscated. Chinese
[692] Communist judges took over the judicial functions of the qadi and
the people's courts took over the handling of criminal and civil
cases, while the so-claimed cultural cadres assumed the guidance
of the daily life of the people. The local branches of the
China Islamic Association and other mass organizations supplanted
the leadership of the Moslem clergy. With institution of

S
795 civil marriage, marriage and divorce ceased to be an important
798 function administered by the qadi.
• 668 Thousands of religious scholars and intellectuals, denounced
177 as counter-revolutionaries, were arrested. The people's courts
tried some thirty thousand Moslems, sentencing some to death
S [648] and others to life imprisonment. Soviet forces were reported to
[648] have joined the Chinese Communist troops in suppressing the
[669] anti-Communist uprisings, in which it is estimated that 130,000
Moslems were slaughtered, 260,000 sentenced to forced labor
and 150,000 fled from Sinkiang. [Figures based on Hikmah (Indonesian weekly), July 23, 1955, in Missionary Bulletin, January 1954, and report of Mochtar Gazali, member of the Executive Council of the Federation of Indonesian Moslem Labor, in Missionary Bulletin, July 1953.]

But the persecutions have failed to wipe out opposition from large segments of the Moslem population. As late as the spring of 1956, it was still charged that "counter-revolutionaries" were hiding in religious circles and "under the cloak of religion they carried out various kinds of destructive activities." (Report of Su Chen-yung, vice director of the Bureau of Public Security, Kansu People's Government, in Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956.)

N
B. Lamaism

795 792 *668 177 As was the case with Islam, the present regime has also tried to placate Lamaism as a device to attract the loyalties of the Lamaistic peoples, the Mongols and the Tibetans. Famous Lama temples were kept in a good state of repair. Lamaist priests and dignitaries received subvention and a certain restraint was shown toward interfering with strictly religious practices (for details see IMAR Handbook, Religion). More particularly, the two highest priests of Tibetan Lamaism, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, both 'teen-agers, by the way, were kept at Peking for long periods of time and shown around at international gatherings.

N 795 792 *563 *668 177 Attitudes toward Lamaism as a religion and an institution differ somewhat in the Mongolian and the Tibetan contexts. Generally speaking, it can be said that among the Mongols the influence of Lamaism was on the wane. Even among those Mongols who stuck to their traditions and maintained loyalty to their princes, there was a tendency to break loose gradually from the leading-strings of the Lamaseries. Already in pre-Communist times, progressive Mongols supported this movement. The Regent of the Alashan Mongols, for instance, had made it a rule to submit Lama novices to compulsory secular education and military training in order to educate them out of Lamaism. No reports are available on how Mongolian Lamas have reacted to

000 communities.

795 The Russian Orthodox Church in Sinkiang had quite a differ-
668 ent fate.[1] By 1938 the Vicariate of Urumchi comprised eight
177 parishes and counted fifteen thousand faithful. It was headed by
Mgr. Juvenal Kilm, who in the meantime has been promoted to
the Archbishopric of Omsk. Archpriest Dimitry Mlodzyanovky
is now active in Urumchi, and it is reported that the number of
believers is increasing.

---

[1] [In contrast to the Roman Catholic church in Northwest China, see pp. 359-361--Analyst]

N
204
*668
177

12. Chinghai jih-pao (Chinghai Daily), Hsi-ning, Chinghai. The Party paper in the province of Chinghai.

S
204
•668
177

13. Sinkiang jih-pao (Sinkiang Daily), Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang. An old paper taken over by the Communist Party after their conquest of Urumchi (Tihua). Now it is the leading Party paper in Sinkiang with a daily circulation of 330,000 copies. It is in Chinese.

14. Sinkiang Ch'ing-nien pao (Sinkiang Youth) Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang, organ paper of the Sinkiang New Democratic Youth League in Uighur.

15. T'ien Nan jih-pao (Southern Tien-Shan Daily), Kashgar, Sinkiang. A Party paper in the local area of southern Sinkiang.

16. Ili jih-pao, (Ili Daily) Ili, Sinkiang. First published on October 1, 1955, in Kazakh for the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou.

N
204
*668
177

Other papers, not presently identifiable must exist or have existed. In 1950, it was claimed that "except for Taiwan and Tibet, each of the 28 provinces of China has its own state-owned newspapers." (NCNA December 17, 1950). It might thus be assumed that there was also an official paper in Ninghsia.

S
204
668
177

Yolbars Khan wrote in 1954: "according to Communist official reports there were at the end of 1953, sixteen different newspapers in Sinkiang printed from lead types. Among these, eight were in Uighur, four in Kazakh, two in Chinese, one in Mongolian, and one in Manchu. (Chung-hua nien-pao, February, 1954, p. 54). A later report states that "In Sinkiang, there are now (September 20, 1955) thirteen newspapers published in five different languages, Uighur, Chinese, Kazakh, Mongolian and Sibo. (Sibo is an extinct Tungusic language.) (Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao, November, 1955, p. 33).

N
204
205
*668
177

Besides these local papers, some of the leading nationwide papers are specially shipped into the Northwest by air mail. Starting from August 1, 1952, the Communist postal administration has arranged the air mail delivery to Sinkiang and other northwestern areas of Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), the Kung-jen jih-pao (Daily Worker), Kuang-ming jih-pao (Kuang-ming Daily), and the Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien pao (China Youth), all published in Peking. The papers could in this way reach their destinations in two to nine days. Air mail charges for newspapers were 700 (3¢ U.S.) per copy in addition to the ordinary postage. (see China General, Public Information)

N
204
*668
177

The contents of these national and local papers are monotonously similar. Especially in the local papers, the very limited space averaging four pages a day is crowded with Party documents, editorials, reports, and articles, leaving very little room for news. Most of the material is supplied by the New China News Agency, which is the Communist Party outlet, guaranteeing successfully strict news control. (The denunciation of Stalin at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956, was not mentioned in the review of this congress in the official

N 204 3. Kung-jen wen-i or Laborer's Literature.
*668 4. Shensi wen-i or Shensi Literature.
177 (The above three are literary magazines published in Sian.)

S 204 5. The Sinkiang Propagandists, a semi-monthly published by
•668 Sinkiang People's Publishing House in Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang,
177 with 2,665 regular subscribers, among which 1,719 subscribed to the Uighur language edition and 946 to the Chinese edition. It is a directory for propaganda workers in Sinkiang.

6. Sinkiang Education, a monthly edited and published by Sinkiang Education Corporation and distributed by the Urumchi (Tihua) post office. It has editions in Chinese and Uighur.

N 214 III. Publishers and Distributors

Before the Communists took over the mainland, most important publishing houses and distributors throughout the country were private. Some semi-official publishing houses, such as the Cheng-chung Book Stores were gaining some ground but did not dominate the field. In Northwest China, there were branch stores of nationwide publishers such as the Commercial Press, the Chung-hua Book Company, mostly acting as distributors of books published in Shanghai or Chungking. Local publishing houses were few and small in scale. They were short of capital and inefficiently managed, therefore often ephemeral.

N 214 *668 177 After the Communists took over, the official and semi-official publishing houses were taken over and the private ones put under control. Previously, Communist controlled publishing houses, the Sheng-huo Book Store, the Tu-shu sheng-huo Book Store and the Hsin-chih Book Store, were consolidated into the San-lien Book Company. This company was then used as a nucleus to control the leading private publishers: "Four of the leading privately operated book companies in China, the Commercial Press, the Chung-hua Book Company, the K'ai-ming Book Company, and the Lien-yin Book Company and one private and public jointly operated, the San-lien Book Company, will form a joint house to be known as the China Book Distributors Corporation to coordinate with the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store in establishing a network of distribution centers throughout the whole country. This is a decision reached on September 15 in the First National Publication Conference held under the auspices of the Publication Administration." (Shanghai News November 19, 1950)

The integration of the private publishing business into the interests of the party was the necessary reorganization and division of labor that changed the blind and anarchial situation of the past." (Wang Po-kung in Shih-shih shou-ts'e pan-yüeh-k'an, September 20, 1951, p. 22.) From that time on publishing business soared (see China General, Public Information).

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11

N 214 *668 177 N [213] S [213]

As the major distributor of books, the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store has established 1,086 branches all over the country. The state-owned International Book Store became the special distributor of the books and periodicals imported and exported. In the main cities all over the country the Party has established 12 state-owned printing presses with modern equipment. Among these twelve, one is in Sian, Shensi, and one is in Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang. Private publishers, printers and distributors have mostly been forced out of business or have become a part of private state joint enterprises. For Northwest China, the most significant publishing house is the Nationality Publishing House in Peking which has been assigned to publish books in minority languages.

N 214 *668 177 S 214 •668 177

In Northwest China itself, there are two leading publishing houses, one is the Northwest People's Publishing House in Sian, Shensi. The other is the Sinkiang Provincial (later regional) People's Publishing House in Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang. Both are state-owned but apparently the former is under the direct control of the Party, while the latter is under the control of the Provincial Government. The Northwest People's Publishing House uses the printing facilities of the Hsin-hua Printing Press in Sian. The Sinkiang Provincial People's Publishing House apparently has its own printing press since it has put special emphasis on publishing books in languages of the minority groups.

S 549 668 177

The distribution of books and magazines in the Northwest is mainly dependent on the branches of the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store. The short history of the Hsin-hua Book Store in Sinkiang illustrates this fact.

On January 10, 1950, the Sinkiang branch of the Hsin-hua Book Store was founded in Urumchi (Tihua). On March 19, April 19, and July 1 of the same year, the sales departments at South Main Street, North Main Street and Nan-liang in Urumchi (Tihua) opened for business respectively. In April, 1950, the Qomul (Hami) Branch opened. In June the Kashgar branch opened. In August, the branch stores in Sha-ch'e, Ili, Altai (A-shan), Chuguchak (T'a-ch'eng), Khotan (Ho-t'ien), Kharashar (Yen-ch'i), Aksu, and Manass (Sui-lai) opened as a part of the provincial government's project. In September, 1952, two branch stores were established in the industrial and mining districts Fu-wen and Tu-shan-tzu. In October, 1952, four branch stores started business in Karghalik (Yeh-ch'eng), Kucha (K'u-ch'e), Yangihissar (Ying-chi-sha) and Maralbashi (Pa-ch'u). Up to the end of 1952, there were 16 branch stores which, in turn, had established 48 sub-stations in counties where no branch store was in existence. At the end of 1950, "with the help of Soviet friends" the Hsin-hua Book Store took over the five International Book Stores at Urumchi (Tihua), Ili, Kashgar, Chuguchak (T'a-ch'eng) and Altai (A-shan).

549 On November 2, 1952, the Qomul (Hami) branch of the Hsin-
● 668 hua Book Store established the first "self-service" sales station.
177 In November, 1952, in Urumchi (Tihua), the store organized 116
443 special individual distributors in the various units of government
offices, schools and military forces. At the same time, four
more sales stations were established.

[489] To ship the bulky and heavy books to the whole province, the
Hsin-hua Book Store utilized the army transportation facilities.
[705] With the help of the army, 1,280,000 copies of elementary and
middle school textbooks were delivered.

In August, 1952, Hsin-hua Book Store organized a moving supply section to go deep into the nomadic counties Barkul (Cheng-hsi), Ch'ang-chi, Hu-t'u-pi (Ching-hua) together with the Visiting Group of Sinkiang Provincial Government. It also established a
[205] mail order department, accepting also orders for books published
in other places in the country and the Soviet Union (Sinkiang jih-pao, January 11, 1953).

Distribution of Communist books has been pushed tremendously by the organized force of the Party. The distribution of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung in Uighur and Kazakh started with the organization of a distributing committee at every level of the Party organization above the county. Every member of the Party and the Youth League was required to join in the selling of the book, to his friends and acquaintances as well as in the bazaars. Every branch of the committees had a selling quota to meet. Dancing teams, drum teams performed and marched on the streets to promote the sale. Salesmen were carrying books to every door.

With this kind of high-pressured salesmanship, Hsin-hua Book Company sold in three years (1950-1952): 2,491,531 copies of books; 733,348 periodicals; 1,848,555 textbooks; 2,973,762 international editions of books and periodicals (This included Chinese, Uighur, Kazakh, Russian, etc., among which 1,200,000 copies were textbooks.) This is a total of 8,037,196 copies. Broken down by languages, the figures were:

Uighur	4,018,595	or 50%
Chinese	2,813,019	or 35%
Kazakh	482,232	or 6%
Mongolian	160,744	or 2%
Russian, Uzbek, etc.	562,603	or 7%

Compared with the past, these figures are impressive. The impression is modified, however, when the distributed titles are examined. Many of these publications were documents, handbooks, or propaganda pamphlets.

Among these, the periodical The Sinkiang Propagandist was distributed in 782,902 copies in three years. Another best seller was the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, translated into Uighur, S 549 443 • 668 177 Kazakh and Mongolian by the Propaganda Department of the Sinkiang Sub-Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which sold 243,395 copies. In 1951 alone, Mao's books, On the New Democracy and On Practice, and the People's Democratic Dictionary sold 131,000 copies.

N IV. Books and Pamphlets

214 439 Because the Northwest has been culturally backward for years, most of the books there have been imported from outside. The cultural development of China has thus directly affected the situation in the Northwest. If there are more books published in the country as a whole, the Northwest will proportionally benefit by this fact.

N 214 *668 177 After the Communists took over, achievements in the publishing business were boosted. In 1951 it was reported that from January to July 6,754 different titles were published, an increase of 158% over the same period of 1950. Among these, 2,540 titles were popular reading. This raised the proportion of popular books to 40.9% of the total.

In an article published in 1952, Hu Yü-chih, the Director of the Publication Administration of the Central People's Government of China, made the following statements: "On October 12, 1951, vol. I of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung was published. So far 3,020,000 copies of the first two volumes of this series have been printed and distributed.... During the past three years, the state-owned People's Publishing Houses alone...have published 48 titles and 3,686,000 copies of the classical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin...."

According to his statistics, books and periodicals published before and after the Communists' conquest compare as follows:

Year	No. Copies Published	No. Periodicals
1936 (Pre-Communist record year)	178,000,000	32,300,000
After:		
1950	274,632,630	35,301,679
1951	669,639,911	176,774,253
1952 (estimation)	882,000,000	180,000,000

He further stated that before the Communists took over, the average number of copies for each title besides textbooks was 2,000. In 1951, the number was 9,782, an increase of about five times. He named the four best sellers in 1951 as follows:

1. The Popular Edition of the Illustrated Explanation of the Marriage Law - 11,500,000 copies.
2. The Popular Edition of the Illustrated Explanation of the Regulations for Punishment of the Counter-Revolutionists in People's Republic of China - 10,680,000 copies.

N
214
*668
177

3. The Thirty Years of Chinese Communist Party - 2,800,000 copies.
4. The Pictoral Story of the Thirty Years of Chinese Communist Party - 2,500,000 copies.

He also revealed that since 1951 textbooks used in the junior middle schools all over the country have been unified. They were uniformly edited and printed by the state-owned People's Educational Publishing House, marked with uniform prices and uniformly distributed by the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store. In other words, the profitable textbook business was taken out of the hands of the private publishers and monopolized by the state. Together with the already monopolized grade school textbook business, the total number increased from 153,849,314 copies in 1950 to 306,230,000 copies in 1952, an increase of 90% in two years. These figures did not include those of textbooks used outside the regular schools. In the second half of 1952 alone, the textbooks used by the winter schools and beginners blasses for adults sold 270,320,000 copies.

Besides books for peasants and workers and books for the youngsters, publications for the minority groups were especially emphasized. The New China News Agency reported that in 1951 176 titles of books (including textbooks) were printed in minority languages with a total of 2,200,000 copies; in 1952, the total increased to 376 titles and more than 4,300,000 copies. It is also reported that during the three years from 1950 to 1952 the Committee of the Nationality Affairs alone had published more than one million copies of books and periodicals translated into Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uighur.

S
214
• 668
177

Up to the end of 1953, the Sinkiang People's Publishing House had published 189 titles of books with a total of 2,114,000 copies. Among these, 56 titles were translations of Mao Tse-tung's writings in Uighur and twelve titles were Mao's writings in Kazakh. In other words, more than one-third of these were Mao's pamphlets.

S
N
214
171

The figures on books published in 1954 for the minority groups in Red China were given as follows:

Books Published in Minority Languages (including Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, and Kazakh)

	Titles	Copies
Local Publishing Houses	835	8,730,000
Nationality Publishing House in Peking	201	1,967,000
Total	1,036	10,697,000

This emphasis on the publishing of books in minority languages is further illustrated in the fact that during the eight months from January to August, 1955, Red China published 112 titles of books in Mongolian with a total of more than 432,200 copies.

To assure a wide circulation of books, the Ministry of Culture in Peking issued new regulations about the prices of books in

S N 214 171

March, 1955. Through these regulations, the prices of some books were lowered from 4% to 21%.

S 214 • 668 177

The above reported figures are impressive. The narrow choice of titles, however, has given constant cause for complaint. Readers in Aksu, Sinkiang reflected, according to a Sinkiang jih-pao report of January 11, 1953: "Why do you people in the Hsin-Hua Book Store sell only this kind of book?" And the editorializing explanation: "...to spread Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" will have hardly sounded convincing to the questioner. The China Youth Journal, 1955, No. 10, writes: "For a long time, young people have not found satisfaction in the published books. They are mentally half-starved. Some youths are so eager to read that they have fallen prey to feudal, superstitious, mysterious and sexy books."

S N 214 668 177 (656)

Similar complaints can be found in the press and the journals all over the country. Apparently, the policy of the Communists to swamp the "simple-minded" minority groups with Party doctrine did not pay off. Thus recourse was had to censorship. On July 20, 1955, the State Council promulgated the Temporary Regulations on Controlling the Book Renting Business, according to which the books which are lewd, supernatural and full of reactionary ideas are excluded from circulation.

N 207 *668 177

V. Radio

Radio broadcasting of the Chinese Communist Party had a humble start. On September 5, 1945, the Hsin-Hua Broadcasting Station in Yenan made its first official broadcast. It had a power of 300 watts only. When the Nationalists attacked, the station fled with the Party headquarters but never ceased to broadcast.

From September 5, 1945, to September 4, 1946, it broadcast for two hours a day. The programs included news, comments, introduction to the liberated areas, etc. From September 5, 1946, the time increased to two and a half hours daily. The program included speeches, and voices of the people. Later a broadcast to the Nationalist Army was added. Starting from September 5, 1947, the broadcast increased to three hours. News summaries were added, and later, programs in English.

In March, 1949, the station moved to Peking and took over the Nationalists' station there. On October 1, 1949, the name was changed into the Central People's Broadcasting Station. It became the leading broadcast center.

In April, 1950, the Communists began to establish monitoring stations throughout the country. The Central People's Broadcasting Station has since broadcast the main programs for the monitoring stations all over Red China, including the Northwest. In 1950, there was only one program lasting 7 1/2 hours per day. From 1954 on, it increased to two programs with a total broadcasting

N
207
*668
177

Representative Meeting
20:00 - 21:00 Shensi Opera, "The White Rabbit Trick". (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, July 2, 1952, advertisement)

July 6, 1952:
Noon:
12:00 - 12:30 Workers' Period: Correspondence, An introduction of comrade Chang Chen-ts'ai, a municipal worker who is positive in production and diligent in study.
12:45 - 13:15 Single String: "the excellent labor model Chang Shu-yün" (musical program)
Evening:
19:00 - 19:30 Honan Opera: Hua Mu-lan, K'ao-kung
Shensi Opera: The little Son-in-law
19:45 - 20:05 Commentary: The government offices and schools must promote wholeheartedly the patriotic, healthy, anti-epidemic movement.
20:05 - 20:20 Answers to questions from the audience about common sense to prevent contagious diseases.
20:20 - 21:00 Shensi Opera: "The White Rabbit Trick".

S
207
• 668
177

These programs are re-broadcast by loudspeakers through monitoring stations all over the Northwest. In Sinkiang, the main broadcasting station is the one in Urumchi (Tihua). In every county, there are one or more monitoring stations. According to a 1954 report, there were 140 monitoring stations in Sinkiang. On February 15, 1955, Sinkiang Broadcasting Station started a Kazakh language program, 35 minutes daily except Sunday.

In March, 1955, the State Council in Peking ordered the supply of 1,500 receiving sets for the establishment of monitoring stations in nine provinces and autonomous regions. Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang were among these nine. Two months later, 350 monitoring sets were delivered by air mail to Sinkiang. This trebled the monitoring stations in Sinkiang. (NCNA May 27, 1955). Thus there should have been 525 monitoring stations in Sinkiang by summer of 1955. According to the report of Burkhan, however, by September, 1955, there were only 360 monitoring stations (Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao, 1955, p. 33).

One of the first acts of the people's government of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, established in October, 1955, was to expand the radio-receiving facilities in the region, especially for the nomadic peoples living in the more remote parts. In addition to the radio monitoring centers already established in the agricultural areas, 113 centers were set up for the pastoral districts. The plans for 1956 call for the establishment of 479 new monitoring stations in the SUAR. The cost of providing sets will be borne entirely by the people's government and the aim is to have

S
207 at least one monitoring station in each pastoral and agricultural
668 district in Sinkiang.
177 These sets are designed to monitor local stations but are not
S powerful enough to receive foreign broadcasts. Reconditioning
[674] a radio set to suit "illegal" purposes is one of the major crimes
(Hsin-Hua Yüeh-pao, 1955, 8, 258-9).

Extension of broadcasting and diffusion services is being con-
N stantly stepped up. By 1962, it is planned to have every village
[207] and cooperative listen to Peking. But even these plans exclude
*[668] the "remote areas" which means that the border areas of Chinghai,
[177] Sinkiang and Kansu will not be reached.

N VI. Movies and Lantern Slides
546 In 1950, the Communists trained more than 1,800 people in
*668 Peking to operate movie projectors. At that time they planned
177 to establish 700 mobile movie teams. The Communists also
reported that by 1951 there were at least 9,943 lantern slide projectors in the country, serving 8,000,000 in 1950 and about 200,000,000 in 1951. Simultaneously the production of lantern slide projectors and slides was expanded. In 1952, there were sixteen factories specializing in manufacturing lantern slide projectors and fifteen organizations to produce slides.

In Sian, Shensi, a city of about 600,000 people, there were four movie theaters. Before the Communists took over, the public usually would have a choice of four different pictures. A recent advertisement of these theaters shows the following monotonous pattern:

Liberation Theater	Northwest Theater	A-fang Palace Theater
3:15, 6:45, 9:15	2:45, 6:15, 8:45	2:15, 5:45, 8:15

People's Light Theater
2:00, 5:30, 8:00

We solemnly dedicate our show to
a translated Soviet Feature, the
Glorious winner of the Stalin Prize
SVERDLOV

This picture concretely illustrated the firmness, courage, and wisdom of Sverdlov. In the dark years under the Czar, he organized the progressive workers to struggle for the establishment of Lenin's Party, and lit up the revolutionary fire which destroyed all.

Released by the Northwest Branch of the China Movie Managing Co.

(Sian, Ch'ün-chung Jih-pao, 1952, July 2, advertisement.)

Sverdlov, Yakov Mikhailovich, 1885-1919, an outstanding revolutionary and one of the major organizers and leaders of the Bolshevik Party, a close friend of Stalin and Lenin, with whom he worked in early revolutionary movements. He spent several years in exile with Stalin. Lenin called him chief organizer of Party and Soviet power.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

546 668 177 According to an advertisement in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 5, 1953, two of the four cinemas in Tihua showed the Chinese feature: "Defend the Fruits of Victory" and the other two showed Soviet Russian films of the heroic type.

Shen Yen-ping, the Minister of Culture, recommended the following films as good features: "The Steel Fighter," "The White-Haired Girl," "The New Young Heroes and Heroines," "The People's Fighters," "The Victory of the Inner Mongolian People," "Chao I-man," "The Red Flag on the Green Hill," "The Concentration Camp in Shang-jao".

He mentioned the following pictures as good documentaries: "The Great Army Marches across the Yangtze," "The Victory Song of the Great Southwest," "The Red Flag Flaps in the West Wind," "The Great Union of the Chinese Nationalities," "Happy Sinkiang," "The March of the Army Liberating Tibet," "Resist America, Aid Korea," "We Must Control the Huai River," "The Victory of the Chinese People," "The Liberated China."

According to Burkhan, the governor of Sinkiang, at the end of 1952 there were more than 40 movie theaters, six rural mobile movie teams in government and army units, sixteen 16 mm. projector movie teams and 91 other movie projecting units in Sinkiang. In 1951, these theaters and teams performed before an audience of more than 4,214,800 (Sinkiang jih-pao, January 1, 1953). In 1952, films and slides were shown to over 5,700,000 people in Sinkiang (NCNA, May 4, 1953). The lantern slides have captions in Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian and Chinese which were added to them on their arrival in Sinkiang. In 1952, there were only 600 of these sets, but 3,400 sets were being prepared for 1953 (NCNA, May 5, 1953).

In 1954, fourteen Chinese films were dubbed in Mongolian, Tibetan and Uighur (NCNA, December 31, 1954). The first movie showing the life of the Kazakh people, named "Hassan and Karmila" was released. A musical film recording ancient Uighur music was also made for the Uighur inhabitants. In September, 1955, there were 45 movie theaters, 35 educational mobile movie teams, three nationality cultural teams, six theatrical troupes, and 39 cultural halls in Sinkiang.

563 575 872 The institution of cultural halls is not new to Sinkiang. In the past, each of the nationalities residing in Sinkiang has had its own cultural association. These were usually headed by Moslem priests, village elders, living buddhas, or the princes and begs, and it was these cultural associations, not the provincial Commissioner of Education, which had control over the primary schools in Sinkiang. In 1938, they controlled 1,840 primary schools with a total of 105,087 students, and the Uighur Cultural Association, the largest, controlled 1,540 schools with 89,804 students. There were sub-associations in all the cities and towns of Sinkiang, all under the direction of the headquarters of the joint cultural associations located at Urumchi.

o8o
575 ciations located at Urumchi. With the advent of the Chinese Com-
668 munists, the nationalities cultural associations were taken over
177 and in their place, cultural halls and cultural teams managed and
operated by Communist cultural cadres were established in the
S cities and towns of Sinkiang.

217 It is strange that in the pronouncements of Communist leaders
668 and the reports of cultural and educational achievements in Sin-
177 kiang in the Communist press, no mention can be found on libraries. One can only speculate that with the expansion of publication enterprises under the Communists, the number of libraries must also have increased, as well as the number of books. In the library of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, the number of books increased 700 per cent of the pre-1949 figure, and the number of books in the languages of the minority peoples increased by 1,400 per cent.

N VII. Organization

20 The organizational system of public information in the North-
105 west appears simple but is complicated. Government offices in
+668 charge of information services are Bureaus or Committees of
177 Cultural and Educational Affairs on the provincial level, which
[647] receive instructions from Peking and control the various inform-
[648] ation services. Some of these, however, are directly controlled from Peking, and among the newspapers and journals are many which are in the hands of the party rather than of the Government.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

LABOR

I. "Free Labor

N
464 Information on labor conditions in the Northwest is very
scanty. However, there are indications that the Communists
have faced a very serious problem of labor shortage in that
N
[162] area. To begin with, the Northwest is a very sparsely
populated area. It embraces about one third of China's territory, but its population is only about six percent of the national total. If any large scale reconstruction works are to be effected,
N
[871] it seems to be necessary to use outside labor supplies. Moreover, educational standards in the Northwest have been relatively
N low. Consequently, the quality of native labor is also a problem.

464 To overcome these difficulties, the Communists have adopted
*668 several methods. One is to encourage or force skilled and
177 semi-skilled labor in other parts of the country to work in the
167 Northwest. For instance, the communication department of
[466] Sinkiang in May, 1955, absorbed some 409 automobile drivers
S and mechanics from among the demobilized servicemen in
[464] Shantung and Honan for reconstruction work in the border
[166] regions. In March, 1955, 200 cadres of Hui nationality of the
People's Liberation Army Railway Corps have been transfered to work in the Hui-nationality areas in Kansu and Chinghai. Most of these cadres have passed through the Anti-Japanese "War of Liberation," land reform and Anti-U.S. and Aid-Korea campaigns. Of these ninety percent are party members or members of the Communist Youth League.

In late 1954, four thousand skilled building workers and technicians from other cities have signed up for work in Sian. They began to arrive from Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton and other places in early 1955, and they were warmly welcomed by the local authorities. All this shows that outside labor has played a very important part in the economic reconstruction in the Northwest (See also section Population).

II. Army Labor

S
464 Another method is to use the army as a labor force. This
701 has been particularly important in Sinkiang, in which the
708 People's Liberation Army have participated in many reconstruction
•668 projects. To take 1955 as an example, they were engaged in
177 the following tasks:

A March 24, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liberation Army farming units in Sinkiang have started their afforestation program in the south of this province. This year they plan to plant trees on 1,200 hectares, mostly shelter belts to protect reclaimed farmland."

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

464 An April 18, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liber-
701 ation Army in Sinkiang has started spring sowing on the plains
708 north and south of the T'ien-shan Mountains. Crops already
668 sown include spring wheat, oil-bearing plants and long
177 staple cotton. The army men are experimenting with the
241 cultivation of long staple cotton in the Turfan Basin, where
favorable conditions exist. This year the PLA farming units will cultivate over 66,000 hectares, or thirteen percent more than last year. More than half of the land will be ploughed by tractors. Adequate supplies of chemical fertilizer and insecticides are on hand."

708 A June 3, 1955, despatch reports: "The largest reservoir
653 in Sinkiang is being enlarged this month by engineering units
312 of the People's Liberation Army stationed in Sinkiang. When
668 completed, the Men-chin reservoir, north of Urumchi, will
177 have a storage capacity of sixty million cubic meters of water
which can be used for irrigation."

503
464 An October 31, 1955 despatch reports: "A leading part has
been played by the People's Liberation Army in irrigation works in Sinkiang. With their help, the peasants have constructed nine reservoirs, repaired irrigation canals and ditches, totalling 30,000 kilometers in length, built hundreds of new canals and added more subterranean waterways, a form of irrigation traditionally used in the region. In addition, the People's Liberation Army units have built and expanded works capable of irrigating 200,000 hectares, mostly farmed by local peasants. The army men also reclaimed over 73,000 hectares of wasteland and set up twenty-nine mechanized state farms."

708 A November 3, 1955, despatch reports: "Manass Basin
241 Agricultural Production Construction Troops of Sinkiang Military
668 District of the People's Liberation Army plan to grow cotton in
177 an area of 202,000 mou next year, one hundred forty-six percent
464 larger than this year. These troops are now actively undertaking
(248) the preparatory works."

A December 24, 1955, despatch reports: "A new mechanized farm has been built in the Manass Basin by PLA. It has some 10,000 hectares of well irrigated farmland, part of which has already been sown in winter wheat. They plan to supply the state with nine thousand tons of grain and twenty-eight hundred tons of cotton next year."

701 The constitution of the so-called People's Liberation Army
708 in Sinkiang has not been disclosed. But to use the regular army
464 as a labor force in peace time is, to say the least, forced labor
466 in disguise. (See section Forced Labor of General Handbook).
668

177 III. Conscript Labor

000

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

S N 464 466 Forced labor in the strict sense, or "corrective" labor, has however also been amply used. Conscript labor solved several of the problems connected with the labor situation in the Northwest. "Free" or induced labor had to be given certain incentives, such as higher wages and better living conditions in order to overcome non-economic barriers to labor mibility, such as language barriers, differences of customs and living standards, differences of climate, etc. For skilled and semi-skilled labor these incentives might prove a worthwhile investment; for unskilled labor, however, a cheaper labor supply was desirable. Conscript labor would also overcome the problem of labor discipline, which is prone to be particularly serious among laborers working far from home. Specifically conscript labor could be employed at a level of subsistence far below the minimum to be paid to a recruited or induced labor force; it could be employed in dangerous work without the necessity of using costly safeguards against accidents; and it had the advantage of perfect mobility and could be moved around without regard to family and other social ties. In the following, some reports, mostly collected in summer 1955 among Turkestani refugees are given to throw some light on the extent of conscript labor used in the Northwest.

S 464 492 466 697 668 177 648 From a refugee in a colony in Yugoslavia, called Yengi Khotan "New Khotan":

In 1950 at an open People's court session in Cherchen, former Kuomintang officials, influential merchants and landowners were tried, sentenced and dispossessed of their property. They were transported to Charklik (Chin.: Cho-chiang) from where they proceeded in a southeastern direction where a new auto highway was being constructed. The prisoners were formed into working units which were led by Soviet soldiers of the Seventh Regiment. Halim estimates that at least six to ten thousand prisoners were working between Charklik and Timurlik. Each three hundred men was headed by a Russian corporal or sergeant. He said that the real masters of the area were the Russians, and he repeatedly emphasized that the latter treated even the Chinese Communist officials with no respect. S [316] Furthermore, he saw several mining projects in this area, especially gold mines. When he was transferred to the area of Tash-Kurghan (Turk.: Stone tomb) in 1953, he managed to flee to the Wakhan area of Afghanistan.

S 464 466 697 499 668 177 Reports, published in Turk-i-stan, Arabian edition, March 1955, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, give a limited account of the railway construction between Turfan and Hami. It states that since May, 1953, about 80,000 prisoners have worked there. The main body of prisoners consisted of Chinese, but there were also thousands of New-Uighurs, Kazakhs, Mongols and

464 Tibetans. The prisoners were organized in military fashion,
466 i.e., squads, platoons, companies, battalions and regiments,
697 led by Chinese of the so-called Transport Army Corps. The
499 prisoners had to work twelve hours a day. They were
668 rigidly guarded by means of machine gun towers. Due to
177 undernourishment, overwork and rough weather conditions
the death ratio was about thirty to fifty men a day. The equipment was of Russian origin and handled by Russian "specialists."

According to the same source about 180,000 were employed in levelling the terrain and building the embankment for the railway tracks on the route between Kulja-Wusu-Urumchi and Turfan. The prisoners were mainly Chinese but heavily intermingled with minority groups, either condemned insurgents, court-martialled soldiers or people who were tried by People's Courts for being "kulaks," saboteurs, "capitalistic spies" or former independent tribal leaders. Entire Tibetan tribes of the Sinkiang-Tibetan border area, who repeatedly revolted between 1950 and 1953 were finally captured and brought to the Bogda-Ula (mountain range with elevation up to 17,000 feet) where the passes and tunnels for a railway were constructed. The Communists first used Chinese prisoners but the death rate was extremely high because the Chinese, who were sent mainly from China proper, could not become accustomed to the rough climate of the T'ien-shan mountain range. The construction took
[648] place under the supervision of the 18th cavalry regiment of the
9th Soviet Cavalry division. Technicians and "specialists" are mainly Soviets. Administrators are Chinese Communists. At the same time Chinese military units are trained by Russians in regard to embankment constructions.

In the coal and petroleum area of Wusu, Urumchi and Kurla about 35,000 prisoners worked, reinforced by Soviet and Chinese engineers and technicians. Dozens of mountain roads were built by pioneer units of the People's Transport Army Corps which do all the dynamiting and bridge building, while prisoners do routine work.

464 Two Turkic refugees, now living in Germany, reported that
466 they were working for an irrigation building co-op in Mazartagh
697 on the Khotan River. Those co-ops usually receive fifty to a
668 hundred prisoners as handymen, who are guarded by a few
177 Chinese soldiers, who are stationed at the co-op.

464 Another Turkic refugee who was sentenced to ten years
466 (1950) for underpaying his employees in his fur trade enterprise
315 was sent to the oil field near Yü-men in Kansu. His sentence
697 was reduced to two years when he saved a bulldozer at the risk
668 of his life when an oil shaft blew up. He said about 18,000
177

464
466 prisoners work on the oil fields. When he returned to his home town
315 Keriya in 1953 he had to go through Soviet control posts at the
697 Sinkiang-Kansu border towns of Hsinhsingsia and Kushui.

628
669 After his flight, the former Aksakal of Kizilbulak (northeast
177
[648] of Aksu) Abdul Azizi Hajji wrote an article in the Turkish newspaper Ulus, July 15, 1955, relating how all cities along the line Kashgar, Aksu, Karashahr, Urumchi, Turfan, Hami, Kulja, Ili, Chuguchak, including the Tarbagatai region, are occupied by at least four Soviet dividions, two of which definitely have been identified as tank dividions, equipped with T34 models.

466 A copy of the well-informed newspaper Al-Mizir (Cairo)
464 of May 19, 1955, says that the total number of prisoners who
697 are used as forced labor amounts to 380,000 in Sinkiang alone.

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

S 759 C. Efforts of the Government in the Field of Health and Sanitation

S [177] Only a few doctors in Eastern Turkestan have a Western
scientific training. Most of them are either Chinese or Euro-
peans (White Russians). Lately, however, young Turkic people
possessing a formal education have been sent to Western Turkes-
S tan and to China Proper to study in medical colleges. Awareness
759 of the lack of proper medical personnel and equipment in Sinkiang
743 first inspired the Nationalists to try to open clinics and hospitals
S in Sinkiang. The Communists have followed in their steps with a
743 somewhat more extensive program, according to their reports.
744 Clinics were opened in various parts of the Sinkiang Autonomous
668 Region, with the aim of combating the most common diseases in
177 the area. They have facilities for innoculation against certain
diseases, and place particular emphasis on curing and preventing
venereal diseases.

S 874 In April, 1955, a new medical college was opened in Sinkiang
to meet the problem of lack of medical personnel. The Commun-
ists announced that "Sinkiang's new medical college...is ready
to enroll 250 students of various nationalities for the coming
autumn term. A teaching staff of 100 including professors, lec-
turers and practicing physicians will arrive here in June from
S other parts of the country to take up their posts. The medical
874 college is part of a scheme for building a medical center in this
743 provincial capital of Sinkiang, where the inhabitants belong mostly
to national minorities. The project includes a 600-bed hospital
and a clinic able to treat 800 patients daily." (NCNA, Urumchi,
April 19, 1955).

III. Health and Sanitation among the Tibetans of Chinghai

N *563 262 A. The Diet of the Tibetan People

Regardless of whether he be rich or poor, farmer or nomad, the diet of the Tibetan consists primarily of four staples, grain (primarily parched and roasted barley), meat, cheese and butter. However, the questions of wealth and mode of life determines the relative proportions of each of the staples. The parched barley, or tsamba is generally added to the buttered tea and the consequent mush is eaten. The sedentary Tibetans resort most frequently to pork or small game animals, such as marmots, for their meat supply. Very few of the farmers can afford beef or mutton as a staple. Yak cheese and the curds of soured yak and sheep milk are favorite items, the latter often counting as a sort of dessert. The nomadic diet uses much less of the grain and is preponderantly meat, including yak-beef and mutton, butter and other dairy products. The Tibetans eat almost every part of the animal except its hooves and hide. The wealthy Tibetans, and the poorer ones

N 744 *668 177

Health of the Various Nationalities in the Country," was convened by representatives of the Tibetan, Moslem, Yi, Uighur, Mongol, and Han nationalities, representatives of the health administrative organs of the Central People's Government and the various administrative regions, the representatives of the nationalities affairs, authorities of the various administrative regions, leaders of the medical preventive service corps to the national minority areas, and specially invited delegates of all nationalities.

"The Conference will undertake special studies in the diseases which most seriously endanger the health of the people in the national minority areas, such as venereal diseases, malaria, women's and infants' ailments (colds, measles, smallpox, puerperal fever), and thus to proceed to the decision on a definite policy for the work of promoting the health of the national minorities.

The Conference is expected to reach decisions also on various necessary measures for building up a public health system in the minority areas, such as the organization of health machineries, the fostering of health cadres, and the propaganda on health matters among the population." (NCNA Peking, August 24, 1951).

N [759]

The need for professional medical help in the Northwest was one of the most urgent problems facing the Communist Government in the implementation of its health program. Young students from Central China with some medical knowledge were encouraged to go to the aid of the national minorities in the Northwest. "Go West" is the slogan of the day, and is considered to be a true pioneering act.

N 743 *668 177

The primary attention is given to the workers, particularly those working on big governmental projects. "In the mountainous region of Szechwan, Shensi and Kansu Provinces, workers on reconstruction receive medical care. For each billeting camp of 1,000 of more a clinic staffed with 5 to 8 doctors and nurses is operating. Four regular hospitals have been opened in Chengtu and other cities along the line especially for road workers." (FBIS, No. 61, March 29, 1955).

S 743 744 •668 177

In April, 1955, a new medical college was opened in Sinkiang to meet some of the problems of lack of medical personnel. Clinics were opened in various parts of the Sinkiang Autonomous Region to combat the most common diseases in the area. Particular emphasis was placed on curing and preventing venereal diseases.

"From June to October, four health service teams dispatched by the venereal disease prophylactic and therapeutic clinic of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region gave free treatment to some 3,000 peasants and nomads of various nationalities. In addition to the prophylactic and therapeutic stations already established in the various counties, another well-equipped outpatient department has been added in Urumchi. The clinic has enrolled 60

S
743 students from the nationalities to learn prophylactic and therapeu-
744 tic work." (FBIS, November 30, 1955).

• 668 Particular attention has also been paid to the Tibetan region
177 as a whole and to Chinghai Province. About health programs
N developed in Tibet we have the following information: "Over
657 5 million yüan have been allocated by the Central People's Gov-
743 ernment to develop health work in the Tibet region during the past
744 four years. During this time hospitals have been built in Lhasa
171 and Chamdo; in addition, clinics and mobile medical teams have
*668 given service to patients in small towns and remote areas.
177 Incomplete statistics show that free medical treatment and innoculation reached 963,000 people. In the same period, 170 Tibetans have been trained as medical workers. The Central People's Government has sent more than 400 doctors and nurses from other parts of the country to the region.

Plans were drawn up at a regional health conference of leading members of Tibet's health organizations and representatives of the Ministry of Public Health to establish more clinics and mobile medical teams and to train 50 to 80 Tibetan medical workers in the coming two years." (FBIS 181, September 16, 1955).

N In Chinghai province itself, the Provincial Health Office ad-
744 ministers the health program. Health clinics have been estab-
743 lished in different parts of the province. The work here is more
*668 difficult because of the many nomadic tribes in the steppes. The
177 Communists have aimed to train people among the nomads to take the position of medical personnel in their tribe. Progress in this area is slower. Some of the bigger already established clinics have been converted to hospitals.

According to their reports, on the whole, the progress made by the Communist Government in the field of health and sanitation is quite impressive. The first positive steps toward improving the health and sanitation conditions have been taken, but there is still much to be done in the future.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

I. The Turks of Sinkiang

186 795

A. The Concept of the Unity of the Moslem World

The Moslems of Sinkiang (Turkic: Türk-e-stan 'Land of the Turks') identify themselves strongly with the rest of the Moslem World. In spite of the many divergencies in national cultures of the various elements which constitute the Moslem world, there is a supernational religious civilization which unifies them all. The feeling and firm conviction of unity of all believers finds expression in the Koran as well as in the traditions and the extensive Islamic literature, and in propaganda slogans which became current since the turning of the century, such as: ittihad ve terakki 'u 'unity and progress', or Muslimlerin hakki birles "Moslim people unite'. The rest of the world is looked at as being apart from the Moslem World - being the domain of war, whereas the area under Moslem jurisdiction is considered the domain of peace. [208]

186 208 795 This feeling may have its roots in the history of the propagation of Islam where political institutions and allegiance went hand in hand with religious institutions and allegiance. The acceptance of the religion of Islam, Din-al-Islam, meant also the acceptance of the Moslem political state. The allegiance with a definite political tinge of many Moslems who do not live today under Moslem control remains with the leaders of the Moslem World. They may feel an even stronger attachment to the Moslem leaders than they do to their own non-Moslem political rulers, as has been the case in Sinkiang under Chinese domination. The allegiance and recognition of the Turks of Sinkiang went to the Ottoman Turkish Empire and later to the leaders of Western Turkestan rather than to their Chinese rulers. It is reasonable to assume that the Moslems of Sinkiang today identify themselves much more strongly with the world of Islam than they do with the Communist block. They think of themselves in terms of being Moslems and not in terms of being Communists. No matter how much indoctrination has gone into uprooting this allegiance to the Islamic world, it will take a whole new thoroughly indoctrinated generation to forget the strong sentiments and attachments to the rest of the Moslem world.

• 668

B. Turkic Nationalism

Besides having supernational allegiance and sentiments of attachment to the Moslem world, there is also a strong nationalistic movement among the Turks of Sinkiang (called milli tahrik). They consider themselves as being a part of Turkestan as a whole and not as belonging to China. They view themselves as Turks, and not as Chinese nationals. They do not regard their position as a national minority in China as the answer to their national

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 aspirations, but dream of an independent country, some of them visualizing a unified state consisting of Eastern and Western Turkestan, while others think in more local terms. Eastern Turks have strong cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with the other Turkic peoples of Central Asia. The Chinese culture and way of life is totally foreign to them. The history of Chinese and Turkic relations has always been a history of conflicts and rebellions. There has never been an identification with the Chinese nor has there been a feeling for friendship toward the Chinese people. The efforts of the Chinese administrators in Sinkiang to bring the Turkic people close to the Chinese culture and way of life have mostly failed. The Turks have consistently refused to learn the Chinese language and many of them have refused to take advantage of the offered Chinese educational facilities.

The National Turkestanian Unity Committee, established in exile (in Germany) in recent years, represents a strong nationalistic movement for the unity of the Turks in Central Asia. The following statement was made by the National Turkestanian Unity Committee: "Turkestan, a country situated in the center of Asia, is Turki-Muhammedan and must be considered one single nation as regards language, faith, culture, economy, geography, and history. Up to the time of her subjugation by the Russians and Chinese, the country enjoyed freedom and independence for centuries."

"We are firmly convinced that the people of Turkestan, if fair elections (i.e. without any interference from the side of Russia of China) were granted, would unanimously lay claim to a free and independent Turkestan." (Memorandum presented to the United Nations by the National Turkestanian Unity Committee).

Others, while acknowledging the cultural unity of the Turks do not aspire to create a larger Turkic political unity. Togan, a Turkic nationalist and scholar, says the following on the subject: "The movement for Turkish unity, is not a fancy that all the Turks will ever create a political structure. When we talk of a Turkish world we think of a civilization of Turkish complexion and Turkish spirit." (Togan, Turkistan Today, quoted by Sir O. Caroe in "Soviet Empire, The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism").

There is no reason why we should think that the basic sentiments of the Turkic people have changed within the last seven years, since the Communist "liberation" of Sinkiang. Turkic and Pan-Turkic national aspirations, of course, do not find an open expression under a totalitarian regime, nor do we hear about the desire for independence and free election by the Turkic people of Sinkiang. The Chinese Communist propaganda describes the Moslem national minorities as being extremely happy with their new fate under Communism, but it is difficult to believe that strong national emotions could be forgotten in such a short period.

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 Suppression of external expression of nationalism appears to be an acceptance of the present regime, but it certainly is not to be regarded as constituting the fulfillment of the national dreams of the Turkic people in Sinkiang. The great number of Eastern [167] Turki refugees from Sinkiang testify to the fact that they consider the new regime as much more oppressive than the former Nationalist administration. During the former Chinese Imperial and Republican rule of Sinkiang, no similar mass flight of Turks occurred. The number of refugees alone indicates deep discontent.

563 578 669 186

C. The Traditional Animosity between the Turks and Chinese

The animosity of the Turks to the Chinese is one of the traditional attitudes which became evident in the many Moslem rebellions against the Chinese administration in Sinkiang. The Turks regard the Chinese not only as their oppressors (Turk: gaddar) but also as infidels (Turk: kafir), who have not received the true knowledge about God. While being politically and militarily stronger and superior to the Turks, the Chinese are regarded as inferior by the Turks in culture and faith. Loyalty to the Chinese regime is not strong and is maintained by force and political pressure. We have seen the Moslem reaction to Chinese rule in the past - during the 1860's and the 1930's when large-scale rebellions took place against the existing regime. One may even take into consideration [648] the events that took place in Western Turkestan during World War II. Many of the Western Turkestanian battalions which constituted a part of the Red Army defected to the German Army. They later were organized into special units and joined the fighting against Soviet Russia. At the present, the occurrence of such an event seems unlikely in Sinkiang, and there has been no indication of an organized large-scale rebellion, or any spirited attempts to oppose the existing regime. It is likely, however, that it would be extremely difficult to trust the Turks fully as Chinese patriots. They could not be used effectively as soldiers, since their true loyalty lies with Turkic nationalism in an Islamic framework.

121 779

D. The Conflict of Islamic and Communist Ideologies

Before considering Islam in relation to other ideologies it is necessary to remember that Islam is not to be regarded as a religion only, but also as a social and political philosophy, forming a set pattern for the religious, social and political living of all Moslems. Any political ideology which attempts to enter the domain os Islam has not only to cope with a religious doctrine, but to compete with the ideas of Islam in the realm of politics.

Another important basic conception to keep in mind is the division of the world in Islam into two domains, the first of which is constituted of the believers, who have submitted to Islam - Dar

/Turks of Sinkiang/

121 al-Islam (The Realm of Islam), and the second constituted of those
779 who have not received the word of Allah and Muhammed and fall
in the non-believers category Dar al-Harb (The Realm of War). It is expressed duty for all Moslems to try and extend the domain of Islam (by means including the holy war), until it encompasses all of the domain of war. A new ideology would not be considered only as competing with Islamic ideology but also considered as being totally unacceptable, since it is a product of the domain of war. These basic concepts, which have often proved to be
[668] barriers in the progress of Islamic civilization, also set strong obstacles in the way of the spread of Communist ideology, or its acceptance.

779 There are other barriers in the way of Communism which are
668 set forth in the principles of the Koran and Sunna, forming the
177 foundations of the Moslem religion. The first of these is the principle of the unity of God "There is no God but Allah." This article of faith has been the rallying point of all Moslems. Communism strongly rejects not only the concept of the unity of God, but the whole concept of God itself, leaving no place for such a supernatural entity. The second important principle of Islam is that of recognition of Muhammed as the Prophet of God (Turk: Peygamber al-Allah), the last and the greatest of God's messengers, which, of course, finds no equivalent in Communism. Nor does the third principle of the acceptance of the Koran as the revealed word of Allah transmitted by his prophet receive acknowledgement in Communist doctrine. Other principles of Islam, including life after death, divine justice with rewards for the righteous and punishment for the sinners, are strongly rejected by Communist ideology as having no valid basis. Communism does have its creeds and beliefs, but there is no correspondence between them and those of the Islamic religion (see section Religion).

While the ideologies of Communism and Islam could never be reconciled, the Communist practice has been that of allowing a place for some religion in its midst. Particularly interested in gaining the favors of the Moslem World, the Communist official policy toward the adherents of Islam both in China and in the Soviet Union has been one of tolerance. Eventually, however, if the Communists aspire to win the complete allegiance of their Moslem citizens, they will, by force or through indoctrination, have to substitute Communist principles for those of Islam. The two doctrines cover too much of the same ground, and because of their incompatibility could not possibly survive together.

648 E. Attitude toward Foreigners

177 The foreigners in Sinkiang are not as varied an international crowd as those inhabiting the coastal cities of China. Because of

181 spite of the strong feeling of identification with Islam, the looseness of the family ties, the absence of any clan ties among the sedentary population, and the tremendous amount of individual economic independence, are indicative of this trend of individualism in the Turkic sedentary society.

The traditional economic structure of the urban society, which is based on the small individual merchants, shopkeepers and artisans, is probably the main contributor to the individualistic nature which developed in this society.

Individualism in the Turkic society is not a conscious intellectual movement (although it is reflected in much of the Turkic literature), but is a product of spontaneous historical evolution of the 181 668 177 society. The establishment of a strong Communist regime with its exceedingly numerous social controls on the life of the individual is an unnatural imposition on this society. The stress on conformity to set a pattern of thought and behavior, the encroachment on the individual liberties, and above all the destruction of the individual economic basis, will probably destroy much of the individualistic traditions of the Turkic society.

181 184 The situation differs in some respects in the nomadic tribal society, where the individual depends so strongly on the society for his economic and cultural needs as well. Here the individual's freedom of action and expression is curtailed to fit the pressing needs of the society as a whole. The family and clan ties are much stronger and more important.

181 183 192 G. The Concept of Freedom

While the Chinese, living in the same environment as the Turks, even lack a proper term for 'freedom', the Turks feel so strongly and emotional about 'freedom', that they have an abundant number of different words for it, just as the Mongols have hundreds of words for military and tactical matters.

Words for freedom are, besides istiklal (of Arabian origin and most used), hürrüyet (e.g. söz hürriyeti 'freedom of speech'), serbestlik (the Eastern Turks often refer to their struggle for freedom as to serbestlik harbi 'the war or campaign for independence'), muafiyet, azadelik, etc.

181 183 The concept of freedom goes back to the nomadic tribes of Central Asia. The freedom enjoyed by the nomad is one of the most highly valued of his treasures. The sedentary Turks still look up to the nomads, whose way of life they have given up centuries ago. Their literary and cultural traditions have come down from their nomadic forefathers, and with them the concept of the unlimited freedom of the steppe people.

The traditional concept of freedom was not of Turkic origin alone; the Arabic influence on the Turkic civilization has left ~~its~~
[192] marks here also. The word that designates freedom in Turkish

/Turks of Sinkiang/

181 is "istiklal" which is actually an Arabic loan word. Istiklal means
183 both freedom and independence. Along with the nomadic conception
(192) of the freedom of movement in the vast steppes, there is also
a reflection of the concept of political independence and being one's
own master. The 19th and 20th centuries brought additional associations
181 to the word freedom. Along with the rise of nationalistic
183 aspirations, which resulted indirectly from the similar movements
668 in Europe, some Western ideas and notions have reached Turkestan
177 indirectly also. Though the Western full concept of freedom
and democracy is not comprehended among the majority of the
people of Eastern Turkestan, it has added more depth and breadth
to the concept of freedom. The awareness of the need for political
freedom has grown in Sinkiang in the last century. Sinkiang's
history in this period indicates the strong desires and wishes of
its people to be free of Chinese rule, or any other foreign domination.
The Turkic people strongly resent and resist the encroachment
on their freedom of action and political decision. This feeling
of resentment is not only experienced by the more sophisticated
sedentary population, aspiring for political independence, but is
also shared by the nomadic people. The Communists have made
attempts to either encroach on their freedom of movement in
their searches for pasture land, or have completely attempted to
sedentarize them. Thus, not only the economic existence of the
nomads is threatened, but the freedom characteristic of their way
of life is in danger also. The Communists have not only arrested
the political freedom of the Turks and their desires for independence,
but have also touched on their traditional values associated
with their nomadic past, and threatening the existence of the nomads
today.

H. Attitude toward Change

177 There are elements of both resistance and of desire for change
178 among the Eastern Turkis. The dominating social and economic
565 classes - consisting of the wealthy merchants (the Türks call them
'pek mühim ve zengin tüccar' , verbatim: "the very important and
rich merchants'), landowners (Türk: Emlak sahibi), and clergy
(Türk: Rahibler) - opposed change which threatened to undermine
their social and material status. The general population aspired
to raise their social position and standards of living, but at the
same time did not wish to lose their leaders to whom they have
always looked for direction and guidance. There is no question
that no section of the society aspired to a forced, radical type of
change for which they were not prepared. This type of change in
the social structure, the complete leveling off of the social classes,
with only the party hierarchy in a superior position, which was
forced down on the population by the Communists, is an artificial
product for which the Turkic society was not ready, nor willing to
inflict upon itself.

177 inflict upon itself.

178 • [668] The desire for political change is, on the other hand, quite unanimous and finds expression in the nationalist movement, which aspires to throw the Chinese out of Sinkiang and set up a Turkic government. The only ones who welcome the existing rule are the Turks with positions in the party who have a vested interest in the present regime.

177 178 668 The wish for economic and technological change, while in general looked upon with favor, is opposed by those who have vested interests in the present system. The small artisans (Turk: zanaatkar ve el iscisiler) and handicraftsmen are likely to lose their livelihood with the coming of such changes. The social changes imposed on the population by the Communist regime, pave the way for the introduction of economic and technological changes. While industries threaten the existence of the small artisans, handicraftsmen, and merchants, the collective state farms, using new agricultural machinery and techniques, would threaten the existence of the small farmer, who could never afford such renovations, and is not encouraged by the present regime to own his land and equipment.

181 I. War and Peace Concepts

The Moslems are known in China for their courage in battles and their rebellious spirit. They are known to make good soldiers, when fighting for a cause they believe in. Their skill and talent in way enjoys a reputation as being superior to that of the Chinese.

181 721 779 The Turks have inherited their tradition of war and their fighting spirit from their nomadic ancestors, descendants of the great Turkic empires in Central Asia. War is not only a Turkic tradition, but a strong conception of war is also included in the Moslem religion. One of the five primary duties of a Moslem is to go on a Holy War (Jihad) and to fight in the name of Allah against the non-believers. This tradition stems from the early days of Islam during Mohammed's attempts to overcome his opponents, and it was particularly stressed during the days of the Moslem political and religious expansion. A Holy War today still is an important tool for rallying the believers of Islam to war, although its effectiveness cannot be compared with the times of the past.

While the duty of war is impressed on the believer against the domain of war, peace is the order in the domain of Islam among all the believers. 'Peace, in Turkic 'baris', has the connotation of giving each other shelter. It is important to keep in mind that while the Turks in Sinkiang could quite easily be rallied to war under an Islamic flag, fighting side by side with the Chinese is a totally different matter. The emotional cause and motivation, and the feeling of loyalty which constitute the important elements of the morale of any army, would be completely lacking there,

/Turks of Sinkiang/

181
721 and the Turkis are likely to make untrustworthy soldiers.
779

J. Material Concepts

556 One of the most important standards according to which an
183 individual's place in society was measured in Sinkiang was the extent of his wealth (Türk: zenginlik). The wealthy merchants
[565] and landowners for centuries occupied the leading positions in society, while those who lacked property, the poor and the beggars, were at the bottom of the social ladder. Wealth was considered as a sign of God's blessings (Türk: Allahin nimetleri) and of the individual's earthly wisdom. A man of property commanded political power as well as an important position in society, while a man who had been reduced to poverty lost all his prestige. Poverty was considered a disaster, as the following folk song
[735] indicates:
[539]

> "My horse is gone from before me,
> My whip is no more at my side.
> Even though this be my native land
> Poverty is come upon me."

(C.P. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p. 208)

556 From the Communist propaganda, it seems their intention is
668 to eliminate the wealthy classes. It is difficult to tell how many of the leading property owners have become influential under the
177 present regime as "Communist" leaders, and how many have been
[565] truly eliminated. If Communist doctrines are truly pursued, a new attitude in regard to property, will have to be developed. The association of property with the individual will cease, since the property will be transferred to the ownership of the state. We have indications that such a transformation has not fully occurred. The leadership of the Moslem community, however, has been transferred from its wealthy members to the party officials. An individual cannot aspire any more for advancement in terms of gathering more property, but only in terms of becoming an important party member.

815 As regards science (Türk : bilgi, verb. 'knowledge', the term
668 is as old as recorded Türkic history) there was not much of it p prior to the Communist revolution. The only type of knowledge
177 prevalent among the population was the knowledge of religion, of Islam, and the scholars of the Turkic community were its Islamic scholars, and not those versed in secular education. However, with the dependence of the new regime on the new regime of science and scientific achievements (sometimes the term science corresponds to what we mean by it, and often it is used to embrace much more), a new emphasis has been put on the sciences. There are very few among the Turkic people in Sinkiang who are familiar with any of the sciences, and therefore there still is no basic attitude or reaction to the world of science. It is regarded with mixed curiosity, admiration and fear. The term "science"

815 668 177 is not quite clear in the minds of the people - they are acquainted with the science of medicine, for which they have great respect, they are bombarded by propaganda telling them of the evil uses of scientific discoveries, mainly the "germ warfare" supposedly launched against China by the United States, and they are encouraged to adopt a "scientific" attitude toward the ideology of Communism, the science of revolution.

829 668 177 [439] Industrialization is, for the most part, a thing of the future as far as Sinkiang is concerned. The Turks do not even have a word for industry. They use now the term caliskanlik, meaning industriousness. Not much has been done in this field, and the products of industry have been brought to Sinkiang from China Proper and Soviet Russia. Since the process of industrialization will so strongly affect a large part of the urban population consisting of independent small artisans, shopkeepers and merchants, it is very likely that these groups will not look with favor at this process.

423 668 177 With the strong emphasis that the Turkic people put on ownership of property, particularly landed property, it is only natural that great resistance is encountered from both the small farmers and the big landowners to the process of collectivization. The incentive to work will, in many cases of collectivization, be taken away from the farmers, when they are not allowed to anjoy the products of their labor. Collectivization is forced on the Turkic people, and involves a basic change in their economic outlook and ideas. Collectivization may not affect the tenants as strongly, since they have never tilled their own land, and the loss to them is not as great, economically or psychologically, as it is to those who owned their land, no matter how small their property was.

K. Attitude toward the Present Political Regime

829 668 177 Communist sources describe the reaction of the national minorities to the new regime and its leaders as follows: "Political consciousness is rising; the people's love for Chairman Mao Tse-tung and their homeland is heightened by all that is happening day by day (Ulanfu, Vice-Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs, Report of the General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities), or, "The growth of the movement to resist United States aggression and aid Korea has further added to the education in patriotism among our national minorities whose overwhelming majority deeply love and warmly support Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government."

In spite of these statements, it is difficult to conceive how the Turks so "deeply love and warmly support" a Chinese leader who has not brought about the fulfillment of their national aspirations, but those of Chinese nationalism, and who has united them not with the world of Islam but with the Communist block. The glori-

S
829 fication of a non-Moslem is not likely to be a very spontaneous
• 668 movement on the part of the Turkic people, nor is it conceivable
177 that they "deeply love and warmly support the Central People's
Government." To most of them it is a remote government in a
foreign country - China - to which most of them have never been,
and it is very difficult for them to visualize it as the government
S to whom they owe supreme allegiance.

631 Direct authority is represented by the local government bodies.
554 Although composed of many Chinese officials, the representatives
of the local population fill prominent positions in the local govern-
668 ment also. There is a certain amount of pride felt by the local
177 people owing to the fact that some of the important leaders are
829 Turkic Moslems, who have achieved a position of importance in
the government. It is quite likely that leaders like Burkhan and Saifuddin are quite popular among the Turks of Sinkiang. The Turkic refugees abroad and the strongly nationalistic-minded ones who still are in Sinkiang, look at these leaders participating in the Chinese Communist regime as traitors cooperating with the oppressive powers, rather than national heroes.

II. The Mongols of the Northwest

N
A. Introductory Remarks

*563 Northwest China is the arena for some 150,000 Mongolian
[361] herdsmen. Although uniform in respect to their Buddhistic-
[162] nomadic culture and language (with the exception of the Monguors
S who speak a Mongolian-Tibetan mixed dialect) they do not con-
563 stitute a political or areal unit, living as they do thousands of
[361] miles apart, in the northeastern area of Sinkiang, around the Tsai-
[162] dam swamps area, in the Edzingol area, in the northern part of
Kansu and even in some enclaves in Shensi. Since Chingis Khan, they have never constituted a political unit, although Legdan Khan united the major parts of them into a short-lived empire (see Historical Setting).

The reason for this lack of unity is first and above all, the fact that the Mongols of the Northwest area are outnumbered by Chinese (30 million) and Turks (4 million). The second reason is the treatment by the Manchus who shifted the Mongol banners from place to place in connection with the Manchu, Sibo, and Solon banners, who constituted the main and more reliable garrisons in the frontier area. The reliability of the Mongolian garrisons was partly due to the policy toward the banner and tribal leaders who were made wang (king) or nobles of various ranks.

N
B. Views of the People with Respect to their own Country

*563 The average Mongol of the Northwest is fully aware of the fact
829 that he belongs to a minority and that all he possesses are his
S
563
829

/Mongols of the Northwest/

N
829 pastures, but not a country. Nationalistic movements of recent
*563 times hardly reached the Mongols of the Northwest (see Political
*[668] Dynamics) and serious attempts to join a greater Mongolian unit
S (Outer Mongolia) have never been made by the Mongols of Sinkiang.
829 For most of the other Mongolian splinter groups of Chinghai,
563 Kansu and Shensi, such an ambition would have been still more
● [668] unrealistic due to their geographical separation from Inner and
Outer Mongolia and due to their more progressed sinification, which is especially true for the Chinghai and Shensi Mongols. (Two heretofore isolated groups in Kansu, the Mongols of Alashan and Edzingol have recently been incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.)

For the Mongols of the Northwest their country is China and their supreme representative, the court of the government in Peking. Their immediate superiors and chiefs were the banner leaders who observed a rather strict loyalty to China's court or government as they received a yearly apanage and, after having performed special, mostly military, services for the court in Peking, were promoted to higher ranks which in turn meant an increase in their yearly presents received from Peking. This fact did not encourage them to make any attempts toward independence, self-determination or autonomy. The Mongols of the Northwest thus did not think of their country but of their domain. An important aspect of this view is also the cultural basis of the Northwest Mongols, Lamaism, whose realm is everywhere where Buddhists live and whose center is Lhasa (Tibetan: 'the city of
S gods') rather than Peking. For the religious world is the real
N and essential world to them, the Dalai Lama, the supreme spiri-
[792] tual leader of all Lama Buddhists, became more real and essential to them than the supreme political leader in Peking.

C. Traditional Attitudes of the Northwest Mongols

No matter where Mongols live, some trends are common to all of them: the pride of being a Mongol; the pride of speaking Mongolian, which is considered by them as melodious, sonorous, and full-toned in comparison with the 'chirping and cackling' of
S Chinese; and finally, the pride of being a free nomad, herding
N wherever he wants and riding wherever he wishes. Whenever
[197] Mongols meet each other they can communicate with each other as their dialects differ only slightly. They realize, too, that they have even more in common than only external appearance and language, something which is of utmost importance to all of them - their Lamaistic religion. In these respects they certainly feel that they constitute at least an ethnic unit, very different from the Chinese for whom they do not want to be mistaken.

/Mongols of the Northwest/

N
829 These feelings and emotional attitudes were hardly sufficient to
*563 arouse animosity or hatred toward the Chinese but rather an un-
S justified and unwarranted feeling of superiority. The progressive
829 advancement of Chinese settlers, however, who gradually took
563 over lot after lot of their pasture land led not only to hatred but
resulted in petty uprisings, so that even the Manchu government
several times issued laws against Chinese advancements, which
were hardly ever observed. Complaints of the Mongol leaders
did not help and they were numerically too weak for military action.

Only in the case of the sedentary Mongols of the Northwest, the Monguors, such problems never arose, as they had become so strongly sinified that their tribal leaders were considered by the Chinese themselves as Chinese officials with a reputation of absolute loyalty.

S D. Attitudes toward the Communist Regime

N
Throughout the history of the Mongols, their pattern of living,
(178) internal and external, changed very little. Their families con-
(596) stituted auls, the auls, clans and the clans, tribes. Besides this
(614) structural organization, there existed the military institutions of
(619) banners and leagues. The internal order was always strict and
(701) the laws and regulations hard. A leader who was not strict and
(622) hard would hardly be considered as a leader and the history of
(554) the Mongols shows that a strong leader always evoked their respect
and found them to be submissive followers.

N In view of this fact there is little doubt that the Mongols of the
829 Northwest will respect the iron hand of Peking, even though probably
*563 with mixed emotions. The creation of autonomous chous (districts)
populated only or overwhelmingly by Mongols might give them a
*668 certain feeling of self-determination and cultural autonomy. The
177 organization of veterinarian stations which take care of their live-
(634) stock will certainly be welcome to the nomads; the organization of
(242) a widespread educational system might be another asset for the
S Communists as it fosters Mongolian language and promotes litera-
829 ture written in Mongolian. The establishment of permanent
563 winter sites, on the other hand, which is contradictory to Mongol
668 customs and above all the threatening collectivization of their
177 livestock, which is the Mongols' highest and greatest treasure,
(634) are negative aspects. This, of course, refers to the present
(242) generation only. The younger and youngest generation, subject to
S
N
(361) a very vivid and propagandistic education will undoubtedly change
their attitude toward the present regime, a process for which
the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia are a classic example. (see also
IMAR Handbook, same section).

N
829 III. The Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans
*563 An attempt at a cohesive description of popular attitudes among
S
829
563

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1
China AF1

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

N
635

*668 I. The Historical Background

177 When the Communists conquered Northwest China, they created
S 635 a Northwestern administrative area, which included the five provinces
● 628 of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. In 1954, the
177 Communist Government abolished Ninghsia Province and put it
S under the jurisdiction of Kansu. In 1955 it changed Sinkiang Province
S [642] into the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. So now, Northwest
China includes three provinces, namely, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai,
and one autonomous region, Sinkiang.

N Historically speaking, Shensi and Kansu were under one gover-
635 nor-general during the Manchu Dynasty. For many purposes, such
631 as provincial examinations, the two provinces were handled as a
*175 unit. At that time, part of Chinghai and Ninghsia were considered
S 635 to belong to Kansu. While most of Sinkiang was administered under
631 a special military government system, its eastern strip, from
175 Tihua (Urumchi) to Hami, was under the jurisdiction of the gover-
nor-general of Shen-Kan. When Sinkiang later was made a province,
it absorbed all the territory west of Hami.

N 635 Under the Nationalist Government, the Kokonor area was sep-
arated from Kansu. It became the nucleus of the Province of
631 Chinghai, which was established in 1928. During the same year
*175 the Nationalist Government also established Ninghsia Province by
uniting the northern counties of Kansu along the Yellow River with
N the two Mongolian Banners, Alashan and Edsin. Thus, when the
*[668] Communist Government abolished Ninghsia as a province by com-
bining it with Kansu, it merely reestablished part of the old border
line.

S During most of the Manchu Dynasty, Sinkiang was a special
175 area. The local people retained a high degree of self-government.
631 Even after the area was established as a province, the Chinese
635 government let the local leaders handle most of the business of
[642] their own people. Thus, the establishment of an autonomous region
in Sinkiang also had a historical basis.

C

II. The Constitutional Systems

175
642

A. Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic

669 In October of 1927, Mao Tse-tung retreated to the border area
668 of Hunan and Kiangsi. There he established the "Hunan-Kiangsi
Border Region Worker-Peasant Government". This was the begin-
ning of the Chinese Soviet Government. After the Communists had
consolidated their position, they established a "Constitution of
the Chinese Soviet Republic". This was a Communist constitution
for a Communist government. After suffering severe losses from
Nationalist attacks, the Chinese Communists were no longer able

000 purge took place.

N *668 798 In order to control Christians, the Communists sponsored a movement to reorganize the churches. Following the principles of Communism all the churches were supposed to be combined under the leadership of the Communist government. The movement started with a government-sponsored statement entitled, "Road for Chinese Christian Churches in Reconstructing New China." All Christians were asked to sign their names to this statement. To most Christians, this movement was a rebellion against God. To the Communists, any Christian who refused to sign was a potential "counter-revolutionary". According to the Communist report, 1,527 Christians signed the statement in August and 1,741 signed in September of 1950. Among these, 44 were in Shensi and 1 in Kansu. (Peking Jen-min Jih-pao, December 5, 1950). No detailed figures of the later years are on hand but it was the start of a continuous persecution of Christians loyal to their faith.

An editorial of the Jen-min jih-pao of July 7, 1955 complained about sabotage activities of "reactionary" religious groups in Shensi and Kansu during 1954 and recommends: "We must take effective actions and resolutely beat the sinful activities of all the reactionary religious groups.... We must severely suppress these religious leaders. As to the common believers... we must order them to register in the government and force them to sign a pledge to withdraw from their religious organizations."

S 668 423 692 The Sinkiang jih-pao of June 18, 1953 discussed the activities of people's courts in the district of Urumchi: "When the land reform began, the personnel of the courts cooperated with the land reform teams to penetrate into the villages. They called various meetings and publicized the policy, function and missions of the people's court... They encouraged the mass to accuse the landlords,.... Generally they would arrest the landlords... confiscate their property and publicly liquidate them. When a case could be used to educate the people they would convict the man in public trial before a mass meeting. For instance, after the arrest of the unlawful landlord Je-he-p'u (most likely an Uighur) of T'o-k'e-sun, the team and the court organized a small scale liquidating meeting against him in his village. Then they organized a large scale liquidating meeting in the hsiang with deputies from every district of the county presented.... In less important cases, the landlords were warned before the public... and forced to admit their sin and publicly accuse themselves... The important point is to use the local people as the judge and the jury. ... For instance, when the 3rd hsiang of the 3rd district of Shanshan publicly accused the local despot and landlord P'ai-tsu-nan (probably an Uighur), the judge and the jury were all minority cadres. The mass was very much pleased, saying, "Now... it

S
668 is our own people who are judging and sentencing people." But. . . we must give the minority cadres concrete help and guidance."

423 692 The Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1955, no. 7, reported: "On March 14, 1955, the People's Court of Hsien-yang County in Shensi called a public accusation rally to punish Chao Chu-shih. It reclassified him as a landlord, and confiscated all his land, drafting animals, farming tools and houses, except the part his family deserves to have."

C
IV. The Pledges and Practices Regarding Economic Rights

668 423 In view of this lack of personal security very few people dared to defend their property rights. In the Common Program of 1949, Article 3 stated: "The People's Republic of China must abolish all the prerogatives of imperialist countries in China. It must confiscate bureaucratic capital and put it into the possession of the people's state. It must systematically transform the feudal and semi-feudal land ownership system into a system of peasant land ownership; it must protect the public property of the state and of the cooperatives and must protect the economic interests and private property of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. It must develop the people's economy of New Democracy and steadily transform the country from an agricultural into an industrial one." A number of terms in this article are vague; they are presumably to be kept this way to allow for a flexible interpretation.

It is hard to draw a definite line between the "bureaucratic capital" and "economic interests and private property of workers, farmers, the petty bourgeoisie class and the national bourgeoisie." Only after the loss of one's property, he would realize that he was a bureaucratic capitalist or feudal, or semi-feudal landowner. Those who kept their property would have to regard it as a favor rather than a right.

C
The present Communist Constitution is more explicit. It has 668 quite a number of articles relating to economic system and rights. These are articles four to fourteen. Besides, there are several 642 more articles to protect the citizens, namely 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 421 96, 97, etc.

In these articles the constitution clearly states that the economic system in a socialist nation shall be built on state ownership, supplemented by cooperative ownership, (articles 6 and 7), while they are definitely going to eliminate "rich-peasant economy" (article 8) and "capitalist ownership" (article 10). The protection of the rights of ownership and inheritance (article 12), the property of the individual farmers (article 8) and workers (article 9) is subject to the regulations of law which will be adjusted from time to time to encourage the individual owners to organize cooperatives voluntarily. Protection of private income, savings, housing, and

C
668 other living materials is limited to those which are "legitimate."
642 Thus landlords cannot legitimately collect rent on land and
421 interest on loans. The legal status of house rent and banks'
C payment of interest on deposit are not yet clarified. The duty of
[651] paying taxes (article 102), the privilege of working hard (article
[461] 91), and the responsibility of offering contributions in labor,
money and kind, furnish more means for the Communist government
to ensure "the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the
building of a socialist society." (article 4)

C Late in 1950, the agrarian reform movement began to spread.
668 The movement did not concern itself only with the redistribution
423 of land, but also included the confiscation and redistribution of
422 draft animals, farm implements, grain supplies, and so forth,
which was later to be followed by a program of cooperativization.
Some excerpts from the Chinese press will illustrate how the
agrarian reform was handled in the Northwest.

S The New China News Agency, November 16, 1950, reported:
• [668] "The farmers in Sinkiang, including the various minorities, deeply
felt the warmth of the People's Government and the People's Army
[421] and requested to pay more taxes (in grain).... At the same time,
[651] the peasants in various places universally started class struggle
against the... criminal landlords."

The same agency, December 7, 1950, reported the start of a
S "Rent Reduction and Down with Local Despots" campaign in the
668 Northwest as a prelude to full scale land reform. From the win-
423 ter of 1950 through the spring of 1951, it was reported that 3017
N hsiang (administrative villages) confiscated more than 1,000,000
*668 mou of land (each mou is ca. 1/6 acre), 30,000 heads of draft
423 animals and more than 200,000 pieces of farm implements in
Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. By May, 1952,
4364 hsiang in the Northwest had completed 72.6% of the original
quota. (NCNA, May 28, 1951). In total, during the winter and
spring seasons of 1951 and 1952 more than 20,000,000 mou of land
were confiscated in the Northwest. The population who received
land and other productive material was from 10,000,000 to
12,000,000 people. (Sian Ch'ün-chung Jih-pao, May 5, 1952.)

S Thus Burhan, the Governor of Sinkiang, could report to the
668 Sinkiang Provincial People's Congress on September 20, 1955:
"From September, 1952 to the end of 1953, in the agricultural
423 district of Sinkiang we completed the whole program of land reform.
We destroyed the landlord class. We abolished feudal land owner-
ship. We confiscated and condemned more than 7,300,000 mou
land and other properties to be distributed to 2,100,000 poor
farmers with little or no land."

S A report by the Vice Secretary-general of the Communist
[578] party at Aksu, Sinkiang, P'eng I-min, in Sinkiang jih-pao, April
3, 1953, reveals, however, some of the difficulties which the land
reform movement encountered in Sinkiang.

S
668 reform movement encountered in Sinkiang. The attempts at forced
423 cooperation resulted in many hard feelings and in violations of the
578 principles set forth by the government. Examples were cited of
474 "middle farmers" supplying carts or other tools, but not participating in the actual labor. Village cadres were unwilling to work on the cooperative farms lest their private interests suffer. Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding people who would accept responsibility. A partial solution was sought in sending more professional party workers to aid the cadres.

N Similar reports are available from other parts of the North-
*668 west. From these reports the following trends can be gathered:
423 (1) In the program of cooperativization the policy was to exclude
474 not only the landlords but also the rich farmers. Since those who
S were not in the cooperatives would suffer social and economic os-
668 tracisim, the threat to all individual farmers kept out of the co-
423
474 operatives was great.

(2) The experience of those who did join the cooperative groups, however, was not happy. Their hard work often was not properly rewarded. It was difficult to keep the record of credits straight. This was the reason why many cooperatives collapsed.

(3) However, the average farmer, including the party cadre, dreamed of becoming a rich farmer and private businessman.

Against this background one can understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's drive for one million cooperatives in 1955. According to Mao's plan, by the spring of 1958 half of the agricultural population must be organized into cooperatives. In other words, by that time, half of the farmers in Northwest China would no longer be working on their own farms.

N In the field of commerce and industry, the 3-anti and 5-anti
*668 movements were the prelude to the program which calls for the
472 total elimination of private enterprise.

S
668 As described above, the political rights in the Chinese Soviet
472 days followed the conventional Communist Party line. But during
N the Second World War, the Chinese Communists had advocated
*668 their democratic government and democratic elections in the
666 border regions. Their procedure of a secret ballot included the following practices: "Each of the candidates' names is written on a bowl. The voter drops a bean or pea in the bowl bearing the name of his choice. If his election "unit" is entitled to more than one representative, he is given the proper number of beans. If a considerable number of the voters cannot read, the candidates are lined up, each carrying a well-calanced bowl or basket on his back. The voter drops his bean or beans into the bowl or bowls of his favorite candidate or candidates. The bowl is carried on the back to insure secrecy, so that no candidate knows who elects whom." (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 59.)

C
668 By this law, the key elections are those below the county level.
671 These elections were generally open elections by raising of hands
666 in public. Only under special conditions were secret ballots allowed.

Furthermore, in spite of article 4, which promised equal rights of election to different groups of people, article 5 disqualified everyone who might vote in opposition.

The control of elections was tightened by article 8. As all campaign expenses are dispersed by the State Treasury, the Communists can easily make or break any candidate.

C
668 In the new Constitution of 1954, there are at least ten articles,
642 i.e., 23, 24, 27, 38, 39, 44, 56, 61, 86, referring to the right to
666 vote or right to stand for election. There is no basic change from
the situation analyzed above.

N C. Political Rights in Practice

631 The following news items trace the practice of political rights
*668 in the Northwest: "On the basis of the universal convocation of
People's Representatives' Conferences of all circles in municipalities and counties throughout the country, 20 provinces have successfully convened their first Provincial People's Representatives' Conference of all circles. These provinces and districts are...Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai...

N
631 "Of these, the People's Representatives' Conferences of all
*668 circles of the first 16 provinces in the above list have successfully
666 elected their respective Provincial People's Government Committees. The People's Representatives' Conferences of various provinces and administrative districts have further elected and set up consultative committees to assist the government in carrying out the resolutions of the conference after it adjourns." (NCNA, Peking, December 20, 1950).

N
631 "Since last year, the provincial and municipal People's Gov-
*668 ernments in the Northwest region have attached importance to
People's Representative Conferences. Except for some pastoral districts of Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang which still do not possess conditions for holding People's Representative Conferences, all counties and municipalities in the Northwest have held People's Representative Conferences while those of over 80 counties and municipalities exercise the functions and power of People's Congresses. But there are still a number of responsible officials of counties and municipalities who do not sufficiently understand that People's Representative Conferences and People's Congresses represent the basic system of our state and who do not convene People's Representative Conferences according to the system." (NCNA, Sian, July 15, 1952)

S "During the three years from 1949 to 1952, twice the Provin-
631 cial Conference of Representatives of All Nationalities and All
668 Groups of the People was held in Sinkiang Province. In each of

S
631 the 78 counties, 1 municipality, 1 central district in Sinkiang, at
● 668 least three times, and up to nine times... these conferences have
been held. In Tihua Municipality and Ch'ien-tse County, the con-
S
ference has already acted as the People's Congress. It elected
[666) the mayor or the head of the county and the Council members..."
(Burhan: "The great achievements during the three years of
people's Sinkiang" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 1, 1953).

S
"In October, 1953, a general election was held..." (Burhan:
668 "The work report of the past six years of the Sinkiang Provincial
666 People's Government," a report at the 2nd meeting of the 1st
session of the Provincial People's Congress, in Hsin-hua yüeh-
pao, 1955, No. 11, p. 30).

N
This general election mentioned by the Governor of Sinkiang,
*668 Burhan, was one part of the election held all over the country. It
666 was carried out according to the Electoral Law of 1953. The
S
nation-wide election was not completed until September, 1954, just
668 in time to meet for voting on the new Constitution. The meetings
666 of the leading local People's Congresses in the Northwest were held
on the following dates: (NCNA, August 24, 1954)

Unit	Beginning (1954)	End (1954)	Days of Meeting	Deputies Elected to the National People's Congress
Sian Municipality	July 14	July 17	4	8
Sinkiang Province	July 21	July 31	11	21
Chinghai Province	August 4	August 15	12	9
Shensi Province	August 4	August 12	8	19
Kansu Province	August 16	August 20	5	25

The real meaning of this kind of election was well illustrated in a deputy's confession: "I have never thought of being elected as a deputy to the National People's Congress. Some of my friends ran over the other day to congratulate me, saying, 'Do you know that? You have already received the weighty trust of the people of the whole nation. You are a deputy!'

"When I read my name in the People's Daily I did not know whether I was happy or flurried. My eyes became moist. I was grateful as well as ashamed. I felt that I could hardly catch my breath." (Ts'ao Yü, "I must do my job well as a deputy to the National People's Congress" in Hsin-kuan-ch'a, 1954, No. 18, September 16, p. 3).

VI. The Rights of the Minorities

C
668 A. Constitutional Rights
641 In the Common Program of 1949, chapter VI defined the Com-
642 munists' Nationality Policy. In this chapter, it said:
Article 50: All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's
Republic of China are equal....

C
668 Article 51: Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where
641 national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy
642 organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according
to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.

Article 53: All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs...

In the Constitution of 1954 the articles 3, 53, 54, 60, 67-72, 77, and 86 refer to the minorities. Some statements in these articles are very concrete, such as:

"Article 68: In all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties where a number of nationalities live together, each nationality is entitled to appropriate representation on the organs of self-government.

Article 71: In performing their duties, organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used in the locality.

Article 77: Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The People's Courts are to provide interpretation for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality.

In an area where people of national minorities live in compact communities or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in people's courts are conducted in the language commonly used in the locality, and judgments, notices and all other documents of the people's courts are made public in such language."

Others are more vague, such as articles 3, 67, 70 and 72. Contrary to Article 4 of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic of the early 1930's, which stated that the minority groups "may either join the Chinese Soviet state or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer," the Constitution of 1954 denies the right of secession. It says in clear and definite words: "National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China." (Article 3). Before further analysis can be made, some essential data help reveal the Communists' policy in practice toward the minorities in the Northwest.

S
B. Class Barriers vs. Nationality Barriers

563 1) "Comrade Editor:
423 In November, 1952, when the six 'land-reform experimenting
431 hsiang' in the 5th district of Sui-ting County were 'distributing the
565
668

563 fruit of struggle' there were more landlords and more fruits in the
423 1st hsiang than the 6th hsiang where both the landlords and fruits
431 were few. The laboring people of the 1st hsiang passed to the
565 peasants of the 6th hsiang fruits valued to 400 buckets (hu) of wheat
• 668 and 3,000 mou (about 500 acres) of rice paddies for distribution.
The peasants of the 6th hsiang were deeply moved and wept. The 6th hsiang originally was a Kazakh area. When the Russians, Chinese Uighurs, Mongols of the 1st hsiang...drove carts loaded with fruits to the hsiang, the Kazakh fellow-citizens were so happy that they jumped up and down and ran to the side of the carts. They hugged the Russians and kissed them. They stuck out their thumbs before the Chinese (a gesture of approval) and yelled 'A-k'ang' (i.e. elder brother). They danced with the Uighurs and the Mongols.

At the same time, when the 6th hsiang classified the people, they found that there were 2 Chinese landlords, 1 Uighur landlord and 4 Kazakh landlords. People suddenly realized that the ones
[186) who had suppressed the people were these landlords, not the landlords of one particular nationality, and certainly not any nationality as a whole..." (Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 24, 1953).

668 This is an excellent example of the way the Communists carry
565 the class struggle across nationality lines. They substitute class
186 hatred for national hatred.

2) "The second stage of land reform in Shu-le County, Sinkiang,
✓ 668 involved 20 hsiang and lasted 78 days from December 12, 1952, to
423 March 3, 1953... In these 20 hsiang (during the land reform) we have developed 859 'positive elements,' an average of more than forty people in each hsiang. This laid the foundation for further works....

"Before the confiscation, we called in the rich farmers, the small land lessors and religious leaders for discussion meetings. In these meetings we explained the policy of preserving 'rich farmer economy' and 'freedom of religious belief.' In execution, we definitely carried out the government's policy toward the mosques. Besides leaving strictly alone the land originally owned by the mosques, through consultation between the mosques and the farmers associations, we left a reasonable amount of land to the mosques which had lost their land through confiscation. In the bazaar, we called meetings of businessmen. There we propagated one step forward the policy of protecting business. Throughout the confiscation we did not touch business owned by the landlords.

"We strengthened the work of the United Front. Through the upper level, the religious leaders and people with high prestige and influence among the local mass, we promoted the propaganda of our policy. Hence we avoided the fear psychology which had spread among the landlords to a certain extent. During the confiscation, we firmly carried out the policy of discrimination. We carried out struggled against landlords who stubbornly resisted,

668
423 but gave a certain degree of good care to the liberal-minded landlords during the procedure of confiscation. To those obedient landlords we only carried out confiscation but not the struggle. Besides land, other properties were left to them for a while before actual confiscation. Thus we isolated the stubborn landlords, reduced the resistance and increased help. Under the threat of the peasants, the majority of the landlords expressed willingness to be obedient.

"But there were still defects and mistakes...(1) We were not able to build up the poor farmers and hired hands to be the nucleus of the movement as we had planned...(On the contrary), it was the middle farmers who led the poor farmers, and the poor farmers who led the hired hands...(2) Some farmers...gave sympathy to the landlords during the confiscation and dared not accept the land in distribution...(3) During the distribution, there was illustrated a serious domination of the party cadres over the farmers...." (Yang Tseng-wen, "Victoriously concluded the work of the second stage of land reform in Shu-le County" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, 1953, April 3.)

Some basic facts in this statement can be summarized as follows:

(1) Natives were used to fight against the natives.

(2) Native workers were selected and built up through various devices.

(3) Enemy groups were divided and isolated by discriminating treatment.

(4) Only a few of the most stubborn enemies were selected as targets at one time. Thus most of the people were kept hopeful and cooperative.

(5) Religious groups and the local leaders with great influence among the minorities were handled with care.

668
563 The policy of controlling the minority groups through minority cadres is further shown in the following report: "In the whole special district...of Ili, there originally were 3243 cadres at the hsiang, ch'ü, county and special district level. During 1952...the number increased to 4736. It was a 46.3% increase over that of 1951.... During the past one year,...more than 30,000 common workers and farmers became 'positive elements' who executed the policy and orders of the Communist Party and the People's Government....

"During the past year, 90% of the cadres of the special district received education and drill through the struggles of the suppression of the counter-revolutionists movement, the American Aid-Korea movement, the reduce-rent and anti-despot movement, the land reform movement, the 3-anti and 5-anti movement...and joined the Communist Party and Youth Corps. Some of them became leading workers. According to the incomplete statistics, in the whole special district there were 274 persons promoted from 'positive elements' to become new cadres; 88 persons promoted from cadres to leading

S
668
563

cadres; (among these 17 were at the level of county head, 2 were at the level of division head in the special district, 46 were at the level of division head in the county, 23 were at the level of ch'ü head); 22 persons promoted from servants to be cadres; with a grand total of 384 promotions. Among these, 93% belonged to the minority groups and 7% were Chinese. 84% of those being promoted from 'positive elements' were selected from the workers and farmers." (A report from Ili in Sinkiang jih-pao, January 18, 1953. Cf. Chao Hua-Sheng: "A report on Party construction in the 1st hsiang of Aya ch'ü in Hami Qumul County" in Sinkiang jih-pao, January 24, 1953.)

N
*668
*563
S
[668]
[563]

With this control of the minority groups from inside, the Communists claim to be promoting the minority autonomy and internationality harmony with unprecedented success. The following are some of the reports: 1) "A report on the life of the Tibetan minority in the Northwest, 'Improvement of the political, economic and cultural life of the Tibetans in China during the past year,' given by Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o, Tibetan Vice-chairman of the Chinghai Provincial Government, appeared recently in the Sian Ch'ün-chung jih pao and was released by NCNA from Peking on November 2, 1950, stating:

'In political life, Tibetans now participate in the work of the people's government on all levels and spheres. They take part in local, and national conferences, where they study the work of the government, discuss and adopt government decisions and enjoy the right to vote and to be elected. They also visit other parts of the country to study conditions and exchange experiences. Like all other fraternal nationalities, they have become masters in name and in reality. Any dispute arising among nationalities is solved by ways of arbitration and discussion on the principle of equality, through which they have realized the importance of unity among various nationalities!'"

2) "In the past three years, the people's governments at all levels in the Northwest region have correctly and definitely implemented the nationalities policy, carried out nationalities work, and made great achievements. More than 3000 cases of internationality conflicts were mediated, of which some had not been solved in the past decades or in hundreds of years. Nationality democratic coalition governments have been established in various places. 11 autonomous areas, equivalent to first grade district and counties have been established. Besides, the Yu-shu autonomous area, equivalent to a first grade special district with a dense population of Tibetans, has been established in Chinghai province. About 30,000 cadres of the national minorities have been trained throughout the region to take part in political work, and some of them have become the backbone of the local political work." (NCNA, Sian, May 12, 1952.)

N
*668
*563

The success, however, is not so complete as it is indicated in these reports. While there are minority groups which cooperate with the Communists, others do not. A good example is Hsiang Ch'ien, a Tibetan chief in Chinghai, who fought against the Communists from the beginning of the Communists' rule till he exhausted his supplies. For more than two years, the Communists wooed him to no avail. In 1952, he suffered big losses, and even his family was captured by the Communists. The Communists mobilized numerous local leaders to talk terms with him and finally brought him to surrender. This case was publicized because it had a "happy ending" for the Communists. It nevertheless indicates that not all goes as well in the Northwest as the Communists might like.

N
*668
*563
19
[642]

D. Minority Languages

Besides these general practices of the Communist minority policy, a special point of interest is the promise in article 3 of the Communist constitution: "All the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages." In fact, the Communists even intended to create new written languages for those nationalities who had not had a written language of their own. (A resolution at the 217th meeting of the Government Administration Council on May 20, 1954, in K'e-hsüeh t'ung-pao, 1954, July issue p. 24). After consultation with experts a compromise was reached in 1954. It was decided to try one or two new written languages first. After reviewing the whole situation, Lo Ch'ang-p'ei, head of the Institute of Linguistics of China Science Academy, drew this conclusion: "Not only may the minority groups learn written and spoken Chinese before their own written language is created, but even after they have a written language, it is still necessary for them to learn Chinese." (Lo Ch'ang-p'ei, "Following the direction of the Government Administration Council to help the various nationalities without language to create their own," in K'e-hsüeh t'ung-pao, July, 1954, pp. 24-26.)

The language policy is apparently two-fold. On the one hand, the minority groups may retain their own languages; on the other hand, they are encouraged, it not required, to learn the Chinese language. This second policy has to be seen in the light of the drive to promote the national language and to eliminate all local dialects. Judging by the trend in the Soviet Union, the minority groups at least will be required to learn and to use the Chinese language, regardless of the fate of their own.

S
•668
563
19

A team to investigate the minority languages in Sinkiang was organized and sent to the field by the Institute of Linguistics of the China Science Academy. They stayed in Sinkiang for over fifty days recording and collecting material concerning the local

S
668 languages. This seems to be part of the effort toward the creation
563 of the new written languages.
19 So far the only new written language on record in the Northwest
S is the language used in Kozelesu Khalkha Kirghiz Autonomous Chou
19 in Sinkiang. This Kirghiz group had had a written language before,
212 but it used now an Arabic alphabet. The Government adopted for
the group, the Soviet Kirghiz script and created a new 3--letter
alphabet. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, April 11, 1955.)

N As the situation stands in 1956, the written languages, other
S 19 than Chinese, used in the Northwest are Uighur, Kazakh, Manchu,
212 Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kirghiz.

N
*668 635 offices were usually members of the Provincial Council. The people in the Council also ran the administrative organs; under the Communists, however, most of the members of the People's Councils have no part in the bureaus and offices where real power lies.

(3) Under the Nationalists, the chairman of the Provincial Council had effective control. Under the Communists the chairman of the provincial People's Government in the past, or the governor of the provincial People's Council at present, may or may not have control. For instance, the chairman of Kansu in 1950, Tent Pao-san, was merely a figurehead, and the newly-elected governor of Shensi, Chao Shou-shan, looks like another. But Ma Ming-fan, chairman of Shensi in 1950, definitely held power. In brief, the influence and power of a local official under the Communists does not depend on his official position in the government, but on his relations with the party. Ma Ming-fang was important because he was also the Deputy Secretary-General of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party.

(4) Under the Nationalists, when a minority leader such as Ma Hung-k'uei was appointed provincial chairman in the Northwest, he had authority in fact as well as in name. The Communists publicize the northwest local government members who belong to minority groups, but in practice what matters is the assignment given to the member by the Party. If a trusted party member - be he Chinese or Muslim - is assigned to run the office he is the actual head, even if he has a low rank. However, he is only a wheel in the party machinery, and has very little freedom to act on his own.

N
[631] (5) Under the Communists, the local governments at every level are much larger and more powerful than under the Nationalists. See Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 for the structure and personnel of the provincial governments in Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Sinkiang in 1950, and Table 6 for the relationships between local governments in the present stage.

N
*668 635
S
• 668 635 The specific structure of each provincial government in Northwest China and of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as of 1955, is not yet available. Except for the abolition of the Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs and the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, one may assume that the present structure of these provinces and of the Sinkiang Uughur Autonomous Region are approximately the same as in 1950.

N
*668 633 Sian was a municipality directly under the central government authority from late in 1949 until 1954. The people's government of the city had thirteen different bureaus and offices, and the area was divided into twelve districts. In 1950, the mayor was Chia T'o-fu and the deputy mayors were Fang Chung-ju and Chang Feng-po. In 1952 the mayor was Fang, with Chang Feng-po and

N
*668 Ch'en Shih-yü deputy mayors. All were appointed by the central
[633] People's Government. After the abolition of the administrative
region in 1954, the Communist Government made these major
N changes in Northwest China:
[633] (1) Sian was changed from a municipality under central authority
N to a municipality under the authority of Shensi province.
[635] (2) Ninghsia was made part of Kansu on September 27, 1954.
S (3) Sinkiang province was made the Sinkiang Uighur autonomous
● [668] region on October 1, 1955.
[635] Thus, in 1955 the administrative units of Northwest China were
N
*668 quite different from those of 1950. The units under Shensi, Kansu,
631 and Chinghai are summarized in Table 7. The units under Sinkiang
S
668 in early 1955 are shown in Table 8, while those after October 1,
631 1955, are shown in Table 9.
N After the promulgation of the Chinese Communist constitution
*668 in 1954, elections were held and People's Congresses and People's
631 Councils were organized. There were some personnel changes,
666 but the general structure and control of the government remained
about the same.

III. Government of the Autonomous Districts

N
*175

A. Earlier Systems

631 In the past, although the Chinese government gave little pub-
*563 licity to them, autonomous governments existed among the minori-
S ties in Northwest China. As late as the 1880's, when the proposal
175 to transform Sinkiang into a regular province was presented to the
631 Court, it met with strong opposition on the grounds that the minor-
563 ities who differed from the Chinese in tradition, language, religion,
and customs would be difficult to govern. Before then, the minorities had been governed by their own leaders. Even after the area became a province, the life of the minorities was not greatly disturbed.

N

B. The Communist System

*668 The Communists have a definite program for changing the
*563 social and economic order. Knowing that cooperation is neces-
631 sary to attain their aims, the Communists intend to lessen the
S friction between racial groups under their regime. On the surface,
668 they grant autonomous governments to the minorities; in fact, they
563 control them from within through hand-picked Party members.
631 So far there is no evidence to show that the structure of these autonomous local governments is essentially different from that of the regular local governments. The government of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as well as of the local governments under it, superficially is the same as under the former Sinkiang province. A complete list of all autonomous districts in Northwest China,

N
*668 with the local governmental divisions down to the county level, is
*563 shown in Table 10.
631
S
● 668
563
631

TABLE 8

Administrative Units in Sinkiang Province early in 1955:

631
635
● 668

NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Sinkiang province	Urumchi	4 municipalities 1 branch office 10 special districts 4 autonomous chou (special districts); under these and the regular special districts, there are altogether 75 counties and 4 autonomous areas at the county level

TABLE 9

Administrative Units in Sinkiang Province since October 1, 1955:

NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region	Urumchi	4 municipalities 7 special districts 5 autonomous chou (special districts) with a total, under these and the regular special districts, of 74 counties and 6 autonomous hsien[1]

---

[1] The three special districts of Ili, T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak), and Altai were combined to make the Kazakh autonomous chou of Ili. On February 5, 1955, all the self-governing special districts were renamed "autonomous chou" and the self-governing counties were renamed "autonomous hsien."

TABLE 10
Autonomous Administrative Units at or above the County Level:

• 668
631
634
563
[635]

NAME	DESCRIPTION
SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION	Same as the former Sinkiang province
Kazakh autonomous chou of Ili	The three former special districts of Ili, T'a-ch'eng, and Altai (Chuguchak)
Mongol autonomous chou of Pa-yin-ko-leng (Bayankara)	Including the two counties of Ho-shuo and Ho-ching, and the Moslem autonomous hsien of Yen-ch'i
Kirghiz (Kolkoz) autonomous chou of K'e-tzu-le-su (Koslesu)	Including the three counties of A-ho-ch'i, U-ch'a, and A-t'u-shih, and the Tajik autonomous hsien of T'a-shih-k'u-erh
Moslem autonomous chou of Ch'ang-chi (Changki)	Including the three counties of Urumchi, Mi-ch'üan, and Ch'ang-chi
Mongol autonomous chou of Po-erh-t'a-la (Borotala)	Including the three counties of Wen-ch'üan, Chingho, and Po-lo
Sibe (Sibo) autonomous hsien of Ch'a-pu-cha-erh (Chapchal)	In the Ili area
Mongol autonomous hsien of Ho-pu-k'e-sai-erh (Hobukozel)	In the T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak) area
Kazakh autonomous hsien of Pa-li-k'un (Balikun)	The former county of Ch'eng-hsi
Moslem autonomous hsien of Yen-ch'i (Yenki)	The former county of Yen-ch'i
Kazakh autonomous hsien of Mu-lui	The former county of Mu-lui-ho
Tajik autonomous hsien of T'a-shih-k'u-erh (Tash Qurghan)	An area comprising the former counties of P'u-li, Wu-shih, Ying-chi sha, and Su-fu

N
* 563
635
648
S
563
635
648

attempts of the native peoples to throw off the Chinese yoke and to set up their own government, a story of intrigue and bloodshed, set against the backdrop of international rivalry.

S
175
668

In the past thirty years, superimposed on the political and international complex of Sinkiang were the new ideas that have added fuel to the discords and discontent in Sinkiang. Generally, the more important of the new ideologies injected into the political life of Sinkiang were the following:

1. Policy of assimilation, generally denounced by its enemies as the Great Hanism (Ta-Han chu-i), in which the border peoples were regarded as descendants of an ancient Great Chinese race and should be reabsorbed into the Chinese race. This concept was pushed by the Kuomintang extremists.
2. Program of cultural diversity and cultural autonomy. This idea was pushed by men such as Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chang Chih-chung, as an alternative to the policy of compulsory assimilation.
3. Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism, promoted by the native people, especially by the Uighurs and their Kazakh allies, stressed the fact that the majority of people of Sinkiang speak Turkic language and belong to the Moslem faith. The exponents of this concept belong to many shades of political opinion, from the moderates such as Maksud Sabri, Burkhan Shahidi, and Mehmet Emin Bughra, to the more radical faction which included Akhmejan Kasimi, Saifuddin Azizi, and the members of the Kulja coalition.
4. Territorial and cultural autonomy under the principle of federalism based on ideas derived from the Soviet policy towards the minority nationalities. This policy was actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists and served to inflame the native peoples as well as to embarrass the Nationalist authorities.

S
668
[565]
S
668
669
554
[175]

These divergent views, in substance, were the expressions of nationalism on the part of the Chinese and on the part of the native peoples of Chinese Turkestan, especially among the educated classes. As in many other parts of the Orient, the game of politics was not a popular one. The people, downtrodden and persecuted, desired only to be left alone, and they rose in revolt only when tyranny and injustice became intolerable, and they would then follow the cue of their leaders in wholesale uprisings. In the wars of the Oirats against the Ch'ing government two hundred years ago, the leaders were the tribal chieftains; and in the rebellion of the Khojas and the Dungan rebellion in the last century, the leaders were religious prelates. But in republican times, there were few of the hereditary tribal princes or religious leaders taking a part. Instead, the leaders were drawn from the ranks of the bandits, officers in the Chinese army, or young intellectuals who had studied in China or abroad. On the part of the Chinese, the men in political life in the Northwest were either local civil and military officials, or officials sent out by the central government.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

N
*668 Even with the advent of the Chinese Communists, there was
554 little fundamental change in the composition of the panel of men
S in the political arena of the Northwest. The men who acquiesced
● 668 to the Communists and were retained in office as well as those who
554 opposed the Communists were the same men who had been in the
political limelight in the past. Some of the men sent out by the
Communist Central People's Government were the same men who
had been sent out in the past by the Nationalists. The names of
local Communist officials appeared to be new, but actually many
of them had been in the Northwest for a long time, working in the
underground. The old and the new, the local and the Peking-appointed,
were all worked into the Administrative Council of the
S Northwest and the provincial governments. The general election
N of 1954 resulted in a reshuffle of the political figures of the North-
[666] west, but not in a basic change in the composition.

N
#668 The situation in the northwestern provinces was in a state of
#175 flux in 1949 prior to the actual occupation by the Chinese Communists
669 who were then in the process of conquering all of mainland
S China. In May, Sian was occupied by Chinese Communist troops,
668 who were posed for their westward advance to gain control of Ning-
669 hsia, Chinghai (both of which soon fell to Communist arms), and
175 Sinkiang.

S Out in the west, Sinkiang was divided into two political regimes:
669 the adherents of the provincial government and the insurrectionists
175 in Ili. At Urumchi was the headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist
631 Army, under the command of T'ao Chih-yüeh, and the provincial
635 government headed by Burkhan Shahidi, a Russianized Uighur, who
was then middle-of-the-road in politics and who represented the
554 large Uighur population. With him was Mehmet Emin Bughra, who
had played a part in the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic
of 1933 (at Kashgar) as well as in the East Turkestan Republic
of 1944 (at Kulja in Ili). Politically, they cooperated with the
Nationalist Government and they sought only a modicum of liberties,
such as the establishment of a government of their own choosing
and the preservation of their languages, culture and traditions.
They were thus a less militantly revolutionary group than the Ili
faction. In September, 1949, with the defeat of the Nationalists on
the mainland, with the Chinese Communist Army preparing to
march into Sinkiang, and with the persuasion of such men as
Chang Chih-shung, the provincial government under Burkhan and
the Nationalist forces under T'ao Chih-yüeh formally submitted to
the Communists.

The revolutionary movement centered around Kulja was, since 1948, quiescent, rendered impotent by internal dissensions and the defection of some of its leaders, including Osman Batur. To recoup their fortunes, Akhmejan Kasimi and his lieutenant, Saifuddin, organized the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace

669 and Democracy and began to make overtures to the Chinese Com-
175 munists. In September, 1949, Akhmejan Kasimi was killed in a
631 plane crash en route to attend the Chinese People's Political Con-
635 sultative Conference convened by the Chinese Communists.
554 Saifuddin, who was already friendly to the Communists and who
may have been an undercover Communist agent, became the head
of the Sinkiang League, bringing it formally into the Communist
fold and using it to assist the Communist takeover of northern
Sinkiang.

Even with the submission of civil and military dignitaries of
175 both factions, the situation in Sinkiang was delicate, due to the
631 strong growth of Soviet Russian influence in the political vacuum
635 following the withdrawal of Nationalist power. Actual authority
648 rested in the hands of the Soviet consul-general at Urumchi, the
669 Soviet consul at Kulja, and the secretary-general of the Turkestan
branch of the Communist Party. The district of Ili was reported
to be wholly Russianized, and by April, 1949, according to Urumchi
police records, 6,200 natives changed their nationality to become
Soviet citizens. (Mehmet Emin Bughra, Doghr Turkestan, (Eastern Turkestan), pp. 83-4, and interview with Isa Yussuf Aliptakin,
in NYT, March 23, 1951). The Chinese Communists were obliged
to proceed with caution in their advance on and occupation of
Sinkiang.

II. United Front Work, 1. Political Leaders and Factions

175 The fact that the provincial leaders of the Northwest peacefully
668 submitted to the Chinese Communists, bringing the areas under
669 their control along with them and thus sparing the Communists of
the effort and cost of a military campaign, posed for the Communist
leaders acute problems of absorption and disposition of the local
officials. As a reward for their defection to the Communist cause,
even though it was, for some of them, at the eleventh hour, they
had to be retained in office. However, it was also necessary to
reward the Communist officials, who had been working in the
underground, as well as the officers of the Communist army, and
at the same time, it was necessary to establish control by the Communists over the local functionaries.

175 The Communists, long anticipating this problem, had a ready-
668 made solution. This was the United Front, when applied to everyone in general, and the "democratic coalition" when applied to
different factions working together for the Communist government.

"The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-a-vis the Northwest," stated Wang Chen (commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub bureau of the CCP), were "first, to establish people's provincial governments made up of democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nation-

S
175 alities and classes to participate in the governments; and third,
● 668 to establish people's democratic United Front of democratic
nationalities under the leadership of the people's provincial governments and various branches of the CCP committees." (JMJP Oct. 1, 1950).

In response, the people's council of Sinkiang passed a resolution urging the establishment of a people's democratic dictatorship based on a union of all democratic classes and all nationalities, built around the alliance of workers and farmers. This was to be achieved by the establishment and consolidation of the united front, by the annihilation of reactionary elements, by the re-education and reform of former government functionaries and by the absorption of progressive elements into the government.

The extent to which the Chinese Communists succeeded in implementing their policy of a United Front in Northwest China may be seen in (1), the alignment of the top ranking officials and the parties, (2) the mobilization of the people, and (3) the building of an army of trained men - the cadres - to serve as instruments of Communist policy.

N
A. Top Echelon Officials

*175 The men in power in the northwestern provinces at the time
*668 of the Communist takeover belonged to an assortment of political
554 factions and held to a hodge-podge of views and interests. There
635 were the Communists, many of whom had held official positions
S in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, who were immedi-
175 ately summoned to take charge. There were the members of the
668 Democratic League, which had thrown in their lot with the Com-
554 munists and which maintained branch offices in Sian and Lanchou.
635 The Nationalist officials in China Proper who defected formed
themselves into the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and they were joined by the Nationalist officials in the Northwest. Among the national minorities, there were those who held responsible positions under the Nationalists and who, as prominent men among the national minorities, were carefully preserved by the Communists. Another group of native leaders who rose to power were the former participants of the Ili revolt.

The administrative structure formed from these varied political groups was a cunning piece of assembly. The non-Communist figures had to be given conspicuous display in order to give the impression of a coalition government, but their line had to be stiffened by Communist officials so that it would answer to the dictates of Peking. Each of the top-ranking officials held three or more concurrent positions in one or more places.

Political: in the Central People's Government, in the regional Military and Administrative Council (later the Administrative Council), in the provincial or the municipal governments.

N Military: In the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the
*175 Northwest Military District, or the provincial sub-districts.
*668 Party: In the Central Committee of the CCP, in the Northwest
554 Bureau of the Central Committee and the Sinkiang Sub-bureau, and
635 in the provincial committees.
S Mass organizations: In the national committee and in regional
175 committees.

668 The positions held were either vertical, from Peking down to
554 the provincial level, or horizontal, in more than one collateral
635 agencies. The system of interlocking political positions may be
seen in the cases of the following men, chosen at random as illustrations.
The positions they held were as of 1952:

Hsi Chung-hsün: In Peking, he was a member of the Government Administration Council, member of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, and a member of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, In the Northwest, he was vice-chairman of the Military Administrative Council, director of the Commission of Land Reform, deputy director of the Commission on Culture and Education, and political commissar of the Northwest Military District. In the Party, he was an alternate member of the Central Committee, and first secretary of the Northwest Bureau.

Ma Wen-jui is primarily concerned with party work. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in which he is a member of the council, he was chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission and member of the Commission on Political and Legal Affairs. In the party, he was concurrently director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee and director of the Committee on Women's Work.

S Saifuddin Azizi, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic
175 League, was also a member of the Northwest Military and Administrative
668 Council and a member of its Political and Legal Commission
554 and its Nationality Affairs Commission, which have offices in
635 Sian. In Sinkiang he was vice-chairman of the Provincial People's
Government and fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the CCP. In Peking, he was a member of the Central Peoples Government Council, a member of the Political and Legal Commission and vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. He was also reportedly commander of the 5th Army in Sinkiang.

S Among the non-Communists, the men who had climbed the
N highest in the Communist hierarchy were the members of the
175 Democratic League. One of these was Han Chao-e who, in Peking,
554 was a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League,
635 a member of the Central Committee of the China Farmers' and
Workers' Democratic Party, and a member of the People's Supervisory Commission in the Central People's Government. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, he was a member of the Political and Legal Commission and vice-chairman of the Land Reform Commission.

000
N Land Reform Commission. In the Shensi Provincial People's
*175 Government, he was vice chairman and director of the People's
635 Supervisory Commission.

554 In the case of Yang Ming-hsüan, one can see the tie-in between
N *175 the Democratic League and the Chinese Communists. Before the
554 rise to power of the Chinese Communists on the mainland, he was
635 a vice chairman of the Communist-controlled Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
*668 Border Regional Government which had its headquarters at Yenan.
Later, he became chairman of the Northwest branch of the China Democratic League, with headquarters at Sian and thus helped to prepare the way for the take-over by the Communists in 1949. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in which he was a member, he was director of the Cultural and Educational Commission and a member of the Commission on Nationalities Affairs.

It would be tedious to list the concurrent posts held by other key figures in the Northwest. Table 1. shows the number of responsible positions (director, chairman, secretary, member of councils and committees, military command and head of mass organization and minority party branches) held by a few of the members of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in Peking and in the Northwest provinces in 1952.

S
B. Parties

175 Having integrated the leaders of non-Communist political
● 668 bodies into the government, the next step was to reorganize them and to utilize them as arms of the Communist Party. The Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, headed by Saifuddin, was reorganized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League (not to be confused with the China Democratic League). It brought over 17,000 trained cadres, veterans of the Ili revolt, to the Communist cause. The official announcement of the reorganization, in 1950, stated that the Sinkiang League was to be guided by the CCP and would base its work on the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. It was to be established in parts of Sinkiang as part of the democratic United Front.

N In December, 1953, the Northwest branch committee of the
*175 China Democratic League held a conference at Sian, to hear Yang
*668 Ming-hsüan, chairman of the branch committee, and other League leaders report on the work of organization, propaganda, and education. Yang exhorted the members of the league to unite and educate the intellectual masses to take part in building the economy, national defense, and culture of the Northwest. Responding to the resolution of its parent body in the spring of 1953, the Northwest branch committee called upon its membership to concentrate its efforts in mobilizing and organizing the students and teachers in

N

*175 the Northwest under the leadership of the Chinese Communist
*668 Party.

In May, 1953, the Northwest Work Committee of the KMT Revolutionary Committee was organized with Chang Chih-chung as chairman. Its avowed aim was to coordinate all its branch offices and members of the KMT Revolutionary Committee in the Northwest under the leadership of the CCP and to implement so-called United Front work. It was significant that the conference of the KMT Revolutionary Committee at Sian was attended by high-ranking Communist Party and Democratic League officials, who were there apparently in a supervisory capacity, a fact which may indicate that the KMT Revolutionary Committee had not then gained the confidence of the Communists. Ma Ming-fang, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, expounded on the role of the "democratic" parties during the stage of New Democracy, which he said was "to educate their members to actively participate in political campaigns." Yang Ming-hsüan, chairman of the Northwest branch committee of the Democratic League, in a speech similar in content with those of the other speakers, declared that it was imperative "to continue the enlargement of the people's democratic united front (and) to get closely united under the CCP and Chairman Mao." (Sian Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, May 26, 1953).

III. United Front Work, 2. The Masses

A. Mobilization of the Masses

The organization of people's governments and the employment of non-Communist political leaders were part of the window-dressing for the organization and mobilization of the masses of the people.
S
[195] As early as January, 1950, the Sinkiang People's Government Coun-
cil, in a statement of its policies, declared that one of the primary
[668] tasks was "to activate and organize the workers, farmers, youth, women, and other popular bodies so that they would become strong and reliable support for the government in all fields of construction." (NCNA January 8, 1950).

The agencies for the mobilization of the people were, as in other parts of China, the mass organizations, which supplement and bolster the work of the political parties, and were either directly controlled or indirectly manipulated by Communists or trusted agents of the Communists. The following are a few of the organizations of mass control.

The United Front Department of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: This agency has overall supervision over the other mass organizations and also serves as liaison between them. The chairman, Wang Feng, was also director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

N *175 *668 467 554

Northwest Federation of Trade Unions: The chairman is Chia T'o-fu, a member of the Financial and Economic Commission in the Central People's Government and vice chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council. An influential figure is Chao Chan-hui, director of the Department of Labor in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and a member of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

N *175 *668 554

Federation of Democratic Women: The dominating personality in the Northwest is Chang Tzu-fang, onetime director of the federation in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and after 1949 a member of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, she was a member of three commissions. Ma Wen-jui, chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and director of the Organizational Department of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, was also director of the Commission of Women's Work. Thus, intimately and inescapably entwined with Communist activities, the Northwest Federation of Democratic Women saw a tremendous expansion of its membership.

S [175 [668

In Sinkiang, by the summer of 1951, it had branches in 47 of the 78 counties and in five of the ten administrative districts, and 190,000 women members took part in the propaganda campaign to resist America and aid Korea.

N *175 *668 [467

Federation of Literary and Art Workers: By September, 1950, 7,000 literary and art workers in the Northwest were mobilized to take part in propaganda activities, and 30,000 writers and artists joined the Reformation Congress of Literary and Artistic Workers in the Northwest to establish the United Front.

New Democratic Youth League (renamed the Communist Youth League in 1955): This is an auxiliary of the Communist Party the function of which was to mobilize the youth. In the Northwest it was guided by Lo I, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League and of the China Democratic Youth Federation, and a member of at least two commissions in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.

S [175 [668

An example of the expansion of the New Democratic Youth League in the Northwest may be seen in Sinkiang, where, by spring of 1953, there were 1,015 branches with over 20,000 elite youth members. Half of the labor models in the Urumchi Saw Mill in 1952 were New Democratic Youth League members, and it was reported that the New Democratic Youth League members "have become efficient assistants of the (Communist) Party in carrying out patriotic movements in factories and villages." (NCNA May 4, 1953).

N *175 *668 648
S 175 668 648

Sino-Soviet Friendship Association: By the end of 1951, there were 1,314 branch associations and 417 sub-branch associations in 157 of the 274 counties in the four Northwest provinces. Over

N 60,000 of its total membership of 336,610 in the Northwest were
*175 from the city of Sian. Hsi Chung-hsün is president of the Sino-
*668 Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, and Chang Chih-
648 chung, Chia T'o-fu, Chang Chia-fu, and Burkhan are the vice-
S presidents. Since 1951, the membership of the Sino-Soviet Friend-
175 ship Association throughout China has vastly multiplied, as the
668 following figures show: three million in 1950; 17 million in 1951,
648 23 million in 1952, and 58 million at the end of January, 1953.
The membership of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, therefore, must have increased proportionately.

One of the strongest centers of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the Ili Administrative District, where, by fall of 1951, there were 36,814 members in 11 county branches (out of the 12 counties), and in 16 branches of the government. According to Te-li-ha-te, head of the Department of Organization of the Ili branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the people of Ili, Altai (Ashan) and Chughuchak (Tacheng) had cherished the friendship of the Soviet Union since their revolt of 1944-45, and as their political consciousness was higher than elsewhere in the Northwest, they took the lead in the founding of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in 1949.

One of the chief responsibilities of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the conduct of propaganda. Its propaganda objectives were not only to propagate the gospel of the advance technology in Soviet Russia and the "very great assistance received from the Soviet Cultural Associations for Foreign Countries," but also to combat popular opposition to Soviet Russia. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Sinkiang might have fared better if many of the people were not deterred from joining by a whispering campaign warning them that if they joined the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association they would forfeit their right of worship of their religion. (Sian Ch'un-chung jih-pao, November 7, 1951).

N

B. Elevation of Political Consciousness

*175 Aside from propaganda, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association
*668 in the Northwest also initiated an ideological remoulding campaign
S in 1951 aimed at 2,500 teachers selected from eleven nationalities.
175 This campaign was one of the many drives, one following or over-
668 lapping another, which were correlated to the work of mobilizing
and organizing the people. The more important of the popular drives were the Land Reform, the Resist-America and Aid Korea Movement and the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries.

By the summer of 1952, the so called land reform was completed in 97 per cent of all the agricultural hsiang (administrative villages) in the then five provinces of the Northwest. The membership in farmers' associations constituted 30-40 per cent of the

N
*175 total number of peasant households. "The peasants in the mutual
*668 aid teams are politically organized," stated the Sian Ch'ün-chung
S
175 jih-pao (January 6, 1954), and the enlargement of the membership
668 in the farmers' association have "strengthened the militia, thereby consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship in the countryside in the Northwest region." (NCNA, May 22, 1952).

S
175 Concerning the effects of the agrarian reform on the political organization of the people, Kao Chin-shun, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government, mentioned the following points:
668 (1) Eradication of the "feudal" landlord class, (2) elevation of the political consciousness of the peasants, (3) consolidation and enlargement of the United Front, and (4) training large number of cadres. (Urumchi, Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). He revealed too that in the process of the land reform, large numbers of the people signed pacts pledging to resist America and to aid Korea.

Late in 1950, branches of the China Peace Committee, organized for the purpose of rallying the people to support the war in Korea, was established in the Northwest. The work of these branch committees supplemented the activities of the people's political consultative committees and the people's representative conferences which were then in session preparatory to the formation of the people's governments. In Sinkiang, for example, the Provincial People's Representative Conference, in May, 1951, declared that its aim was to popularize and develop penetratingly the Resist-America and Aid-Korea campaign. Later in the year, in order to strengthen the hate-America campaign, the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee and the Sinkiang branch committee of the China Peace Committee were merged into one joint committee. (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). Henceforth, the activities of the so-called conferences of workers, herdsmen, peasant, youth, women, religious, industrial and commercial circles, which were the components of the people's political consultative conference, were channeled to the work of propaganda. Seven members of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee who toured the Korean front, returned to spend three months giving speeches to half a million people. By the end of 1951, a total of JMP $213 billion (about US $10 million) was raised, sufficient, it was claimed, for the purchase of 142 fighter planes. This came to 4.24 per cent of the amount raised in all of China.

N
Particular efforts were made to utilize religious institutions.
*175 In Chinghai, Buddhist lamas were organized into propaganda teams,
792 monasteries into meeting places for discussion of current events
*668 and the signing of pledges, and temple fairs and festivals for the extension of propaganda on government policies to the rural areas.
S
175 Similarly, in Sinkiang, mosques were used to hold accusation
668 meetings and the Akhuns and mullahs were brought in line to sup-
793 port the land reform as well as the Hate-America campaign. A
346

175 mass meeting of 3,500 mullahs in 46 mosques in Urumchi was
668 held on May 20, 1951, and again on May 25, 1953, to reaffirm
[793] their pledge to support Mao Tse-tung, the CCP, the Central
People's Government and the Resist-America and Aid-Korea
[346] campaign. Burkhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Govern-
[795] ment, was concurrently head of the China Islamic Association,
which had the responsibility of rallying the Moslems of China
under the banner of the Chinese Communists.

"Through the above-mentioned activities," declared Yü Chan-lin, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference, "the policies of the (Communist) party and the people's government ...have been conveyed to the masses of various nationalities and various circles (i.e., political groups), so that the misgivings and the hesitant attitude on the part of certain people were corrected and the masses mobilized... thus enlarging the anti-feudal United Front." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). As for the future, Yü urged further propaganda on "patriotism and internationalism" by means of mass movements, intensification of the mobilization of all the nationalities and all the political groups, and further supervision over the masses.

The Sinkiang jih-pao, in an editorial (June 30, 1953), also expressed gratification with the progress of the mobilization of the masses. "During the past four years, the people of all nationalities and all circles have been educated by repeated patriotic campaigns and experiences in various political activities, thereby increasing their organizational ability and their political consciousness. The general election will further consolidate and unite the people of all nationalities and the ties between the People's Government and the masses, thus enabling the state system of our people's democratic dictatorship to become more perfect."

C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

668 The efforts of the Communists to herd and regiment the people
669 were not accomplished without considerable resistance. Large
578 segments of the people refused to enter into the Communist fold
175 and their resistance, strong and stubborn, made it necessary for
the Communist authorities to launch campaigns for the suppression
of the opposition, whom the Communis[illegible] designate as "counter--
revolutionaries."

The "counter-revolutionaries" or "bandits" were, according to Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, composed of the following groups: (1) Former Nationalist forces; (2) local forces under Osman Batur, Mehmet Emin Bughra, Jamin Khan and Yolbars Khan; (3) White Russians; (4) members of secret societies; (5) bandits; and, he added, "all sorts of subversive espionage organizations (which)

S
668 make use of reactionary elements of Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-
669 Islamism to establish anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bases of
578 operation." (JMJP October 1, 1950).
175 The extent of opposition to Communist rule may be seen in
N the news dispatches issued by the Communist authorities on the
#175 #668 results of their relentless crack-down of the counter-revolution-
669 aries:
578 Item: September, 1950, liquidation of 58,000 bandit troops who
S refused to disarm and continued to resist.
175 Item: November, 1950, arrest of 6,249 Kuomintang agents and
668 seizure of 208 special service cells and 275 radio stations.
669 Item: February, 1951, capture of Osman Batur and Jamin Khan
578 and escape of Yolbars Khan to Formosa. April, 1951, Execution
of Osman Batur.
Item: 1951. Revolt of workers in the Yen-ch'ang Oilfield, Shensi.
Item: December, 1950, Suppression of the Taoist secret society, the I-kuan-tao, which claimed to have 100,000 members in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia. Members of the organization were charged to have infiltrated into farmers' associations and sabotaged the land reform and peasant organization work.

Despite the savagery of the suppression, the Communists were unable to snuff out the opposition. Kan Ssu-ch'i, director of the Department of Public Security of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, pointed out that in the province of Kansu alone, the counter-revolutionaries killed and wounded 2,117 native cadres resulting in a profound demoralization of the people. "The people blame us," he said, "for having only government and no law. We must...by means of accusation meetings, exhibitions, public trials and forums, mobilize the broad masses to partake in the work of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries." (NCNA, April 7, 1951).

The alibis for the failure to wipe out the opposition in the Northwest was attributed to many causes. T'ao Chih-yüeh, deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military District, charged that "hidden enemies are utilizing old relations, old friendships and all opportunities for winning over and buying over a few backward elements." Ma Hung-pin, vice-chairman of the Kansu provincial people's government, warned the people to renounce their old friendships. "All counter-revolutionaries," he said, "be they your relatives, your friends and your neighbors, or even your family members, must be denounced." (NCNA, April 7, 1951). Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, charged that "the imperialists" were fanning the fires of "narrow nationalism" by spreading rumors and fostering animosity among the minority peoples and they have seized upon pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as their weapons." (JMJP, October 2, 1951).

The admonition and the threats by the officials had no effect

N in curbing the hostility of segments of the population towards the
*175 Communist regime. Sabotage as well as open rebellion continued
*668 unabated, as the following items, culled from Communist papers,
669 show:
578 Item: November, 1951, arsonists set fire to the Urumchi Fur
S Factory causing a loss of two billion yuan (US $100,000).
175 Item: April to July, 1952. Revolt of Chinese Moslems in Kansu,
• 668 who killed over 3,000 Communist cadres and many government
669 officials and seized control of three districts.
578 Item: March to June, 1953. 1,380 "bandits" reported annihilated
in southern Kansu.
Item: December, 1953, Suppression of "bandit" forces under Ma
Liang in the Kansu-Chinghai-Szechwan border region.
Item: First half of 1954, 3,420 counter-revolutionary cases
unearthed.

IV. United Front Work, 3. The Cadres

N
*175 A. Recruitment of Cadres

*668 The placement of non-Communist and non-Chinese leaders in
the government and the organization of the people, while important,
were but subsidiary tasks. The principal task was the reform of
the old cadres and the recruitment of new cadres to serve as the
work forces of the party and the state. The job, which was a part
N of the building of the "democratic United Front" since it concerned
[647] the integration of Communist with non-Communist employees, was
handled by two agencies of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: the
Department of Organization, headed by Ma Wen-jui, which was
responsible for party expansion, and the Department of United
Front Work, headed by Wang Feng, which was responsible for
recruiting and integrating non-Communists and non-Chinese functionaries in government and party work.

The shortage of trained cadres and the need for more were felt by the Communist authorities from the beginning of their rule over the Northwest. In November, 1949, barely a month after the Communists took over the vast territories of the Northwest and two and a half months before the formation of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, Ma Wen-jui, who had already set up his Department of Organization, declared that the main problem facing the Chinese Communist Party was the training and employment of new cadres (JMJP, January 4, 1950). The need was particularly urgent in view of the depletion of trained men due to the transfer of many of the veteran cadres of the old Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to other parts of the country and the reluctance of the local youth to become cadres. Hsi Chung-hsün, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, pointed out that the number of men who had

N *175 *668 served as underground workers in the Northwest came to about 50,000, and with the population of the five northwest provinces about twenty-three million (the 1954 census gave the figure of 35 1/2 million), the number of cadres came to only 0.22 per cent of the population. Even with the addition of the 200,000 party men in the People's Liberation Army, the number of cadres was less than one per cent.

As part of the United Front Work, the Communist authorities, as soon as they took over control of the northwestern provinces, absorbed almost all the former Nationalist government functionaries and students into the rank of the cadres. By providing them with jobs, the authorities expected to remove a potential source of discontent at a time when it was necessary to win over the people. In his speech of November, 1949, Ma Wen-jui revealed that 70 per cent of the new cadres were young intellectuals and former government personnel (JMJP, January 4, 1950).

But both old cadres and those newly converted were unsatisfactory for reasons which will be discussed later, and, not only for the purpose of remedying the shortage but also in the hope of catering to the aspiration of the non-Chinese peoples who make up the bulk of the population in the outlying regions, it was necessary to train large numbers of cadres recruited from the national minorities. The training of cadres was achieved in two ways: one through the schools and special training classes and the other by placing them in low-ranking administrative positions and "coaching them as apprentices."

In June, 1951, the Government Administration Council in Peking approved a resolution entitled "Tentative Measures for the Fostering of Cadres of Minority Nationalities," which in its preamble called for the "universal and large-scale cultivation of cadres of various minority nationalities." Priority was given to the training of military and technical cadres. To implement this policy, a Central Nationalities Institute was established in Peking, to which cadres with ranks above those of section chiefs in the autonomous areas and battalion commanders in the army were sent. Regional nationality schools as well as cadre schools were established for the rank-and-file cadres. In addition, all the institutions of education were used to turn out cadres for the state.

S 175 ● 668 871 Primary Schools: In Sinkiang, it was stated that the 112,393 students who graduated from the elementary schools in the years from 1950 to 1955 were assigned to the labor reserve, promoted to be cadres, or permitted to attend secondary schools.

Middle Schools: The 13,140 students who graduated from Middle schools in Sinkiang in 1950-55 were either permitted to attend colleges or were inducted into the ranks of the cadres. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955).

S [563] Nationality Schools: The seven nationality schools in Sinkiang

S
175 graduated in four years a total of 11,000 students into the ranks
• 668 of the cadres. Deserving boys of Mongol descent were also sent
871 to study in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which was
[563] regarded as the model for the national minorities.
Short-term Training Classes: The first thing the Chinese Communists did upon entering Sinkiang was to set up twenty-five classes to train cadres in three-to-six month courses. By summer of 1951, these training classes graduated 3,600 cadres from 13 different nationalities.

N Colleges: There were by 1955 thirteen institutions of higher
*175 education in the Northwest. The most important was the North-
*668 west Revolutionary University located at Sian. Founded in 1950,
873 it conducted courses on Marxism-Leninism and the writings of
Mao Tse-tung with the aim of "reforming the intellectuals." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, July 8, 1953). In 1953, after having graduated 12,000 cadres, its name was changed to Northwest Cadres
N School of Political and Legal Science. The Nationality College at
*[563] Lanchou was under the direction of Wang Feng, who was head of
the United Front Work Department of the Northwest Bureau of the
S CCP. The Sinkiang Nationality College at Urumchi, headed by
175 provincial governor Burkhan, was distinguished by a faculty of
668 350 Soviet advisors who made up 43% of the teachers. It gradu-
873 ated 1,700 minority cadres in 1953. The Sinkiang People's Gov-
[563] ernment and the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist
S Party each have a cadre school which, along with the training
175 classes, turned out 10,000 cadres by the end of 1955. By the
668 summer of 1955, these two cadre schools and the Sinkiang Nation-
874 ality College trained a total of 396 teachers and 4,355 educational
873 cadres.

N The nationality autonomous areas were also used as nurseries
*175 for the incubation and training of nationality cadres. In Chinghai
*668 over a third of the native cadres were selected from activists in
871 the people's governments.

*563 The purpose of study in the cadre schools was to "enable the students to shake off the bad influences and to strengthen their patriotic ideology." The cadres were drawn from the ranks of the students and from "upper religious circles" and, "on returning to national minority areas, they were able to conduct propaganda in a correct manner, do work actively and promote solidarity among various nationalities in pushing forward political, economic and cultural enterprises." (Kuang-ming jih-pao, February 24, 1954).

Allowing for the possibility of some duplications in the figures, the number of national minority cadres trained may be estimated by adding the numbers mentioned in the Communist press (see Table 2).

Table 2

NATIONAL MINORITY CADRES TRAINED IN THE NORTHWEST

S
175
•668
871
162
563

N
*175
*668
871
162
*563

Sinkiang			
Veterans of the Ili Revolt			17,000
Graduates of 25 training classes in 1950			3,600
Graduates of the training classes in 1951			1,200
Graduates of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau cadre school in 1951, 1044, 84 per cent were natives			877
Graduates of the Sinkiang Nationality College, 1953			1,700
Educational Cadres, from Sinkiang Cadre School			4,355
Graduates of the training classes in 1954			200
Graduates of the Provincial Government Cadre School			296
Cadres promoted from activists			
In 197 hsiang	308		
In Ili, Kashgar and Yarkand	934		
In Bavenkara NAA	80		
In Qizil Su Kolkhoz NAA	1,100		2,422
Total	2,422		
Total			31,650
Ninghsia, summer 1954,			2,300
Kansu, Graduates of the Lanchou Nationality College, 1950-54			2,500
Chinghai			
Number as of summer, 1954		3,471	
Cadres promoted from activists			
Yu-shu Tibetan NAA	250		
Huang-nan Tibetan NAA	258		
Hai-pei Tibetan NAA	302		
Mongol-Tibetan-Kazakh NAA	340		
Shun-hua Salar NAA	190		
Total	1,340	1,340	
Total		4,811	4,811
Shensi, Graduates of the Northwest Nationality College at Sian, 1950-54			2,543
GRAND TOTAL FOR THE NORTHWEST			43,834

N
*175
*668
*563
162
S
175
668
563
162

This figure, 43,834, is not far from the figure of "over 40,000 cadres of national minorities" cited by Wang Feng, chairman of the Commission of Nationality Affairs of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and director of the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in December, 1953 (NCNA, January 6, 1954).

As to the total number of cadres in the Northwest, it is necessary to deduce from the statistics given in the Communist press to obtain an estimate. In September, 1955, Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, claimed that there were 36,000 national minority

N cadres in the province (JMJP September 24, 1955), but this ap-
*175 peared to be an exaggeration, for an article in the Kuang-ming
*668 jih-pao, (by Chang Hung, on September 30, 1955), stated that the
*563 number of minority cadres in Sinkiang was 34,400, and that they
162 made up 66.9 per cent of all the cadres in the then province. The
S
175 total, therefore, comes to 51,543. In Kansu, the total number of
● 668 cadres up to the end of 1953 was 12,361. In Chinghai, the 3,471
563 national minority cadres made up 40 per cent of the total number
162 of cadres, so that the total number would be about 8,500.

Early in 1950, Hsi Chung-hsün, vice-chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, stated that there were 50,000 underground cadres plus 200,000 cadres in the People's Liberation Army, or a total of 250,000. Later in the year, it was stated that over 10,000 students and former government functionaries were undergoing reform in the Northwest Cadre Training School, and that 6,000 of them were from the national minorities. A large number of these cadres were purged in 1952-53, but their ranks were filled by graduates from the training schools and colleges. The Northwest Cadre School at Sian, graduated 2,200 in the years 1949-53 and the Northwest Revolutionary University, also at Sian, graduated a total of 12,000 in the period from 1950 to 1953.

Simultaneous with the process of drawing men from schools and government offices into the special training classes, nationality colleges and cadre schools for training, non-Chinese cadres were also assigned jobs in lower levels of the governments so that they could receive practical experience in the administration and also to bear the brunt of contact with local inhabitants. By fall of 1950, there were about 4,400 native cadres employed in local government agencies, half of whom held offices above the level of hsiang. By spring of 1951, according to incomplete figures, the number of national minority cadres in government increased to 22,000, distributed in the five Northwest provinces as follows, (NCNA, May 13, 1951):

Sinkiang	17,000
Chinghai	2,000
Kansu	1,976
Ninghsia	1,050
Sian Municipality	40

N
*175 The 17,000 administrative personnel in Sinkiang were the same
*668 veteran cadres who took part in the 1944 Ili Revolt and who were
*563 organized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League headed by
162 Saifuddin (JMJP, June 6, 1952; also statement of Wang Feng,
631 December 29, 1951). It was also claimed that seventy to eighty
S
175 per cent of the personnel in the magistrates' offices in the 80
668 counties of Sinkiang were native cadres. By the end of 1951, the
563 number of national minority cadres employed in government work
162
631

N in the Northwest reached the highwater mark of 27,000 (NCNA
*175 January 8, 1952).

*668 A large number of the cadres were sent out directly from
*563 training schools to low-ranking positions in the people's govern-
162 ments. Up to the summer of 1953 the Northwest Revolutionary
631 University at Sian placed over 12,000 of its graduates in govern-
[873] ment service, the Northwest Nationality College 2,573, the Lanchou
[874] Nationality College 2,500, and the Northwest Cadre School 2,200.
S 175 The areas of concentration in Sinkiang were the Ili and Kashgar
668 Administrative Districts and three counties in Yarkand which had
563 6,907 native cadres employed as directors of departments, sec-
162 tion chiefs, and heads of counties and ch'ü (districts).
631

B. Demoralization and Conflict of the Cadres

N A compelling reason for the large-scale induction of cadres,
*175 both Chinese and from the national minorities, was not only because
*668 of the small number of veteran cadres, but also because these old
578 cadres were no longer considered trustworthy and useful by the
authorities. However, the authorities soon found that the new cadres were not any better and their absorption only heightened the conflict within the ranks of the cadres. The defects of the cadres were repeatedly pointed out in the series of conferences convened by the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1951 and in the spring of 1952. The main shortcomings of the cadres, as pointed out by the Communist leaders, were:

1. Lack of political consciousness and demoralization of the old party cadres. It was significant, and perhaps paradoxical, that the major criticisms against the cadres were directed against the veteran cadres who had been trained and who had seen service in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, which since 1935 had been the center of Communist activities and the showcase of Communist administration. As early as January, 1950, Ma Wen-jui, director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, charged in a speech (JMJP January 4, 1950),that the old cadres showed restlessness, they wanted better jobs and were anxious to return home, they suffered from the ideological defects of individualism and jealousy of the new cadres, they were inefficient and careless in their work so that they lost important documents and often divulged state secrets, they lacked initiative and a sense of responsibility, and sought only enjoyment. Cases of graft were quite frequent.

Eighteen months later, at a conference of high-ranking cadres held at Sian in August, 1951, Ma Wen-jui charged that the old party cadres, due to their long stay in the rural villages and due to the demoralizing conditions of the war, lack education. "The degrees of political awakening of some of the party members is

N
*175 of the cadres had a corroding effect on the party and endangered
*668 the party cause." (NCNA July 21, 1954). But, said the leaders,
578 "the main obstacle to party unity in Sinkiang district at present
[661] is the survival of the tendehcy of Great Hanism and the sentiment
of local nationalism among a section of the cadres." (NCNA April 25, 1954).

The demoralization of the government personnel in the Northwest was so widespread that in March, 1954, when the residents of thirty-two villages in the Hu-chu county in Chinghai were told that they were free to voice their grievances, they made a total of 3,800 complaints in the hsiang people's representative assembly against the "bureaucratic work style of the leadership cadres." (NCNA March 20, 1954).

N
*175
*668

V. Political Structure and Political Progress

A. The Northwest Military and Administrative Council and People's Governments

Early in 1950, the Northwest Military and Administrative
Council was established at Sian, which also became the location
of the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party and of the head-
N quarters of the Northwest Military District. In the months that
[635] followed, provincial and municipal people's governments were
[632] also established in the five provinces then comprising the North-
west: Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang.

N
*175 While the members of the Military and Administrative Council
*668 were appointed by the Central People's Government in Peking, the
635 members of the provincial and municipal people's governments
632 were, according to Communist pronouncements, elected by con-
666 ventions of representatives of all circles and all nationalities.
Since no machinery of election was set up and the people were not instructed, these conventions were actually meetings of Communists and fellow travellers who were invited to attend, in the manner non-Communists were invited to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September, 1949.

Since the officials were those on the panels who were approved
by the Communists, there was little for the representatives to do
except to endorse the selection, and then to devote the rest of their
S
[175] time to other unrelated items of the agenda. The first conference
[668] of the people's representatives of all circles and all nationalities
● [631] in Sinkiang, which met April 19 to May 10, 1951, was primarily
devoted to the purpose of propaganda, the discussion of means of popularizing the Resist-America and Aid-Korea Campaign, the campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries and the land reform. The meeting of representatives in Chinghai, held in October, 1950, discussed these items on the agenda plus the means of collecting the grain tax.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13 Sinkiang AI1

Table 3. CHINESE AND NON-CHINESE IN REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

	total	Han Chinese	From the National Minorities	Unknown
Regional: Top level (in 1952)				
NW MAC	43	35	8	--
Provincial: Second level (in 1950)				
Shensi ~~People's~~ Government Council	39	37	2	-
Kansu " " "	29	21	8	-
Chinghai " " "	22	12	7	1
Sinkiang " " "	31	13	15	3
Total	121	85	32	4
(Total in 1951)	133	78	55	-)

County Magistrates: Third level
(in 1951)

Shensi:	Chinese, head of all municipalities and counties
Kansu:	in the Linhsia Administrative District, 6 counties: 3 Chinese, 3 from the minority nationalities
Chinghai and Ninghsia:	in 35 counties: 13 Chinese, 22 from the minority nationalities
Sinkiang:	80 counties, 13 Chinese, 67 from the minority nationalities.

N
*175
*668
635
634
*563
S
175
•668
635
634
563

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11

N
*17 [illegible]shment of the Hai-pei Tibetan Autonomous People's Government
*668 in Chinghai came only after the "achievement of the Chinese Com-
631 munist Party and the People's Government at upper level."
*563 "On entering the Tibetan area in Hai-pei in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party and the cadres of the People's Government exerted great efforts in propaganda, thoroughly carried out policies concerning national equality, unity and the development of production, mediated disputes... and stabilized social order." (NCNA June 18, 1954).

As one after another of the national autonomous areas proved satisfactory, from the point of view of the Communists, more were established. Following the establishment of the T'ien-chu Tibetan Autonomous district in Kansu in May, 1950, eight autonomous districts were established in 1950: five in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and one in Chinghai. Three were established in the years 1951 and 1952, all in Chinghai. Fifteen were set up in 1953: six in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and eight in Chinghai. Of the total of 27 autonomous districts set up by the end of 1953, 14 were Tibetan, five Chinese Moslem (Hui), four Mongol, and four others. Including the smaller autonomous areas, there were a total of over forty autonomous people's governments in the three provinces of Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, by August, 1953. Their size varied. In Chinghai, the Kung-ho Kazakh autonomous hsiang had a total population of 130 and the Huang-nan Tibetan Autonomous district a population of 220,000. These nationality autonomous areas in the three provinces embraced a total of 700,000 people, or one-ninth of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest (NCNA August 29, 1953 and September 9, 1953; but one million according to Ma Ming-fang, Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954).

S
175 The people of Sinkiang, who constituted the bulk of the non-Chi-
• 668 nese population in the Northwest, were, up to fall of 1953, four
642 years after the Communist conquest, not granted the privilege of
563 self-rule. Some of the reasons for the discrimination of Sinkiang
631 were quite obvious.

1. The propinquity of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai and the predominance of the Chinese population made it easier for the Communists to exercise control. Sinkiang, on the other hand, was farther from China and the bulk of the population was non-Chinese with a long tradition of resistance to Chinese rule.

S
2. In Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, Chinese cadres far outnum-
175 bered the native cadres, but in Sinkiang, according to one source
668 (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955), 67 per cent of the
563 cadres were native cadres, including 17,000 of them who had taken
631 part in the Ili Revolt in 1944-45. The fact that they still entertained separatist views may be seen in the fact that Saifuddin, their leader, found it necessary to remind them: "From now on, the

S
175 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racial-
• 668 ism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the...
563 Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in
631 opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

N 3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total
*175 of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or
592 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'ün-chung
162 jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized
S peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
175 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only
592 the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the
162 whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the
77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

N The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in
[474] the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations
[476] and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statis-
tics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses
are computed from percentages given of the total).

S 4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet
175 Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a
648 foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950, to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts arrived to set up machine works, power plants, and to assist the Chinese in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview with Burkhan, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the visit of Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October, 1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 513]

S
175 Chinese-owned companies. Although Soviet and Eastern European
648 experts were retained as salaried technicians, the move was made
to appear that Soviet Russia was withdrawing from Sinkiang in
S favor of Communist China.

175 In addition to these conditions, there was a whole plethora of
668 other factors which made the Communist authorities reluctant to
642 grant regional autonomy to the people of Sinkiang. However, as
631 they had in repeated pronouncements promised autonomy to the
non-Chinese inhabitants of this province, they found that they
563 could not procrastinate any longer, and in the late summer of
1953 they finally agreed to the establishment of the first autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang, but on an experimental basis. The three experimental autonomous governments were: one for the Sibo on the hsiang level, one for the Chinese Moslems on the county level, and one for the Mongols on the district (ch'ü)level. In December, 1953, Saifuddin urged "that a good job must be done to guarantee that the various national autonomies in the province may be established." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 6, 1954).

The experiments proved successful and by May, 1954, the green light was given for the establishment of autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang for other concentrations of national minorities in the province. There were thirty-three autonomous areas below the level of district in Sinkiang in August (NCNA, August 7, 1954). However, in proportion to its population of non-Chinese people, Sinkiang was still behind. During the same period, the number of autonomous areas in Kansu had increased to 86 (NCNA April 9, 1955).

N
*175

C. The General Election of 1953-54

In 1953, the people of Northwest China, as elsewhere in China,
*668 were for the first time permitted to cast their votes for the elec-
666 tion of their representatives. In February, the Central People's
[641] Government in Peking passed the Election Law which provided for
suffrage for adults over 18 years of age with the exclusion of all those whom the Communist authorities had classified as landlords, counter-revolutionaries, and lunatics and those who were deprived of the right to vote or to run for election. The certified voters vote only once, at the lowest or basic levels, and by a show of hands (art. 55). The system is pyramidal. The representatives chosen by the people at the basic election elect their representatives to people's congresses of a higher level, and these in turn elect representatives for peoples of still higher level, and so on up, through the levels of county and district people's congresses to municipal and provincial congresses, and through the level of municipal and provincial congresses to the National People's Congress. Only at high levels was the balloting secret. The candidates running for election were Communist or men approved by the

N
*175 going to the polls, but in Chinghai where it was reported that 95
666 per cent of the people went to the polls, the election was only one-
*668 fourth completed..

In Sinkiang, the Communist authorities were more cautious.
S The experimental elections began in May, 1953, in 17 basic elec-
175 tion units (hsiang) selected from the ten administrative districts,
666 then in 36 basic election units. In these experimental elections,
•668 80-95 per cent of the electorate turned out. With the successful
conclusion of the experiments, the real basic level elections began
in September in 665 basic level areas in Sinkiang, followed in
December by the second group of 860 basic level area elections.
By April, 1954, the basic level election in Sinkiang was concluded,
S having been held in 2,424 basic units in 83 counties and munici-
[369] palities. In urban areas, 89 per cent of the voters turned out,
while in southern Sinkiang, the turnout by the Uighur population
was 95 per cent. The elections during 1953 had been supervised
by 1,127 cadres who formed 144 election courts and 98 mobile
investigation teams, which uncovered 204 cases of irregularities
and nonconformity.

The fruit of the efforts of the election cadres was the election of large numbers of cadres and party members. Sixty-three per cent of the 619 new party members employed in the Sinkiang provincial and Urumchi municipal governments were elected as delegates. In 312 hsiang in Sinkiang, out of the 7,088 of the delegates elected, 5,248 were Communist Party cadres, and the bulk were Chinese. In Ninghsia, only 25 per cent of the 9,700 deputies elected in the basic level elections were Chinese Moslems (Hui).

N Moreover, the elections in the Northwest, as in the rest of
*175 China, were by no means universal. Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-
666 p'ing, one of the top officials in charge of the nationwide elections,
*668 revealed that basic level elections were not held in a quarter of
641 the regions inhabited by national minorities, and the number of
+563 national minority people who were not given a chance to vote came
to 8,708,169. The reason for defranchising these minority people,
he said, was due to the "lack of requisite conditions," which were
(1) the native cadres were unsatisfactory and (2) the people failed
to appreciate the nationality policy of the government. (NCNA
June 19, 1954).

N In contrast to the publicity given to the basic level elections
*175 in the Northwest, the elections in the higher levels were conducted
*668 quietly and, in many cases, the results were not published. How-
666 ever, from scattered information gleaned from the Communist
635 press, the following picture emerges: in Shensi, Kansu, and
S
[175] Sinkiang, the incumbent governors were re-elected. Only in
[666] Chinghai, was there a change in the governor. In these four pro-
[668] vinces, three of the governors are Chinese. In the three provinces
[635] of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai, about half of the thirteen vice-

Table 6. CADRES ASIGNED TO AND TRAINED FOR COOPERATIVE WORK

N
*668
631
474
476
S
• 668
631
474
476

	Total No. of Cadres	Number of Native Cadres	Cadres Assigned to Cooperatives	Cadres to be trained for cooperative work
Shensi			20,000	200,000
Chinghai	8,500	3,400	3,100	7,300
Sinkiang	51,000	34,400	27,000	
Kansu (no figures available)				

N
*175
*668
474
476

B. Transfer of Cadres

The vast expansion of cooperatives and the intensification of the collectivization of the people demanded an increase in the number of cadres to supervise them. The number of cadres assigned to the task of cooperative building and the number of cadres to be trained for such work up to the fall of 1955 are shown in Table 6.

The assignment of the large number of cadres to the rural areas was, according to Chang Chih-chung, "to consolidate the mutual aid teams and producers cooperative work under a policy of active leadership." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954). However, the demoralization, the lack of discipline, the incompetence and low degree of political consciousness of the cadres when employed as officials of the people's governments during the first four years of Communist rule have not only impeded government and party work but also incurred ill-feeling among the people. The assignment of the cadres to the cooperatives in rural areas was to remove them from sensitive positions in the government.

N
*175
*668
*563
631
S
175
668
563
631

Consequently, by 1955, when the work of the cadres in directing the elections was over, there were few cadres left in the upper levels of government. This was particularly the case of the national minority cadres. In Chinghai, out of the 3,400 native cadres, only 93 held responsible positions in the party organization in December, 1954, and in Sinkiang, only a third of the cadres in party committees on all levels were natives, two-thirds were Chinese. In the government and in state enterprises, the number of national cadres was even less. According to Wang En-mao, secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, only 682 out of the 34,400 national minority cadres held responsible positions in the governments above the levels of county, although it was claimed in other Communist publications that 84.6 per cent of the cadres in government offices below county levels were natives. In the state commercial, animal products, tea, silk, and export enterprises, 63 per cent of the officials were Chinese. One of the reasons for the demotion of the national minority cadres was their lack of education and training. Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, seeking to rationalize this state of affairs, said that of the 36,000 national minority cadres (his figure) trained in all fields of work since 1949, only 2,500 showed enough initiative to be promoted to be leadership cadres. (JMJP September 24, 1955).

N
*175
*668
166

To bolster the position of the Chinese cadres and to fill the ranks depleted by the transfer of local cadres to the work of collectivizing the peasant population, large numbers of cadres and workers were sent to the Northwest from the coastal provinces. The figures of Table 7, gathered from scattered items in the Communist press, are incomplete, but they give an idea of the horde of cadres and approved workers and students pouring into the northwestern provinces during 1955.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 523]

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

N
*175
166
464
*668
S
175
166
464
668

Table 7. WORKERS AND CADRES TRANSFERRED TO THE NORTHWEST

Date	Profession	Number	Total Number	From	Destination
January to May	workers		16,000	Shanghai	Northwest
May	workers	1,600	3,620	"	"
	truck drivers	430		"	"
	govt. cadres	1,000		Peking	Sinkiang
	cadres	362		Kuangtung	"
	demobilized servicemen	238		Chekiang	"
June	workers	1,865	2,665	Tsinan	Lanchou
	students	800		Peking	Sinkiang
July	doctors				
August	workers	900	5,640	Tientsin	"
	students from Indonesia				"
	govt. cadres	1,000		Peking	"
	" "	900		Tientsin	"
	students	540		Kiangsu	"
	"	300		Kuangtung, Shanghai	"
	"	2,000		Tientsin	"
November	govt. cadres	1,400	2,000	Peking	"
	" "	600		"	Chinghai
		Total	29,925		

000 northwestern provinces during 1955.
S Thus, even from incomplete sources, the number of people
175 sent out to the Northwest came close to 30,000. Of this number,
• 668 the bulk were destined for Sinkiang. The influx of this horde of
166 Chinese into Sinkiang was to safeguard Chinese Communist inter-
N est and Chinese ascendancy prior to the granting of autonomy to
*[175] the native peoples of Sinkiang. As early as the summer of 1953,
*[668] Burkhan had sought to prepare the ground for the invasion of the
[166] Chinese. In a speech, he said, "It has been due to the great help rendered by the Han Chinese cadres from other provinces and the People's Liberation Army during the past three years since the liberation that achievements of the people of all nationalities in Sinkiang in their construction work was possible. Therefore, after the enforcement of regional autonomy, autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres to take part in work." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

N

C. Expansion of the Communist Party

*175 Along with the assignment of cadres to the countryside to
*668 carry out the work of collectivization and the transfer of workers
178 and cadres from China Proper to the Northwest, there was also an expansion of the membership of the Communist Party in the Northwest. The induction of men into the Chinese Communist Party and into its auxiliary, the New Democratic Youth League (Communist Youth League), had been active from the beginning of Communist rule. In 1950, out of the 3,600 national minority cadres trained in the short-term classes, 560 joined the Chinese Communist Party and 1,000 the New Democratic Youth League; in 1951, out of the 1044 graduates of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party Sub-bureau Cadre School, 88 joined the Communist Party and 726 the New Democratic Youth League.

In May, 1952, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued instructions to strengthen the work of party expansion, and ordered the directors of the Organization Departments of local party committees to convene and to work out methods for party expansion. "In rural areas where land reform has already been carried out, we must recruit more new party members and build up our party organizations so that we may vigorously promote mutual aid and cooperation of labor in production," stated a Central Committee directive (JMJP May 4, 1952). In 1954, the announcement of the General Line for the transition of the state to socialism brought a further acceleration of the work of party expansion.

Shensi: From June, 1952 to the end of 1954, a total of 3,625 basic level (hsiang) party branches were established, increasing the number from 60 per cent to 86 per cent, and 36,833 new members recruited. Up to the end of 1954, the majority of the new

Sinkiang: Party work was also slow in this province. Although
175 at the end of 1953, it was reported that 75.68 per cent of the
178 6,400 new Party members were recruited from the national
668 minorities, only 26.1 per cent of the responsible personnel in
party committees of county level and higher were natives. The Chinese members still predominated. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were in 1955 a total of 57,228 members in Sinkiang, and this organization supplied 3,900 of its members to the Chinese Communist Party.

Compared to the rest of Sinkiang, the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou did much better in the recruitment of party members. From 1950 to March, 1955, it recruited a total of 1,100 new party members from the activists.

VII. Formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region

A. Extend and Limitations of Regional Autonomy

175 The expansion of Chinese Communist Party membership, the
668 transfer of local cadres to the work of cooperative-building in
642 the rural areas and the collectivization of the people, the relega-
563 tion of native cadres to unimportant government posts, and the
177 influx of hordes of cadres and workers from China Proper to take
over the governments and state enterprises were preliminary steps preparatory to the conferring of regional autonomy to the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. Self-rule has been an objective for which the minority peoples of Chinese Turkestan aspired and struggled, and the promises of self-determination and self-government were the chief planks of the political platform of the Chinese Communists. However, the definition of what constitutes autonomy for the minority peoples has undergone evolution.

As early as 1930, Mao Tse-tung had declared that the non-Chinese racial minorities "have a right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic." (The Soviets in China, p. 440 quoted in Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 115). This was incorporated in Article 14 of the constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated in 1931, with the omission of the right to join the USSR.

The Chinese Communists reaffirmed their promise of autonomy to the nationality minorities when they came to power in 1949, but autonomy was to be within the federal framework of the Chinese People's Republic and no mention was made of the right of secession by the non-Chinese minorities. The Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949, promised only regional self-government and preservation of the language, religion and culture of the minority peoples, 175 and equality and prohibition of discrimination.

177 The policies of the Chinese Communists were incorporated
668 into the "General Program for the enforcement of nationalities
642 regional autonomy" which was promulgated in August, 1952,
563 along with two supplementary documents, one for the enforcement
of local nationalities democratic coalition governments and the other for the protection of the equality and interests of the national minorities. Article 2 of chapter one of the General Program declared explicitly that the nationality regional autonomous areas were local administrations under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the leadership of higher level people's governments. Chapter four provides for the "rights" of autonomy, which include the acquiescence to the leadership personnel, the use of their own language and literature, and the privilege of having their "patriotic" activists promoted to be cadres. No mention was made of the right of the nationalities to initiate legislation, and matters of finances, public security forces and militia were under the control of the Central People's Government. Chapter five stipulated that the minorities should love the Chinese and love and support the Chinese People's Republic, and chapter six stated that they should follow the leadership of governments of a higher level.

These provisions were incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in October, 1954, which, in article 2, reiterated that the autonomous regions were inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. Autonomy for the minority peoples, thus defined, meant only the preservation of the language and literature of the minority peoples. The autonomous regions were actually in the same status as a Chinese province, with no legislative powers of their own and no freedom from supervision and control of the Central Government. The love of and adhesion to the fatherland was reaffirmed and no separatist movements permitted from "the great family of the fatherland."

B. Autonomy for Sinkiang

Since autonomy for the national minorities, as conceived by the Chinese Communist who in turn copied it from Soviet Russia, was autonomy in name only and a sham, it was not likely to satisfy the people of Chinese Turkestan, with their tradition for independence and their aspirations for self-government. To quiet them, the provincial governor Burkhan Shahidi, in an article denouncing pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as destructive to the "fraternal and cooperative family" of China, told his people that they did not qualify for national independence. "It is conceivable," he said, "that people who speak the Turkish language may not form a nation as they lack common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychology. Similarly, people who believe in Islam do

175 not ipso facto form a nation." And, he went on, "At this juncture,
177 any national movement which seeks separation from the Chinese
668 People's Republic for independence will be reactionary since...
642 it would undermine the interests of the various races and particu-
563 larly the foremost majority of the race concerned (that is, the
Chinese), and thus would work to the advantage of imperialism."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

175 Later, in June, 1953, Burkhan enumerated the prerequisite
177 conditions for Sinkiang to achieve autonomy within the framework
668 of the Chinese People's Republic. The future Sinkiang autonomous
642 area, he said, must "be an inseparable part of the People's
[563] Republic of China and the autonomous areas of minority nationali-
ties in Sinkiang are likewise inseparable parts of Sinkiang and the
People's Republic of China."

The formation of autonomous governments in nationality areas, declared Burkhan, was contingent not only on having a large number of representatives and nationality cadres in these areas but also on the representatives and cadres of other nationalities in the governments, and he went on to explain that by other nationalities, he meant the Han Chinese cadres, whose presence was necessary because the native peoples were politically and culturally backward. "Autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres."

A third condition for the establishment of regional autonomy was the extent of the organization of the people. "It is imperative," he said, "to conduct more penetratively and extensively publicity and education to the people of all nationalities on patriotism and Sino-Soviet friendship."

Fourthly, he told the people of Chinese Turkestan, they should not be impatient and resentful just because other nationalities in the Northwest had already been granted regional autonomy. Regional autonomy in Sinkiang had to be achieved in five stages; at the hsiang and ch'ü level, at the county level, at the district level, at the administrative district level, and finally, at the provincial level with the Uighur as the principal constituent.

Burkhan, in conclusion, pointed to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region as "the example of the advantages of exercising autonomy in nationality areas," and "the perfect example for other minority nationalities in the implementation of autonomy in the future." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

By fall of 1954, the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the
[563] Central People's Government in Peking was satisfied with the
"notable progress made in substantiating minority self-government organs," which included the promotion of large numbers of native cadres from the activists, the staffing of the governments with cadres, the use of the languages of the minorities, and "in some localities, armed forces of indigenous peoples have been built

175
177 under the leadership of the local party and government organs."
668 (JMJP, August 28, 1954).
642 Finally, in August, 1955, when out of the total of thirty-three
[563] autonomous areas in Sinkiang below the rank of districts, four
[631] were raised to the status of chou and six to the status of districts,
it was announced that Sinkiang would be made into the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in September.

Large numbers of dignitaries journeyed from Peking to attend the second session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference at Urumchi, where the change in the status of Sinkiang was proclaimed on September 20. Among them was vice-premier Tung Pi-wu, who, in his address, told the local leaders that the bases for the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region lay in elevation of the patriotism and socialist consciousness of the people, the training and employment of large numbers of cadres, and on the degree of unity among the nationalities. To preserve and consolidate the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, he said, the people of Sinkiang must (1) welcome the assistance of the Han Chinese cadres, (2) actively assist the other nationality autonomous areas in construction, (3) pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism and prevent the tendency of great nation and provincial nationalism, and (4) consolidate national unity and wipe out the counter-revolutionaries. (NCNA September 21, 1955).

175 Burkhan, in his speech, elaborated on the statements of Tung
177 Pi-wu by saying that the main task of the Chinese Communist
Party on the problem of nationalities during the transitional
668 period was to consolidate the unity of the fatherland and the
642 solidarity among the nationalities in a common effort to build the
563 big family of the fatherland and to follow the centralized leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Communist Party and the provincial people's government. Just as the Uighurs, who are the majority people in Sinkiang, need the help and support of the Han Chinese of China Proper, so the other minority peoples, such as the Kazakhs in Ili, need the help and support of the Uighurs.

"With the establishment of the Uighur autonomous region in Sinkiang, we should all the more warmly welcome the sincere and selfless help extended by the Han Chinese and cadres of brother nationalities. This is because the Han Chinese and their cadres have gone through a long period of revolutionary training and experience.... Only under the unified guidance of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and the party committee in the autonomous region as well as the warm help of the Han Chinese and cadres, and further efforts to consolidate and strengthen unity among the

175 nationalities, will it be possible for Sinkiang nationalities to exer-
177 cise fully the rights of being masters of their own domain and
668 vigorously develop the political and cultural activities in the
Autonomous Region." (NCNA September 24, 1955).

642 On October 1, 1955, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
563 officially came into being. The last act of the Sinkiang People's
[666] Congress was the election of the 37-man people's council of the
new Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (the names of the members have not yet been published). Saifuddin, the vice-chairman of the erstwhile provincial council, was elected chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, but at the end of the month he resigned and Burkhan, the former chairman was reelected chairman. The vice-chairmen included Kao Chin-shun, former vice-chairman, and two natives, a Uighur and a Kazakh.

The Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, formerly subordinated to the Northwest Bureau, was made independent and renamed the Sinkiang Committee, but the party officials remained unchanged. The first secretary was Wang En-mao, a native of Kiangsi who spoke none of the local languages, the second secretary was Kao Chin-shun, concurrently vice-chairman of the autonomous region, the third secretary was Chang Pang-ying. Only the fourth secretary, Saifuddin, was a native. These men had held their positions since 1949. Both the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Sinkiang party committee thus came directly under the control of Peking.

VIII. Prospects

175 The formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
177 brings to a close an important phase in the political domination of
668 the Northwest by the Chinese Communists. By 1955, under the
intensive program of party expansion and the staffing of the governments by party men and by tried and tested cadres, the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai were already under effective Communist control. The United Front of the period of "New Democracy" came to an end with the transition of the country to socialism. The non-Communists in the government were cowed and eliminated. Those who survived the purges of 1952 were weeded out in the
[642] elections of 1953-54. The granting of autonomy to the Uighurs
and other minority peoples in Chinese Turkestan was to placate their discontent and to satisfy their yearning for self-rule, but it was rigged in such a manner as to make the domination of the Chinese Communists over Sinkiang and its ties with China Proper firmer and stronger than that accomplished by any governments in the past.

However, the efforts of the Chinese Communists to consolidate and centralize their control over the Northwest provinces are still impeded, internally, by the clash of interests within the ranks

175 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
177 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of
the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March,
1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres
was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work
of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some
areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough."
(Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for
the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-
liang, secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party commit-
tee, was their fear of the new situation created by the transition
from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their
rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
175 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
668 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
474 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors.
578 As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Commun-
ist Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the
past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all
levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leader-
ship center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain
defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious
fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
668 vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
563 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and
578 by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study,
refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to
policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party
members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists
in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction
within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the
people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in
the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried
on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
[794] I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and
[575] the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the
government in banning this sect.

175 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
795

175 counter-revolutionary activities." He said that they were carrying
668 on "rumor spreading, sabotage, and the deception of the masses in
669 an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity." (Sinkiang jih-
578 pao, February 25, 1955). Consequently, he went on, only "legal"
795 religious activities would be permitted by the people's government.

[798] By spring of 1956, as the heavy hand of Communist rule was
intensified, the counter-revolutionary activities of the people also
668 increased. Su Chen-yung, deputy director of the Bureau of Public
669 Security in the Kansu People's government, revealed the extent of
578 popular unrest in the Northwest when he said: "The counter-revolutionaries have unceasingly waged their destructive activities against the socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With the purpose of impeding the work of peasants joining the cooperatives and sabotaging the agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants and Taoist leaders to cheat backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings. Counter-revolutionaries hidden in factories, mines, and basic construction projects resort to such base acts as sabotaging technical reforms, stealing government secrets, and purposely committing errors of work in order to proceed with their destructive activities. Counter-revolutionaries also hid themselves in religious circles. Under the cloak of religion, they proceeded upon various kinds of destructive activities." (Kansu jih-pao, March 18, 1956).

This revelation of popular opposition to Communist rule almost six years after its establishment in the Northwest shows that the age-old conflicts of culture and ideology, which in the past have divided the region, and the stubborn recalcitrance of the people, which makes government difficult, still remain despite the efforts of the Chinese Communists in centralization and domination, in indoctrination and repression, which were unprecedented in their severity and ruthlessness. The divisive nature of the region and the discontent of the people are intrinsic conditions and cardinal factors in the political life of China's Northwest. Even the Communists themselves, in their public statements, have candidly acknowledged the difficulties and foresee greater resistance from the people as the program for socialism gets under way.

N
*175 military riots on a large or small scale.... The Chinese at Tien-tzu-wa
*563 of Ku-yuan county (in Kansu) were unwilling to be annexed
*668 to Chang-hua-tien where the Moslems were the majority. They
669 repeatedly petitioned to the county government, but the county
magistrate insisted on upholding his own opinion.... This ended
in the tragedy of the magistrate being beaten and numerous people
murdered." (Ibid., p. 444).

3. "(NCNA Sian, December 10, 1950)"

S "Bandit remnants remaining in Sinkiang, native bandits,
175 and special agents working for the US-Chiang elements, led by
579 Ulachibai, Stiga and Pulungchiafu who had been determinedly pursued
• 668 by the People's Liberation Army, were forced on December 1
669 to surrender their force of 127, bringing with them 70 rifles, 4,000
rounds of ammunition, and a number of horses.

"Ulachibai, a Kazak, was formerly the puppet (i.e. Nationalist) deputy magistrate of Chinghua hsien. Stiga, also a Kazak, was Commander of the Kou-mintang Self-Defense Corps at Nanshan. Pulungchiafu, a Mongol, was formerly puppet deputy magistrate of Ashan hsien, and a company commander of the forces of the bandit Osman.

"During the months of June and July, 1950, the aforementioned three bandits, in collusion with the US-Chiang agent, Osman, undertook to shelter special agents and army deserters, and proceeded with an orgy of rebellion, massacre, and robbery, in the Ching-hua, Nanshan, and Yenki areas.

"For the protection of the interest of the people, the People's Liberation Army, after the successful suppression of the bandit gangs led by Osman, Yollbars (Yolbar), and Janimkan (Janim Khan), since July has conducted operations against the bandit remnants of the three bandit chiefs.

"After overcoming many difficulties, the People's Liberation Army finally dealt annihilating blows to the remaining bandits."

An editorial in the Peking Jen-min jih-pao, (December 28, 1950) reported:

N 4. "Liu Yung-nien, chief of the technical division of the
*175 Kuomingtang's 'Second Bureau' in Lanchow...is an arch criminal,
669 who, after liberation of Lanchow, planted 1,200 mines and destroyed
the Hsiang-t'ang bridge."

5. "In the spring of 1952, the anti-Communists guerrillas in the P'ing-liang area of eastern Kansu started two open rebellions on April 2nd and May 8th under the leadership of Ma Hsiao-tung and Ma Kuo-yuan. They attacked the counties of Hsi-chi, Hai-yuan and spread all over eastern Kansu and continued their activities, commented Lo Chun in "The Construction and Management of the Highway in Northwest China," in Chung-kung wen-t'i, No. 3, p. 120.

N 6. "(NCNA Sian, September 7, 1952)
*175 The Ang-la tribe is located 300 li southeast of Sining in the
*668
669
579

N
*175 "Under a call of the correct nationalities policy, Hsiang Ch'ien
*668 yielded to the people in Chiencha in the afternoon of July 11, and
669 arrived at Sining on July 31....
579 "The Chinghai Provincial People's Government has appointed
Hsiang Ch'ien to continue to hold the post of chieftain."
S 7. In an article entitled "The great achievements of People's
175 Sinkiang during the past three years", in Sinkiang jih-pao, January
● 668 1, 1953, Burhan, the governor of Sinkiang, gave the following report:
669 "During the past three years, (1949-1952)...we have wiped out
579 more than 20,000 of the remnant of the KMT bandits, basically
cleared out the hidden spies...."
8. In the same paper, in April of 1953 there appeared the
following:
N "(NCNA Lanchow April 6, 1953)...Northwest Regional Administration
*175 Council called a meeting of the Kazakh chiefs along the
*563 border of Kansu, Chinghai, Sinkiang at Lanchow from March 23,
*668 to April 3, 1953....The Kazakh chief A-t'ung-pai-k'e said: 'In
669 the past, being deceived by the bad people and believing in the
S rumors, we did not cooperate with the People's government. Instead
175 of punishing us for our past faults, you are now helping us...'"
563 The above cases all clearly indicated political disturbances.
668 Judging by what has been revealed here, the Communists did try
669 to modify their laws and standards to woo the minority groups.
They also did use the minority people as their own agents to police
as well as to pacify the resisting minorities.
N 9. (NCNA Sian, February 28, 1955)
*175 "According to statistics of the people's procuratorates in 48
*668 administrative districts, hsien, and municipalities, 3,500 cases
were taken on in 1954."
625 10. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
694 "The Provincial Public Security Department has also dispatched
631 five work teams to various places and adopted a combined policy of
S carrying out penetrating detection, investigation and research together
175 with the resettling of vagrants and the pronouncing of sentences
668 with great fanfare. According to incomplete data from
625 various localities during the past 11 months, 71.7% of the criminal
694 cases have been brought to light. The data from the two special
631 districts of Tacheng (Chuguchak) and Altai, from the two municipalities
of Ining and Kuche as well as from Shache hsien reveal
that a total of 25 major criminal cases have been unearthed."
11. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
S "Judging from the events that have taken place in our province
175 during the past year, there are still some habitual robbers, habitual
668 thieves and other criminal culprits who have not been disposed
674 of. Some elements who have gone through reform through labor or
who have been released on termination of sentences still refuse to
repent and continue to jeopardize social order. Some landlords

S who are recalcitrant in maintaining their reactionary standing and
175 military and government officials of the former Chiang government
668 still cling to the shameful and parasitical way of life without engag-
674 ing themselves in proper employment but commit various practices of thieft and swindling. Some ruffians indulge in drinking and assaulting women. Some illegal prostitutes and professional gamblers convert their brothels and gambling houses into dens for robbers, thieves, and ruffians, and into hotbeds for nourishing crimes. Some unscrupulous second-hand goods dealers and hotel keepers collude with burglarious elements to dispose of spoils and even act as chief planner of crimes. More serious still, a batch of habitual thieves who sneakily move around various places even collaborate with one another to commit theft and robbery in an organized manner, using arms to threaten people and to carry out violence. Some culprits refuse to repent during reform through labor and even escape from jails to continue their crimes. Some burglarious elements who sneaked into our province from other provinces and who also belonged to the category of counter-revolutionaries carry out their counter-revolutionary sabotage activities in the form of criminal offense or impose themselves as military and government personnel to commit extortion and blackmailing. Some ruffians even intensified their activities to rob and rape women."

N 12. "An address delived by Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o, a deputy
*175 from Chinghai, at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National
*668 Congress:
829 "'Recently, in some nomadic areas (in Chinghai) we discovered rumors spread by the enemies, saying, "To start cooperatives in nomadic areas is just another form of confiscation of cattle and sheep." It definitely hurt the productive morale of the people....

N "' Furthermore, there are numerous counter-revolutionary
*175 elements carrying on sabotage under the cover of religion. This
*668 is often discovered in the area of minority groups. For instance
669 in some nomadic areas in Chinghai, people rumored that a Heav-
*563 enly mandate had descended, saying that the world would be de-
787 stroyed soon. The people would suffer in great calamities, etc. It was a disguise of the devil to disturb the common people... But a lot of those who had faith but were short of wisdom believed it.... They interrupted their productive activities and devoted their time wholly on chanting Buddhist scriptures every day, hoping that by doing so they may escape from the disasters....

"'The counter-revolutionists are so active that we cannot afford to neglect them. We must get rid of the idea that everything is in order.... We must suppress them.'" (Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 8, p. 69.)

N 13. In the Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 8, p. 197, there
*175 appeared
669 "An address delivered by Sun Tso-ping, a deputy from Chinghai,
*668

N
*175 at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National People's Con-
669 gress on July 27, 1955:
*668 "'Chinghai is an area where many nationalities live.... There are hidden counter-revolutionists and reactionary landlords, rich farmers who are still trying in every way to sabotage the unity of the nationalities. The methods used by these enemies for sabotage are dangerous and shrewd, mainly along two lines, namely, under the cover of religion or by upsetting international relations. The counter-revolutionists also sabotage our productive activities through arson, robbery, spreading of rumor, etc. They even organize open military rebellions. The reactionary landlords and rich farmers also stir up trouble between the middle farmers and the poor farmers. They infiltrate into the mutual cooperative groups and cooperatives to sabotage the mutual cooperative movement.'"

S
14. The Sinkiang jih-pao, September 30, 1954, reported
175 that
669 "In the first half of 1954 alone, we have discovered 3429 cases of counter-revolutionary plots in Sinkiang. According to incom-
● 668 plete statistics, we have made arrests in at least 15,000 cases of various criminal offenses during the past 5 years." (A Report on the Achievements of the Political Works in Sinkiang Province during the Past Five Years," by Vice-chairman Kao Chin-ch'un of Sinkiang Province.)

S
The above reports clearly indicate that there have been disturb-
[674] ances, resistance, sabotage and open rebellion besides ordinary crimes in every province of the Northwest from the very beginning of the Communist conquest until the present.

4. Conclusion

N
105 The regular police system under the Communists is huge, yet
*668 it is only a very small part of the whole police system, much like the part of an iceberg floating above the sea level. Strictly speak-
625 ing, every branch of the Communist government, no matter whether it is legislative, administrative, judicial or economic, is a part of the police system and under the control of the Party. Moreover, every person in the country is organized and enlisted in the secret service. He is watching and being watched. Violators are subject to very heavy penalty. (See "The Regulations for Punishing the Counter-Revolutionaries" adopted by 11th meeting of the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951, in 1952 Jen-min shou-ts'e.)

175 648 In the meantime Governor Sheng attempted to end his dependence on Soviet Russia and to turn instead to the National Government. When the pressure of the German advance forced the Soviet government to withdraw most of its forces from Sinkiang, it attempted to maintain its position by disorganizing the Turkestan administration. Aside from the negotiations with the Kazakh rebels, the Soviets made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Governor Sheng when they feared he would seek cooperation with the Chinese National Government. This Russian move precipitated a switch of Sheng's administration to the Chinese side. Sheng drove out his Russian advisers and arrested large numbers of his staff who had been cooperating with the Russians as well as with Chinese Communists who had been brought in through Russian support.

175 648 668 The cooperation between the Soviet representatives in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communists during this time seems to have been close. While the Russian representatives conveyed the policy line as determined in Moscow and provided the military and political power behind it, the Chinese Communists infiltrated Sheng's staff and helped to work out many of Sheng's administrative measures. For instance a currency reform instituted in 1938 was claimed to have been the work of the brother of Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-min who had come to Turkestan with the Chinese Communist group under Russian protection. The Communists also established the Fan-ti-hui, or Anti-Imperialist Association which was used for propaganda and intelligence. When Governor Sheng broke with the Soviets and turned to the National Government, he attempted to eradicate this Chinese Communist group. Mao Tse-min and a number of others, including Governor Sheng's secretary, were executed, and many were imprisoned.

VII. Chinese Nationalist Attempt to Reassert Nationalist Influence

175 648 The new active interest which the National Government took in Sinkiang was related to the military situation of the time. The Russian withdrawal was the result of the military defeats brought on Soviet Russia by the Nazi armies which threatened Moscow and forced a concentration of all available Russian troops at the European front. The Chinese National Government could not count on any further Soviet support in its war against Japan, and the further developments in Soviet Russia were uncertain. Even if Soviet Russia could hold out, this seemed an opportune time to eliminate the dangerous Soviet control which was no longer compensated by any military advantage.

The Chinese situation had become still more desperate after Pearl Harbor and the Japanese conquest of the mainland of southeast Asia. Cut off from the supply routes which could bring in

175 a change of the provincial administration came to nothing because
648 of the rapid disintegration and collapse of the National Government
in 1949. The Sinkiang Provincial Government had a formal decla-
[635] ration of adherence to the new Communist regime in Peking in
[668] September 1949.

IX. Sinkiang Under the Chinese Communists

175
648 After the victory of the Chinese Communists, both Soviet and
669 Chinese policy changed in its attitude toward the Sinkiang Nationalists.
668 While they had been supported and equipped with Soviet arms against
the Chinese provincial administration under the National Govern-
ment, they were now suppressed by the Chinese Communists with
Russian help. Soviet troops which were greatly increased and have
been estimated as consisting of about 50,000 men during this
time were instrumental in defeating the independent forces of Os-
man Batur who was captured and executed in April 1951 at Urumchi,
together with over 13,000 of his followers. The key Nationalist
leaders of the Ili area who had been formerly supported by Soviet
Russia were eliminated in another way. While on their way to
Peking to participate in the opening of the Communist People's
Political Consultative Conference, Akmedjan, Isakh Beg, and
several other leading figures were killed in an airplane crash on
August 29, 1949. The leaders who remained behind, Burkhan and
175 Saifuddin, were willing to work with the Chinese Communists
668 and Soviet Russia along a new line of policy which condemned the
[648] former nationalism and re-interpreted the previous fight in an
anti-Kuomintang line. The new leaders were willing to admit
former "mistakes: in their nationality policy which had not made
a clear distinction between opposition to "rapacious Kuomintang
officials, plundering Kuomintang troops, and the oppressive
Kuomintang police," and hostility to the "entire Han race."
This previous "narrow nationalism" was described as harmful
and the aim was now to establish full unity between the formerly
rebellious districts and the rest of the province. The Ili armed
forces were dissolved and integrated into the Chinese Communist
Army and a new policy was introduced of ridding the province of
its "feudal oppression."

175 This new policy propagandized by both Burkahn and Saifuddin
668 aroused strong nationalist opposition. In 1951, a Kazakh revolt which
669 continued in the Ili area spread towards the east. The move-
ment was attacked by Burhan as representing the "reactionary
bourgeois class, such as pan-Turkestanists and pan-Islamists"
who were trying to undermine the "solidarity among various races
in the People's Republic of China." He stated that "what has been
[661] regarded as progressive at one time may become reactionary at
another time," and ordered the liquidation of all "reactionaries,

175 counter-revolutionaries, and pan-Turkestanists" and demanded
668 that the "people of various races" be taught" the spirit of patrio-
669 tism and internationalism." Simultaneously, a large-scale
661 purge was undertaken to liquidate most of the original revolutionary leaders in the three western districts who had not perished in the airplane crash of 1949. These leaders were replaced by Chinese Communist cadres. The new policy was carried through with great bloodshed. According to a statement by Burkhan in January 1952, over 120,000 "people's enemies" had been liquidated. About 60,000 people attempted to flee from Turkestan, of whom only about 35,000 survived and reached safety in other countries. Large number of people were arrested and used as forced labor among the construction works introduced by the Chinese Communists under Russian guidance. Bollowing this purge, a re-education campaign was carried on by "friendship delegation from Peking, and in the words of the New China News Agency: "It was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of the fatherland." (See Allen S. Whiting, 'Nationality Tensions in Sinkiang," Far Eastern Survey, January 1956, vol. 25, no. 1.)

175 This policy was carried through with the backing of Russian
648 troops as well as the Chinese Communist troops of the First
668 Army Corps which had moved in after 1949. At the time of the
669 Korean war, some of the Chinese troops were withdrawn for Korea, and the Russian forces were reportedly increased
661 from 50,000 to 70,000 men. They were garrisoned along the northern route at each important point.

These Russian troops have thus helped substantially in the suppression of the Turkic nationalism which Soviet Russia had formerly built up and equipped against the Chinese Nationalists. Once before, in 1942, when Soviet Russia partly withdrew from Sinkiang, these nationalists had been left at the merch of the Chinese administration. Many had been arrested and executed, although the Soviet consular officials had continued to intervene on the behalf of some of these nationalist leaders. In 1949, however, the movement was crushed and its very motivation was attacked. Only those leaders survived who were willing to cooperate fully with the new Communist line.

175 Although the Russians gave full support to the Chinese Communists
648 in their reconquest of Sinkiang, the potential remained for Sino-
668 Soviet rivalry over control in Sinkiang. For the economic development of the province, the Chinese Communists remained dependent on Russian equipment and on Russian technicians. In the Sino-Soviet treaty of February, 1950, the two governments agreed on the establishment in Sinkiang of joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for exploitation of oil and non-ferrous metals in the province. The Soviet control of these companies indicated the political importance of

175 the Soviet economic stake in Sinkiang.

648 Over the next years, the strength of the Chinese Communist
668 government increased within the Soviet-Chinese relationship. The treaty of 1950, concluded by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow after lengthy haggling, was replaced in December 1954 by a new treaty concluded at the occasion of a visit of Krushchev and Mikoyan in Peking. Among other concessions, this new treaty provided for the liquidation of the Soviet shares in the former joint stock companies. Nevertheless some element of Soviet control remained since the Soviet shares were to be repaid through deliveries of raw materials and other commodities from Turkestan. The whole industrial and communications development of the province which was to be rapidly expanded under the Chinese Communist Five Year Plans depended also on Soviet economic and technical assistance. Most important, Soviet Russia has reportedly kept possession of the atomic energy center at Mirgrad in the Takla Makan Desert and has through the maintenance of military forces full control over the exploitation of uranium deposts in the Altai region where a large number ofRussians, estimated by one observer to be as large as 80,000, has been reported.

On the other hand, a recent British correspondent (New York
648 Times, August 13, 1956, p. 9) has reported that throughout the
668 region "up to the Soviet borders, the direct control of the Central Government on development plans and on political life is everywhere apparent. There are Soviet advisers and experts and plenty of Soviet machinery, but no more than in other parts of China, and the over-riding impression is that China is in complete charge.

"Peking's orders stretch into the remotest villages, where the ever-present cadres and Party members are kept in constant touch with the capital through provincial committees. Nowhere is there any external evidence ofSoviet influence outside the technical sphere."

This observation of a Chinese Communist administration directed from Peking does not necessarily exclude consideration of Russian military and economic decisions for Sinkiang by the Chinese policy-makers in Peking. Nor does it exclude the possibility of conflict in the districtuion of the Turkestan resources between the Soviet and Chinese Communist economies, especially in the case of the uranium exploitation at present obviously in Soviet hands. The railroad from Lanchow to Aktogai in Russian
[496] Turkestan, which in 1956 has been pushed beyond the Yumen oil fields in Kansu, is the most important physical link between the two economies but is also a highway for a vast and growing stream of young Chinese immigrants who are brought in to work on the oil fields, the railroads, and the construction of new towns and factories. This movement, which is aimed at filling up the

648 thinly populated area with a Chinese population, is the most
668 important factor in the reassertion of Chinese control. The
Chinese link with Turkestan is also not limited to the railroad
under construction which will run along the old caravan route
via Qomul, Urumchi, to the Soviet border. In addition the
[491] Chinese Communists follow the policy of the National Government
[496] in the construction of road and railroad connections through
the Tsaidam Basin. This area is reportedly also to be developed
by Communist China into a new key industrial center in central
Asia. Oil and mineral resources are claimed to exist in abundance. The Tsaidam region is farther away from the Soviet or Outer Mongolian border than is the main railroad line and it provides a position in depth in the Chinese Communist connection with Sinkiang. In its advance into central Asia, the Chinese Communist regime seems to follow the main strategic considerations which had been observed by previous Chinese governments

With the shrinking distances and the means of modern industrial development, the importance of Sinkiang with its rich natural resources has vastly increased. There is at the moment no indication of any hitch in the Soviek-Chinese cooperation in the province. But should any conflict evolve between these Communist organizations, Sinkiang must, by the very reason of its geographic location and economic importance, become one of the decisive areas of conflict.

N III. Resentment of Chinese Rule

*563 These internal differences have made it impossible for the
578 people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united
action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated govern-
S ment of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is
[162] non-Chinese, yet the forces of nationalism and of religion, which
at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to
transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary move-
ment and complete independence.

There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a foreign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Moslems (the Dungans) have found themselves caught between two fires. At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists, and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Moslem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

N
*175 The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the
system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China,
657 but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-
*563 t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as
578 an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his
S own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social struc-
175 tures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing
657 Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He
563 considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large
578 numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mongols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them, while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the previous Manchu rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs; they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

S In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion
175 are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have
669 been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short
648 period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control.
Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the
• 668 ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into
Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has
flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the

S
175 Moslems were rising in China Proper, a descendant of the Khojas
669 was able to move from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865
648 he ruled Kashgar and Yarkand. Soon, his chief of staff, Yakub
● 668 Beg, replaced him and conquered the rest of Chinese Turkestan.
Helped by foreign aid and diplomatic recognition, Sinkiang remained independent and under Moslem rule for over a decade. After the death of Yakub Beg in 1877 and the recapture of Sinkiang by Tso Tsung-t'ang, the dream of a great Turkic Empire, extending from the Caspian to the western frontier of China, continued to exist. Turanism (Pan Turkism or Pan Turkistanism) gradually came to acquire the ideological formulations of modern nationalism.

S
175 A Moslem uprising of proportions dangerous to the Chinese
669 government broke out in 1931 under the leadership of Ma Ch'ung-
648 ying, who led an army of Chinese Moslems from Kansu into Sinkiang. His defeat in 1934 by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was partly due to the aid of Russia. It regarded Ma as a collaborator and advance scout of the Japanese whose invasion of Central Asia seemed imminent.

S
175 The most recent example of an anti-Chinese uprising culminated in 1944 in the establishment at Kulja of the "Eastern Turkistan
669 Republic." Unlike previous purely Moslem uprisings, the Kulja
668 movement was an expression of "coalition nationalism," and it
S attempted to unite all the non-Chinese of Sinkiang. The Kulja
[646] government was headed by a council made up of an Uighur, a Kazakh, and a "White" Russian. In the years that followed until the victory of the Chinese Communists, there were alternate periods of fighting, negotiations and near co-existence between the National Government and Kulja. The insurgents' chief demand was for autonomy and self-government, rather than for complete independence from China. Agreements, guaranteeing cultural freedoms and substantial independence in the administration of the local government, were made but were never really carried out. In 1947, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landlord, became Chairman of Sinkiang, the first non-Chinese to hold that position. But as he was considered by many members of the Kulja Government to be an agent of the C. C. Clique and the National Government, the movement split for and against him, and a new deadlock was created. In December, 1948, Masud Sabri was replaced by Burkhan at a time when no assembly was in session to accept or reject him. It is difficult to know to what degree the Kulja Government had been swayed by Communist or Soviet Russian influence. Only one thing was certain - the government was strongly anti-Chinese. But with the Communist victory, the entire provincial government of Sinkiang turned to the new regime and a completely new situation emerged.

N
*668 Thus, there have been two major types of independence movements in the Northwest, one purely Moslem and the other seeking

N
*668 177 collectivize was slight, but the speed toward socialization has been increased greatly especially since the middle of 1955. The plans call for a continuation in the breakdown of privately-owned farms. S [668] [177] [474] In Sinkiang the 1702 production cooperatives which existed in 1955 are to be increased to 3469 in 1956. By 1960, 85% of all households are scheduled to be at least semi-socialized. Furthermore, a relatively large number of mechanized state farms have been instituted in the Northwest (China News Agency No. 112.). It is not surprising that these rapid changes, combined with methods of terror and intimidation, should result in peasant opposition. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955.)

4. Religious organizations

N
*668 798 669 Religious organizations have also come under attack. Counter-revolutionaries are suspected of hiding in them and of using them for propaganda activities and espionage. Sinister anti-government activities are attributed to the traditional secret societies, espe- N *668 575 cially I-kuan-tao, which has many branches throughout China and appears under various names. It is estimated to have 100,000 members in [illegible]si, Kansu and Ninghsia. Secret society activities have existed among the Chinese Moslems since Tso Tsung-t'ang's invasion of the Northwest. Only now are they being suppressed. It is unlikely that, after such a long existence, the Communists will succeed in completely uprooting the organizations in the very near future.

C. Centers of Resistance Abroad

N
*668 669 It is clear that no effective organs of opposition can exist in the Northwest under conditions of terror and in the face of a centralized system of police and military control. All that can be expected is individual terror and sabotage - a method of opposition, nevertheless, that continues to give the administration constant irritation and worry. Moreover, if historical precedent can serve as an indication for the future, a rebellious movement can attain political significance only when military aid from abroad is available. This was the case during World War II, for instance, when the Turks of southern Russia rebelled against the Soviet regime and sided with the Germans. At present only two important centers of resistance exist abroad. One is the so-called National Turkestanian Unity Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik Quomitasinin), headed by its president, Veli Kayum Khan, a member of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan; the other is Formosa, the rallying point of all anti-Communists from the mainland.

1. The Turkestanian Unity Committee

N
*668 669 648 Few people in the West are aware of the existence of an East and West Turkistan government-in-exile, which is supported by the Turks of Central Asia and by Turkestanian refugees. Due to their fear of political entanglements with Russia, none of the

S
668
669
648

N countries bordering Soviet and Chinese Turkestan have given offi-
*668 cial recognition to this government-in-exile. It has its headquar-
669 ters far from Central Asia - in Düsseldorf, West Germany. How-
648 ever, the National Turkestanian Unity Committee is supported
S unofficially by many of the Moslem countries of the Middle East
668 and Central Asia, such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
669 Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In each of these
648 countries the Committee maintains a representative office staffed
by two members from each Turkish clan from Eastern and Western Turkestan. Iraq is the exception where there is only one representative. In addition to giving financial aid to the exiled government, these countries render assistance in getting Turkestanian refugees temporarily settled. They also allow the establishment of National Turkestanian Unity Committee branches within their borders.

The Committee is composed of ten departments, each of which is under the combined direction of President Veli Khayum Khan and a secretary. These departments are: 1) Organizations and Social Institutions; 2) Science; 3)Information; 4) the Press; 5) Public Health; 6) the Clergy (Turkish: Ulema); 7) Military Affairs; 8) Education, directed cooperatively by all members; 9) Women's Activities; and 10) Foreign Relations, of which Veli Khayun Khan alone is the head.

The spiritual leader of the movement for an independent Turkestan is the famous turkologist Zeki Velidi Togan, who is now a member of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Istanbul. A native of Bashkiria, Zeki Veliki Togan studied and taught Arabic literature at the University of Kazan. In November, 1917, he became president of Bashkiria. In 1922 he led the Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule. With their suppression, he fled to Tashkent, and from there to Turkey.

During the Second World War, the National Committee gave Germany effective aid against Russia, but its aim always has been independence from any foreign power. "The Germans, as the enemy of our enemy, were temporarily our friends, but we envisaged this state of affairs only for as long as they were fighting against the Russians." (Milli Turkistan #79B, p. 5). The ultimate goal of the Turkestanian government-in-exile is to liberate all of Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, a territory of about four million square miles with a population of over twenty million. The leaders of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee claim that they are able to maintain contact with the peoples of Central Asia and that messengers frequently cross unguarded mountain passes to take contraband literature to Communist-controlled countries, and return to the West with reliable information of conditions under Communist rule. Naturally, it is difficult to estimate the degree of influence which the National Turkestanian Unity

N Committee holds over the people of Northwest China. Nor is it
*668 possible to predict to what extremes a fanatically nationalistic
669 movement may go in order to establish a Greater Turkestan Em-
648 pire, or the new sufferings which such a Turkic regime may mean
S to others.

[668] 2. Formosa

[669] Since 1949, Formosa has been the natural center for anti-Com-
[648] munist activities. The Nationalists attempt to maintain contact with the border regions, but it is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of such an espionage or sabotage system. Refugees from the Northwest and elsewhere are given subsidies. Frequently they are employed in the anti-Communist propaganda and planning undertaken by Taipeh. The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs sponsors radio broadcasts to the Northern, Northwestern and Western border regions, and has done most of the planning for the eventual overthrow of the Communist regime. These include, 1) a draft plan for the administration of the border regions during the counter-offensive, 2) a draft plan for anti-Communist work to be handled by the anti-Communist agencies in the border regions (although no details are given about them), and 3) plans for the training of administrative personnel from the border regions. The Commission has also been publishing books and pamphlets on the problems of these areas.

An anti-Communist branch of the China Islam Association also has its headquarters on Formosa. It serves as a center for Moslem refugees from the Northwest, as well as from Inner Mongolia and China Proper.

Aside from these organizations, there are also individuals who possibly may form a nucleus for future anti-Communist leadership. They include such people as General Pai Chung-hsi, who works closely with the China Islam Association on Formosa, Yolbas Khan, one of the Kazakh leaders who fought with Osman Batur, Ma Hung-k'ui, the former governor of Ninghsia who now lives in San Francisco, and Ma Pu-fang, the former governor of Ch'inghai, who escaped to Formosa and thence to Egypt in 1949. The latter two are devout Moslems and have fought actively against the Communists in the Northwest. Ma Pu-fang is remembered for his enlightened rule and is trusted by the Moslems in all parts of the Northwest. (See section Biographies for details on these men).

Thus, the potential organization and leadership for a non-Communist government in the Northwest exists. Their practical value must remain slight as long as the regime in power continues to be centralized and as long as it gives the people enough material benefits to take the place of political freedoms.

S 4. Cultural corps
● 668 In the army, cultural work corps promoted propaganda by means
708 of entertainment. In local dances and songs, the Cultural Work
208 Corps of the Fifth Army (originally the Sinkiang National Army)
in the summer of 1951 promoted the Party's Nationality policy and
545 the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement in Sinkiang. They
visited various villages and regularly attracted an audience of
S from three or four thousand to ten thousand people. The members
[563] included thirteen minority groups living in Sinkiang. Some of
[484] them went to Peking in 1953 and presented a performance of 21
[648] acts before the audience in the capital.

S The visit was returned by the Central Nationality Dancing
668 Corps of Peking which sent a performing team of 140-odd mem-
648 bers to Sinkiang in April, 1955 to celebrate the establishment
545 of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. It spent more than
half a year in Sinkiang and returned to Peking on November 13
after having visited ten special districts, three autonomous chou,
seven counties, two state farms, three mines in Sinkiang and two
cities (Lanchow and Su-chou) in Kansu. It performed 112 times
before audiences of various nationalities totalling more than
439,000 people.

N IV. The Methods of Propaganda.

*668 Besides those already mentioned, the Communists are using
208 many other methods of propaganda. Parading, signature drives,
circulation of pictures and pictorial stories, large-scale welcome
meetings for important personnel sent from Peking, lantern slides
and movies produced by the Party and the government, theater
activities such as opera, drama, dance, and concerts all have
been used as means of propaganda. The public accusation meet-
ing is another form. No matter what the main target of a partic-
ular accusation meeting may be, whether a landlord or the U.S.A.,
the accusation always carries out the propaganda of the day,
whether it be the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement or land
reform. Other kinds of meetings are equally useful. "Model
S Peasants Rallies," held in the main farming districts of Sinkiang
[668] are the place to promote propaganda for increasing production as
[208] well as for denouncing germ warfare.

N A. Festiva[illegible]

*668 Festivals are always good opp;rtunities for promoting propa-
796 ganda. In Northwest China where most of the minority groups are
followers of the Moslem religion, the Islamic festivals are used
*[563] as a time to express the thoughtfulness of the Communist govern-
[771] ment. For instance, during their celebration of the three major
[651] Moslem festivals of the year, the butchery tax on beef and mutton
consumed by Mohammedan communities is exempted. Further-

N
*668 the landlord as rent and 60 per cent of what was left to the govern-
651 ment as tax. If these figures were true, then the peasants were
receiving only 4 per cent of what they harvested. Furthermore, at
the most, the Nationalist Government had taxed the peasants only
6 per cent of their harvest while the minimum tax of the Commun-
N ists is 7 per cent of the farmers' total annual agricultural income.

*668 4. Achievements of Communist government

After the Communist government had existed for a while, the propaganda emphasized the achievement of the Communist regime. A good example is the article written by Liu Ke-p'ing, Deputy-Director of Commission of Nationalities Affairs of the Central People's Government, concerning "The achivements of the Nationality works during the past three years." In this article he listed the following achievements:

1) The establishment of the autonomous districts
2) The participation of the minorities in the government
3) The training and education of local cadres
4) The sending of Chinese cadres to work among the minorities
5) The establishment of state trading agencies in the minority areas
6) The gradual promotion of land reform among the minorities
7) The gradual change in the feudal relations between the owner and helpers among minority herdsmen
8) The improvements in public health among the minorities
9) The establishment of schools in Sinkiang and other areas where the minorities live
10) The help given to the minorities to create or improve their written languages
11) The printing and distribution of books and periodicals in minority languages
12) The radio broadcasts in minority languages
13) The study and improvements made on the traditional dances and music of the minority groups
14) The organization of the Chinese Islamic Association to honor the customs, habits and religious faith of the minority groups
15) Visiting groups sent to the national minorities from the Communist government and those organized among the minorities to visit Peking and inland China. (The Great Achievements in the People's Republic of China during the Past Three Years, (Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-he-kuo San-nien-lai-te Wei-ta Ch'eng-chiu, Jen min Ch'u-pan-she, ed. Peking 1952, Dec.) p. 37. The article was written on September 13, 1952.)

S
• 668 Propaganda along this same line can be found in Burhan's articles on "The great achievements made in People's Sinkiang during the past three years" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 1, 1953

S
668 and "The achievements in political and judicial work in Sinkiang in the past five years," also in Sinkiang Jih-pao, September 30, 1954, and numerous others.

N
*668
5. Other campaigns

Besides the above, special propaganda campaigns as well as routine ones have been launched throughout the years. In the Northwest, at least the following campaigns took place:

1) "The march to wipe out illiteracy" in July, 1952
2) The three anti- and five anti- movements in 1952
3) The start of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953
4) The calling of People's Congresses and the establishment of the Constitution, 1953-54
5) Finishing the land reform missions in agricultural areas of Sinkiang, 1953
6) The practice of minority autonomy, 1953
7) The increase of production and the austerity movement, 1953
8) The strengthening education as a whole and training minority cadres in particular movement, 1953
9) The denunciation of the U.S.-Chiang Joint Defense Pact (over Formosa) in 1955
10) The criticism of capitalistic ideas among the peasant Party members in Shensi in 1955
11) The signature movement against the use of the atomic bomb, in 1955
12) The suppression of counter-revolutionary movements at various times
13) The killing sparrows movement in 1955 (Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao, December 24, 1955. Because of the extreme shortage of food, the Communists started to pay attention to all birds, rodents, insects and worms that might consume food. They singled out a few, including sparrows, as targets of campaigns. In this case, the movement started in Kansu and spread to the whole nation.)

S
668
533
539
B. The Content

The flavor of the contents can be sampled in the following paragraphs:

1) A praising song used by a Sinkiang group:

You, Giant Mao Tse-tung,
Brought freedom to the people
You, Hero Mao Tse-tung,
Brought brightness to the people
You, Father Mao Tse-tung,
Saved the suffering people.
In the past we were ill-treated
And had no interest to produce;

S
● 668
533
539

Now we have emerged to be honored,
And happily we produce;
From now on we will never be suppressed by the enemies again.
In the beautiful garden there appear the dawn and spring,
The sun appears in the east;
The people blessedly sing:
With only one heart and only one will,
To follow the Communist Party forever.
(Hsin-kuan-ch'a, 1953, No. 15, p. 27.)

2) Another song for the minorities:

When my heart thinks of Mao Tse-tung,
The sun turns red at midnight;
When my eyes see Mao Tse-tung,
The dark mountain paths open wide;
When my mouth talks about Mao Tse-tung,
My fatigue gone, I work day and night;
When my fellow-travellers mention Mao Tse-tung,
My thousand-pound burden suddenly becomes light. (Wen-i-pao, 1954, No. 2, p. 30:
"All the Nationalities sing about Chairman Mao".)

N
*668

VI. The Effect and Influence of Propaganda

A. Factors Contributing to Success

As a whole, the propaganda program of the Communists has been successful. The success is mainly due to the fact that the Communists have completely shut off all other sources of information. They are the only ones to provide news. Moreover, the repetition, the persistency, the thoroughness and the dead seriousness of the Communists make it hard for people to disbelieve. This is especially true of the youth. The effect of the Communist propaganda is clearly illustrated in the following examples:

S
668
159

1) My name is Ahbuduzheyimu Tsake. I am a Young Pioneer of Uighur nationality. I am 14 years old and attending the first grade of the No. 2 Teacher's School in Tihua. My father is a blacksmith. Before the liberation my family was so poor that we could not get enough money to buy food or clothes...when Sinkiang was liberated the sunshine of the era of Mao Tse-tung began to illuminate every town, every village and every pasture north and south of Tienshan Mountain. My father became much more enthusiastic about his work and life in our family became better and better.... In January, 1950, several schoolmates and I were admitted to the ranks of the Young Pioneers. From then on I made up my mind to study hard, to build up my body and to be a good pupil of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. (New China

S
668
159
S
668
423

through her children's eyes, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953, pp. 49-50.)

2) In the 2nd district of P'i-shan County in Sinkiang, there were a large portion of the farmers thinking that since the land they received from the Communists before was taken back by the Communists for redistribution in the land reform, there is no guarantee that the land they received this time will not be taken away from them at a later date. Hence, quite a number of them were not anxious to prepare for the spring ploughing. After the propaganda work of the members of the Party and the Youth Corps, these peasants learned that the lands they had received before were only given on a temporary basis. The lands they got through land reform are really theirs now. This propaganda dissolved the peasants' mistaken thoughts and doubts.... For instance, before the doubts were dispelled, peasant T'u-ta-a-hung slept in his room all the day long instead of going out to cultivate the land. Now he is working hard on his land and even refuses to rest at noon time. (Sinkiang jih-pao, April 8, 1953.)

N
*668

B. Factors not Contributing to Success

1. Sporadic nature of campaigns

However, these successes do not indicate that the Communist propaganda program has been carried out without exceptions. As early as 1949, some writers who were responsible for manufacturing propaganda found it difficult to praise the new regime. Then when propaganda became a part of the huge Party machine in the newly-conquered mainland, it developed other problems. At first, the movements were sporadic and geared to deadlines. Whenever the Party leader decided to promote a certain program, the rank and file had to work day and night to promote the theme. Once the interest changed, the whole program would be abruptly dropped and a new program would be rushed to fit the new propaganda purpose. This was criticized by the Communists themselves:

"In September, 1953, Mr. Jen....wrote a short article ridiculing several bureaucratic persons who did not consider seriously letters sent in by the people. He mailed it to a newspaper... After one month, the newspaper editor returned his manuscript with the following comment:

'The central propaganda mission concerning the serious handling of people's letters is over now....Therefore we sent your honorable manuscript back to you...'

To the surprise of the editor, on November 4th, Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial: 'Push one step forward in the work of handling letters sent in by the people'. Then all of a sudden the editorial department of that newspaper wrote to comrade Jen,

S
159 military commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang. He
669 further hinted that he might be in a position to persuade Russian
648 authorities to render help for developing Sinkiang under Chang's
631 leadership. Thereupon Chang Chih-chung recommended Burkhan as a member of the State Council of the Nationalist Government in Nanking, and sent him to Nanking to negotiate with the Soviet ambassador. By December 2, 1948, a secret agreement was reached between Burkhan, as personal representative of Chang Chih-chung, and the Soviet ambassador. The prerequisite of the secret treaty was the removal of the Nationalist commander, Sung Hsi-lien. The important clauses included closer cooperation between Chang Chih-chung and the Chinese Communist Party for the purpose of liberating Sinkiang, and in return, the government of the Soviet Union would give assistance toward reconstruction of Sinkiang. Chang had no choice but to remove both General Sung Hsi-lien and Governor Maksud, and recommend Burkhan as governor of Sinkiang. On December
S 31, 1948, the Central Government formally appointed Burkhan.

159 On January 10, 1949, Burkhan officially took over the office.
In his open letter to the peoples of Sinkiang, Burkhan stressed
648 the pro-Russia attitude of General Chang Chih-chung. When
631 Chang called a conference of the political and military chiefs in the Northwest, rumors spread that Sinkiang would be given to the Soviet Union or was preparing to surrender to the Communists. When Burkhan returned from the conference he denied all these rumors. By March 1949, the entire situation in the interior of China had made a drastic change. In Sinkiang, prices had
S
[458] become extremely high. Burkhan proclaimed his policy of economic self-sufficiency in Sinkiang by issuing silver dollars and silver dollar notes as the new currency and discontinuing use of National gold yüan notes. In May of the same year, Burkhan ex-
S tended the Sino-Russian Aviation Pact for another five years.
159 In the meantime Manchuria had been taken by the Communists,
668 and the whole of north China was also put under the control of
669 the Communists with the surrender of General Fu Tso-i, while
631 in Central China, a Soviet regime was also formed. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement from his presidency, and General Li Tsung-jen, vice-president of the Nationalist Government, took over the power and began to negotiate peace with the Communists.

N
In July, 1949, the Communist troops had begun to move into
*[668] Kansu Province. On September 23, 1949, the Communist gen-
[669] eral, Wang Chen, received the surrender of the Nationalist troops at Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu Province. On September 25, two days after the surrender, Burkhan, together with the commander of the Nationalist troops in Sinkiang, cabled to Peiping to announce their severance of relationship from the Nationalist

S
159 Government and their readiness to receive orders from the new
668 regime in Peiping. On October 1, 1949, General T'ao Ch'ih-
669 yueh, the commander of the Nationalist garrison in Sinkiang,
631 went to Chiu-ch'uan to welcome the arrival of the Communist
general, Wang,Chen, in Sinkiang. On October 2, General P'ang Te-huai flew to Urumchi (Tihua) with General Chang Chih-chung. Burkhan was thus appointed by the Communist regime as the new governor of the people's government of Sinkiang. In October
S
[643] 1955, he was elected chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

S
159 Burkhan was a member of the NW MAC, but unlike most of
668 the other officials, he held few concurrent posts. Those he held
631 were president of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, an institution for the training of native cadres, chairman of the Chinese Islamic Association, and a member of the Chinese People's Committee for the Protection of Children. His name was missing from the list of notables invited to attend the CPPCC held in Peking in September, 1949, and it was not until the third session of the CPPCC in 1951 that he became a delegate to that body. In 1955, he was deputy chairman of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC, the function of which had already been superceded by the National People's Congress. His name was also absent from the list of members of the presidium of the National People's Congress meeting, held in September 1954.

These facts as well as reports from escapees from Sinkiang indicate that Burkhan was probably only a figurehead in the political structure of Sinkiang under the Communists. In his speeches, however, he has denounced the separatist aspirations of his peoples as well as pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism, long unifying forces in the struggle of the Turkish peoples of Sinkiang, and has repeatedly and vigorously supported the unity of Sinkiang with the rest of China. He was also one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. He relinquished the office as governor of Sinkiang in September 1955, but when, a month later, Saifuddin resigned, he became governor of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

N
Cha Hsi: Tibetan, Communist

159 Cha Hsi, a Tibetan, served as a member of the Committee
*668 of Nationalities during the period of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
631 Border Government from 1937-1945; at the end of 1949, he was appointed a member of the same committee in the Central People's Government, and also appointed a member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and concurrently a member of the Committee of Nationalities in that council. The council was re-organized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative

N
159 *668 701 631

Administrative Council. Reelected Governor of Shensi in 1954.

Chao's career as an army officer was highlighted at three different occasions: First he took part in the coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-shek during the Sian incident; then he became a war hero in the Sino-Japanese War for his campaign in the Chung t'iao Mountains along the Shensi border, and finally when he shifted his allegiance to the Communists in 1947, he was instrumental in appealing to the Northwestern troops to revolt against Chiang's regime. His appointment as Governor of Chinghai and then Shensi by the Communist regime was a recognition of his service to the Communist cause.

N
159 *668 631

Chia T'o-fu: Communist, government official

Background unknown, dates unknown. During the Sino-Japanese War he served as the secretary-general to the Northwest Office of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party; 1948, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the North China People's Government; later secretary to the Municipal Committee of Sian. 1950, mayor of Sian; 1950-52, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administration Council in the Central People's Government, and vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest; since 1952, vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administrative Council, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and concurrently vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Northwest Administrative Council. Chairman of the Northwest Headquarters of the Federation of Trade Unions, and vice-president of the Northwest Branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Also a member of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP.

In 1955 he was promoted to director of the Fourth General Office (Light Industries, Fuel) and concurrently Minister of Light Industries in the State Council of the Central People's Government.

Chia is one of the principal officials responsible for the economic development and industrialization of the Northwest.

S
159 • 668 631

Ch'ü, Wu: Government official

Head of the Office of Civil Affairs in the Sinkiang Provincial Government under the Nationalists; 1949, mayor of Urumchi, member of the Sinkiang People's Government Council; 1950, deputy secretary general in the Government Administration Council; 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council; 1955, deputy secretary-general of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Member of the Executive Committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

N
159 Forces in Korea; 1955, deputy director of the General Political
668 Department of the People's Liberation Army.
[701]
[631]

Kao Chin-shun: Communist Party member

S
159
• 668
631

Background unknown. When the Communists took over Sinkiang in late 1949, he was chosen as one of the two vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Sinkiang. He is now vice-chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and second secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the CCP.

N
159
*668
631

Li Ching-lin

Background and dates unknown. 1949-53, member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia; 1953-54, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia.

Liao Han-sheng: Communist Party member

A native of Hupeh Province, dates unknown. A political commissar of the People's Liberation Army; in 1949 he was appointed a member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and concurrently one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Chinghai Province until the election of 1954. When the council was reorganized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative Council, he continued as a member.

Lo I: Communist official and mass organization leader

Background unknown; member of the commission on political and legal affairs, land reform and people's supervision in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, and member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League. Member of the All-China Democratic Youth Association. In charge of youth work for the CCP in the Northwest.

Ma, Hsi-wu

Background unknown. In 1952 he was president of the Northwest court of the Supreme People's Court, and member in the Political and Legal Commission and the Land Reform Commission of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council. 1955, vice-president of the Supreme Court in Peking.

N
159
614

Ma Hung-k'uei (1893-)

In the study of the modern history of Northwest China under the Nationalist administration, particularly the history of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, special attention must be directed to the history and background of the Ma clan,

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

Maksud Sabri: (1887-)
Chinese name: Mai-ssu-wu-te

159 Among all the different tribes in modern Sinkiang, and particularly among the Uighurs, Maksud is one of the most loyal supporters of the Nationalist Government. He was born at I-ning in 1887. After he had received his Moslem education at the Moslem school in Ili, he went to Turkey where he received comprehensive training including military, medical and scientific studies, at the Constantinople University. When he came back to Sinkiang, he established a number of schools and the Altai hospital. In addition, he encouraged the program for the ahungs (Moslem priests) to study their scripture, and other social welfare. By 1936 he was elected a member of the Kuo- [631] mintang Central Executive Committee. Since then he has held such positions as member of the Legislative Yüan, councillor of the Central Government, and representative to the People's Political Council. Later he was appointed Commissioner for the Control Yüan in Sinkiang. On May 19, 1947, he was appointed [635] governor of Sinkiang upon the recommendation of General Chang Chih-chung.

159 This appointment came at the most crucial time, when the 669 province was politically chaotic. The tribes of Sinkiang, particularly the Kazakhs and Uighurs, were agitating for indepen- 635 dence. By January 1945 the so-called Republic of Eastern Tur- ● 668 kestan was formally set up in I-ning with the aim of taking over the whole of Sinkiang. At the same time, the Communist Party in Sinkiang was officially organized, and the army of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formed. By 1946, a number of cities in northern and western Sinkiang had been lost to the rebels. To cope with such a crisis, the Nationalist Government at Nanking sent General Chang Chih-chung to Sinkiang to negotiate with the I-ning representatives with the hope that the local affair could be settled peacefully. After a number of talks, a peace agreement was finally signed between Chang Chih-chung and the I-ning representatives on January 2, 1946. As a result of this peace agreement, the provincial government of Sinkiang was reorganized with an equal number of members from Uighurs and Chinese in the local government. The peace treaty did not, however, prevent the rebels from further disturbances. Anti-government movements were found everywhere in the province, whereas the so-called Eastern Turkestan Youth Corps was organized throughout the entire Sinkiang. Unable to tackle the situation, Chang finally recommended Maksud as governor of Sinkiang, hoping that, being a minority leader, he might be able to solve the problems.

Maksud took over the administration in May 1947, but the I-ning group continued its revolt. At the same time the Pei-t'a-

159 At the same time the Pei-t'a-
669 shan (Bogdo Baitik) Affair broke out when Outer Mongolian
635 invaders attacked Sinkiang. Meanwhile, the Communists began
668 their revolution in southern Sinkiang. Realizing the hopeless-
[648] ness of the situation, Chang Chih-chung continued his retreat.
First he removed the commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang, General Sung, then dismissed Maksud as governor and in December 1948 recommended Burkhan, a pro-Russia Uighur, for governor of Sinkiang. With such a political shifting, the whole of Sinkiang was soon taken over by the Communists.

Just before the seizure of Sinkiang by the Chinese Communists, Maksud fled to Formosa where he new resides.

159 Osman Batur (Usman Batur): Native leader, anti-Communist
648 A Kazakh, background and early career unknown; 1940,
669 opposed the arrest of Kazakh leaders by Sheng Shih-ts'ai; 1941,
revolted in the Altai (A-shan) region and fought off the provincial troops; 1942, defeated; withdrew to the border of Outer Mongolia, arrested and jailed for four months in Outer Mongolia; released upon agreement reached with Outer Mongolian authorities. Organized the Altai Kazakh Restoration Society, organized army with arms and supplies from Outer Mongolia and reportedly from Soviet Russia; 1944, led revolt against the provincial government, captured the cities of Chunuchak (Ta-ch'eng) and Altai (A-shan); with establishment of the East Turkestan Republic at Kulja, Osman was made administrator of the Altai Region with headquarters at Sharasume (Ch'eng-hua) and also given command of the troops in the Altai region; 1948, broke with the leaders of the Ili group who, it was charged, were discriminating against the Kazakhs; led his force of six thousand men to join the Nationalist army; stationed at Peitashan (Bogdo Baitik). June 1948, his capture of eight Outer Mongolian soldiers who had crossed the broder precipitated Outer Mongolian forces' invasion of Peitashan. Invasion repelled by Osman Batur. 1949-51, led anti-Communist guerrillas against the Communists; March 1950, deputy commander of the East Sinkiang Region Headquarters of the Chinese People's Anti-Communist National Salvation Army; deputy commander of the First Front Army; July 1950, covered the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces into the Chinghai-Tibetan border and eventual flight to India; February 1951, ambushed and captured by Communist forces; April 1951, publicly executed at Urumchi by the Communists.

Osman Batur was the best military commander of the Ili insurrectionists and apparently a man who had the interests of his fellow Kazakhs at heart. He split with his colleagues such as Akhmejan Kasimi and Saifuddin, who were at that time making overtures toward the Chinese Communists and Soviet

N
159 P'an Tzu-li: Communist Party member
*668 Native of Shensi; dates and background unknown. A long-
631 time member of the Communist Party; served as secretary to the Provincial Committee of Ninghsia of the Communist Party. Since 1949, served as the chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province, and director of the Political Bureau of the People's Liberation Army. 1951, member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi Province. From 1953, member of the reorganized Northwest Administrative Council and concurrently vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi
N
Province. In October 1955 he was appointed Chinese Communist
[648] ambassador to North Korea, and in the spring of 1956 he was transferred as ambassador to India.

N
159 Inasmuch as Chao Shou-shan, governor of Shensi, is not a
*668 Communist but only a political figurehead, the actual power in Shensi was in the hands of P'an Tzu-li. While vice-governor of Shensi, P'an was responsible for mobilizing the people and preparing for the elections. He pushed through the campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and also expedited the judicial process, clearing seventeen thousand cases from the dockets in a couple of months.

000 Pao-erh-han
See Burkhan Shahidi

P'eng, Te-huai
See General Handbook

S Saifuddin Azizi: Communist, government official
159 Born 1914 in Sinkiang. A Uighur. Studied in the Central Asia-
668 tic University in Soviet Russia, majoring in law and political science. Commissioner of education in the provincial government of Sinkiang under Chang Chih-chung's administration, 1946
S and 1947. Member and representative to the first People's Poli-
159 tical Consultative Council, 1949, delegate to the CPPCC. Mem-
668 ber in the Central People's Government Council, and vice-chair-
631 man of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, 1950, and member of the Political and Legal Commission of the Central People's Government and member of the Constitution-Drafting Commission. In September-November 1955 he served as vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and a member of the National Defense Council.

In the Northwest, he was a member of the Military and Administrative Council, in which he served as a member in the Political and Legal Commission and the Nationality Affairs Commission. In 1953, when the MAC became the Northwest Adminis-

159 668 631 trative Council, he became vice-chairman of the council. In the province of Sinkiang, he was from 1950 to 1955 vice-chairman of the provincial People's Government, director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Provincial People's Government, and commander of the Fifth Army. In 1955 he was elected chairman of the first session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee, which did the ground work in preparing the establishment of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. In October 1955, when the SUAR was formally inaugurated, he was elected the chairman, but after a month, for reasons unknown, he resigned and Burkhan Shahidi again became chairman.

Saifuddin's membership in the Chinese Communist Party was disclosed in 1950, but he may have been an undercover agent before. He served as the fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP (later reorganized as the Sinkiang Committee) from 1950.

In the mass organizations, Saifuddin is chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and he was also a member of the national committee of the China Peace Committee, an organization formed to carry out the Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign. Since December 1954 he has been one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

159 668 [669] Saifuddin's rise to recognition started from the revolt at Ili in 1944 when the so-called People's Committee for the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was organized in opposition to the provincial government of Sinkiang and also to the Nationalist Government. Saifuddin was appointed Minister of Education at that time and was also in charge of the Youth Corps. By January 1945 the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formally established. Saifuddin was one of the lieutenants of Akmedjan Kasimi, a leader in the Ili coalition, who in 1948 organized his supporters into the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, and became editor of its organ, The Progressive Daily. When Akhmedjan and two others were killed in a plane crash en route to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September 1949, Saifuddin assumed the leadership of the Sinkiang League which, in 1950, was renamed the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and which furnished seventeen thousand experienced minority cadres to staff the government agencies in Sinkiang. Through their efforts, the Ili region in Sinkiang forged ahead of the rest of the province in land reform, in collectivization, in the recruitment of activists into the ranks of the cadres, and in meeting the requirements for the establishment of regional autonomy.

How trustworthy and loyal are the members of the Sinkiang League to the Communist cause is, however, still a question. The fact that many of them still entertain separatist opinions

159 668 may be seen in the speeches of Saifuddin and Burkhan, exhorting them to abandon their opposition to Chinese rule and forswear their pan-Turkanistic and pan-Islamic views, which were denounced as reactionary. Although Saifuddin has climbed high in the Communist heirarchy and holds concurrent positions in the central government, the regional and provincial government and also the Communist Party, his power rests upon his following, and the fact that he was unsure of them may have been a reason for his resignation as chairman of the SUAR a month after his election.

159 Sheng Shih-ts'ai

One of the most important modern figures in the political arena of Northwest China during the more recent years is Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Sheng was born in 1895 in the district of K'aiyuan in Liaoning Province in Manchuria, of a middle-class farming family. After he was graduated from an agricultural middle school in Mukden he went to Shanghai to attend the Chinese School of Public Affairs, Chung-kuo kung-hsueh, at Wusung (Woosung), majoring in economics and political sciences, and was graduated in 1915. Unwilling to take part in the civil service examinations under the administration of Yüan Shih-k'ai, he went to Japan to pursue further studies. Shortly the question of Shantung came up in the Versailles Conference, and Sheng was sent back to China as a representative of overseas students to take part in the movement against the transfer of territorial rights to Japan. After the movement was over he joined the Military Academy of Kwangtung at Kukong. His military career began when he served as a second lieutenant in the army of General Kuo Sung-ling in Manchuria. Because of his good record in the army he was chosen to be sent to Japan's Military Academy. In the year of 1925 when Kuo Sung-ling resisted Chang Tso-lin for the latter's pro-Japan attitude, Sheng came back to join Kuo's side. When Kuo was defeated by Chang, Sheng went back to Japan to continue his military training. Chang Tso-lin complained to Japanese authorities and Sheng Shih-ts'ai was ousted from the Military Academy. Thanks to the assistance of Sun Ch'uan-fang, Feng Yu-hsiang (the Christian General) and Chiang Kai-shek, Sheng was able to complete his training.

He came back to China in 1927, just in time to take part in the Northern Expedition launched by Chiang Kai-shek. When the expedition was finally successful he served for a short time in the office of the chief of staff as a section chief. Then he began to seek opportunities in the border areas.

159 669 In 1930 he was invited to Sinkiang where he served first as chief of staff in the office of the commander of Frontier Defense. But his real opportunity came when the Moslem rebel,

000 one of the vice-chairmen of the Kansu PPCC.

S 159 631 701

T'ao Ch'ih-yueh: Army officer

A native of Hunan, dates unknown. Graduate of Whampao Military Academy; 1936, commanding officer of the Eighth Division, Nationalist Army; 1945-49, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison; 1949-, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the Sinkiang Military Area, and commanding officer of the 22nd Army Group; 1949-, member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and member of the Government Council of the People's Government of Sinkiang; 1951-, member of the National Committee, People's Political Consultative Conference; 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council.

S 159 701

During the Nationalist administration, T'ao was never in a very important position in the army. His rise to fame began when General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Nationalist Government, conducted peace talks with the local leaders of Sinkiang from 1946-1949. At this time T'ao, succeeding General Sung Hsi-lien, became the commander of the garrison forces in Sinkiang. When the defense of the Northwest by the Nationalist troops was broken down by the victorious Communist army, T'ao took the lead of all military and political leaders of Sinkiang to switch his allegiance and support to the Communist regime in Peking. On September 26, 1949, he made his public announcement in which he separated Sinkiang's relationship from the Nationalist regime and gave his whole support to the Peking regime. And on October 1, 1949, he went to Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu, to welcome the commanding officer of the People's Liberation Army, General Wang Chen, to Sinkiang. His troops were then reorganized into the 22nd Army Group, which he still commands, but which was later disarmed and transformed into "production corps." T'ao was elected to the CPPCC in 1951. He was a member of the NW MAC (later the Northwest Administrative Council) and in 1955, a member of the National Defense Council.

S 159 669 ● 668

N 159 *668 701

Teng Pao-san: Army officer

A native of Kansu Province; dates unknown. 1927, deputy commander-in-chief of the Preparatory Army for National Construction under the command of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General. 1930, deputy commissioner in the Pacification Headquarters of Shensi Province. 1937, deputy commander of Suiyuan War Area under General Fu Tso-i, stationed in Paotou, Suiyuan; 1948, 1949, during the Communist advance in 1949 he gave up his city and fled. Later he defected from the Nationalists. Delegate to the CPPCC; appointed chairman in the People's Government of Kansu Province and re-elected to the same

N 159 S 669 648 suggested to the Manchu Government that Yakub Beg's realm be recognized as a protectorate state. But Tso Tsung-t'ang frustrated this attempt by defeating Yakub Beg and recovering the territory of southern Sinkiang. When the negotiations for the return of Ili were going on between China and Russia, Tso again moved his troops to Qomul (Hami) to prepare for any possible break of the negotiations and recover Ili by force if necessary. As a result, Ili was returned to China and the whole Sinkiang territory was preserved as a part of China.

N 159 S 635 Thirdly, he should be credited for his statesmanlike foresight for his proposal of making Sinkiang into a new province on an equal footing with the rest of the provinces. On this matter he had memorialized five times to the Ching Government, insisting that Sinkiang must be given the status of a province to defend the border of the Northwest. Although Sinkiang Province was finally established after the death of Tso, the credit must go to him.

N 159 Though his achievements in the Northwest were great, they were of a military nature. Politically and economically speaking Tso's achievements during his twelve long years in the Northwest were rather limited and insignificant. He was primarily a military man. Though he held positions as governor or governor general, his primary duty was involved in the pacification of bandits and uprisings. His importance in the history of modern Northwest China should not be minimized, however, but should be recognized and praised.

Veli Kajum-Khan: Anti-Communist political leader

S 159 Born in 1904 in Tashkent, a member of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan. 1921, went to Germany, graduated from the agricultural school of Berlin and from the school of foreign affairs of the Berlin University. 1926, sentenced to death in absentia by Soviet authorities in Samarkand; 1925-41, active in the publishing field, in politics and in the Turkistan liberation movement; until 1940, publisher of the newspaper "Der Nähe Osten," S 159 668 648 and an information bulletin on Turkistan. Since 1941, concerned with the work of looking after the welfare and expediting the liberation of Turkistanian prisoners of war in Germany; 1945, organized ex-prisoners into the nucleus of the National Turkistanian Union Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik Qomitasinin) located at Bonn am Rhein; head of the Committee; founder of the Turkistanian Legion; 1945-47, served as a witness at the International Trials at Nürnberg; 1947, re-elected head of the National Turkistanian Unity Committee; 1953, re-elected president of the Turkistanian refugee organization.

Veli Kajum-Khan, as founder and director of the Turkistanian Legion, has directed more than 180,000 Turkistanian exiles

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

S 159 • 668 648 in Europe, while his National Turkistanian Unity Committee, in which he is president, has, unofficially, the support of such countries as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In each of these countries, with the exception of Iraq, the committee has a representative office staffed by two members from each Turkish tribe of East and West Turkistan. Among his many activities, Vali Kajum-Khan has also the supervision of the political and ideological education of exiled Turkistanian youths. He publishes various Turkistanian newspapers and maintains important contacts with his native country.

N 159 *668 S 159 668 Wang Chen (1908-): Army officer, Communist Party member

Born in 1908 in Hunan in a poor farmer's family. Studied in grade school for three years. Railway worker. member of railway workers' union, 1924; joined Communist Party, 1927; member of the Executive Committee of Communist Youth, 1928; secretary of Communist Party at Liu-yang, Hunan; political commissioner, First Independent Division of Hunan and Kiangsi, 1932; political commissioner, Sixth Division, 1934; chief of staff to General Li Hsien-nien, 1937; since 1952, first secretary in the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Communist Party; in 1950-52, commander, First Field Army, Acting Commander, Sinkiang Military Area. Member of the National Defense Council, 1955.

Wang Chen's outstanding status in the Party is due partly to his long membership in the Party and partly to his excellent record and achievement both as an army officer and as a worker. He participated in the Long March, 1935-36. He won fame in the army when he led a vanguard unit which marched from the Yellow River down to Kwangtung Province, hailed as another "long March." When he was stationed at Yenan, the capital of the Communists, he was given the task of utilizing the soldiers to do production jobs, and the result was that the army became a self-supported team which not only got no help from the government, but paid taxes to help support the government. When the military campaign of the Communists began, Wang Chen played a rather significant role by taking over the whole of the Northwest territory. First he received the surrender of Kansu on September 23, 1949; then on October 21, 1949, he flew to Sinkiang and took over that province.

In Sinkiang, Wang's first job was to crush the opposition, whom he denounced as counter-revolutionaries. His troops took part in destroying the forces of Osman Batur and in pursuing the fleeing Kazakhs to the border of India. In his capacity as first secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP, a post he held for only a year, he helped further the so-called united front of the workers and farmers.

S
159 **Wang, En-mao: Communist Party official**
•668 First secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Central
[631] Committee of the CCP and after September 1955, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the CCP. In 1950-52, member of the Northwest MAC.

Wang is the top party boss in Sinkiang and thus the actual ruler of that province. Unlike his colleagues, he holds no concurrent positions in the administration except for a couple of years as a member of the NW MAC. A man of mystery, little is known about him except that he is a native of Kiangsi and does not speak any of the native languages of Sinkiang, and that in 1933 he served in the CCP committee in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region under Jen Pi-shih.

N
159 **Wang Feng: Communist Party official**
Native of Shensi Province and presently director of the De-
*668 partment of United Front Work in the Northwest Bureau of the
[631] Central Committee of the CCP. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, of which he was a member, he was a member of the Political and Legal Commission, the Land Reform Commission, and chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. He is also president of the Lanchou College of Nationalities.

Wang's main job was what the Communists called united fron work, that is, the alignment of non-Communists to work with Communist cadres in the Northwest and to encourage non-Chinese to work with the Chinese. As director of the Department of United Front Work in the Party, he incorporated thousands of former Nationalist officials as well as students into the ranks of the cadres, to govern the vast territory of the Northwest that the Communists acquired in 1949. Later, he was responsible for the ideological reform and the purges of the cadres in 1952. As
N
a Chinese heading the Commission of Nationality Affairs in the
159 NW MAC, his job was to rationalize the long-standing differ-
*668 ences between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples in the North-
*563 west. Much of the progress of socialist transformation in the Northwest depends upon the degrees to which Wang Feng at the regional level and Li Wei-han, director of the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee, on the national have succeeded in smoothing relations between Communist and non-Communist officials, and between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples.

N
159 **Wang, Shih-t'ai: Military and administrative official**
Background unknown. 1934, member of the Central Execu-
*668 tive Committee in the Chinese Soviet Government in Kiangsi and
631 delegate to the Second All-China Representative Conference of
496

N
241 ning in agriculture has become more complex and difficulties are
*668 encountered in realizing annual targets. The absence of trained
technicians to introduce new farming techniques, the lack of accountants and organizers in the cooperatives, and the so-called
N ideological backwardness of many of the Communist cadres them-
121 selves have prevented rapid cooperativization. We will now exa-
mine very briefly the progress achieved in the different regions
241 of the Northwest and the problems which have arisen to prevent
*668 agricultural development. In this way, the pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural planning can be observed more clearly. Henceforth, all statistics concerning the number of co-ops, agricultural output, etc., are Communist claims and, of course, must be carefully considered.

B. Application of Communist Agricultural Policy to the Northwest

S
1. Sinkiang

175 By June, 1955, nearly six years after the area was occupied
474 by the Communist Army, there were 75,215 mutual aid teams
241 (it is not known how many of these were on a permanent basis)
668 and the agricultural producer cooperative numbered 1,702 with
[476] roughly 66.4 per cent of the peasant population participating in some form of co-op. By the end of 1956, in response to Mao's directive to hasten the creation of agricultural producer cooperatives, it is planned to increase their number to 5,100 and by 1957 to 10,240. (Far Eastern Economic Review. December 1, 1955, pp. 686-87.)

S Emphasis has been on raising the production of wheat, oil
241 seed bearing plants, and cotton, by extending cultivation. The
433 Communists attribute all increases in production to a result of
668 further consolidation and development of the cooperative move-
175 ment. Although there is a paucity of data on output, acreage, and
[474] output per acre, the following table has been pieced together from the information available, in an attempt to give some comparisons of increases attained during the Communist period with that of 1949. The figures for the Communist period have been obtained from 1954 and 1955 reports. See Table 1.

S The government has established agricultural stations, in
242 order to show the peasants of various nationalities how to improve
668 their farming methods. In 1955 it was reported that Sinkiang
433 had seventy such stations. Two tractor stations have also been
175 opened in Urumchi and Sui-ting. These stations have sought to improve production by planting Ukrainian winter wheat and S-3173 cotton, and promote better procedures of farming such as summer ploughing, autumn ploughing, winter irrigation, sowing in rows, close-planting, and cotton-pruning. They have made efforts to wipe out insect pests. The Soviet Union sent

175
242 The Soviet Union sent
668 thirty-three airplanes and large numbers of locust experts to
433 spray insecticides over an area of some 2,669,000 mow (or
[177] 405,688 acres) during 1952-1955. On the state farms, the Army
[475] has done the lion's share of the work of reclaiming land, building
irrigation works, erecting experimental farms and stations and
[701] operating them. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955. p. 7,
No. 9.)

654 The Communists reported that they have given financial and
technical assistance to the various nationalities who till the soil
668 or engage in pastoral activities. By the end of 1954, agricultural
241 loans totalling some 26,140,000 yuan (U.S. $1,061) and some
175 46,000 farming implements had been supplied to the peasants,
enabling every peasant household to have one trowel of its own
and every 1.3 households to own a plow. These small figures
indicate that assistance has been meagre; but even this might
enable the peasants to increase output as compared to output obtained by previous farming implements.

241 Whether agriculture will prosper in Sinkiang depends entirely
312 on the steps taken in water conservancy and the proper utilization
of water. Already five million additional mow of land (160,000
668 acres) have been irrigated in the past six years and the irrigated
175 acreage in 1954 has been increased by 30.2 per cent since 1949.
Reservoirs have been constructed like the well-known "Red Wild
Goose Reservoir" and the "Peace Reservoir" which both now
irrigate more than 237,000 mow (36,024 acres of land). Three
[475] state farms, collective farms, and a dozen or so agricultural co-
[474] ops have been formed in the area.

By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock in the whole
231 province numbered 17,105,000 head, an increase of 7.47 per cent
433 over 1953. (In 1947 the total number of livestock was 15,037,000.
175 The figure reported for 1954 indicates a 13 per cent increase.)
668 The plan for 1955 is to raise the number fo 18,987,567 head, a
net increase of 11 per cent. This will include 537,280 head of
large and small animals of improved breed (including 515,792
sheep, 7,930 large domestic animals, 13,538 pigs); 2,839,140
head of livestock will be innoculated against or cured of various
diseases. The Chinese Communists complain, however, of many
defects in animal husbandry. During the past winters, insufficient feed was gathered and many animals died. It was estimated
that some 200,000 died in the spring of 1954, an approximate loss
of one per cent per annum.

The forestry policy has been to protect existent forests from
313 fire and damage, to survey forest areas suitable for afforestation,
668 to plant saplings there, and to afforestate areas near rural villages
for the development of co-ops and state farms. Each year, the
quota mou to be afforestated is set and state departments undertake to meet these quotas. Nurseries have been built and seedlings
planted in these tracts.

000planted in these tracts.

We have cited some of the achievements that have taken place
668 and the general direction of agricultural development. We must
185 be careful about accepting all figures and recognize that many
241 targets are not met but often revised midway through the year
until they can be met. When one looks at the entire scheme of development taking place it is important to remember that each group in this scheme has certain commitments to meet as set by the plan for that year. Survey teams are supposed to provide definite information about the amount of land to be reclaimed each year. If their information is not accurate, (and there have been complaints to this effect) then those units which reclaim the land are put off schedule, the proper cultivation and sowing cannot be done, and the intended output is not realized. Such intricate planning can lead to grievous bottlenecks in the attainment of planned goals.

Further defects that have been reported are as follows: there has been inadequate hydrographic and meteorological data for farming and animal husbandry. There has not been the correct coordinated activity between State and commercial enterprises to supply the necessary producer and consumer goods for the agricultural and pastoral co-ops. The People's Bank has been
[452] unable to give the needed credit and credit cooperatives and credit
[453] groups still have to absorb idle capital and halt usurious practices
among the peasants, which still seem to prevail six years after "liberation." The Communists report that rich peasants, and so-called counter-revolutionary elements are still causing trouble by "sabotage" and the spreading of rumors which obstruct Communist policy.

According to observations made by some agricultural stations in Sha-ya County the peasants in many districts placed emphasis only on the summer harvest, and neglected the cotton, mazie and rice crops that are reaped in autumn. This meant that the peasants were devoting more of their attention to harvesting a wheat crop, a food item, and neglecting other farm crops that the state was so urgently emphasizing. In Kuerhlei County there were complaints that the peasants were not picking the cotton at the appropriate time and their delay in doing so had allowed much of the ripe cotton to fall to the ground and rot. This occurred in many of the villages throughout the county. Again the Communists complained of the peasants' lack of care for their farming tools and that damage frequently resulted from mechanical troubles and carelessness.

The principal difficulty to date has been the acute shortage of
668 technical cadres in the province and among the local minority
241 nationalities. To solve this problem, several agricultural institutes have been erected to train indigenous groups. But this

S
• 668 training takes time before these technicians, accountants, etc.,
241 can go out and organize co-ops, operate them efficiently, and
train other native cadres. The 1955 plan calls for the training
of 600 technical cadres for the "Centers for Promoting Agricultural
Techniques," for the training of 500 in-office cadres by rotation,
and for the training of 4,190 accountants and 5,337 technicians
for agricultural producer cooperatives.

S
668 An additional problem (which will be mentioned at this point
rather than repeated when each province of the Northwest is dis-
657 cussed) concerns the soldiers' dependents in the region and the
736 plight of discharged army personnel. The State has been particu-
474 larly upset by the lack of participation of these groups in coopera-
729 tivization and special attention is now being devoted to utilize
[464] this source of manpower. Since dependents of servicement are
given certain State stipends, in food, many of them feel that by
joining a cooperative they will be deprived of this compensation.
Because 1955 was a critical year in the Five Year Plan, the pace
of erecting new co-ops and consolidating the older ones has been
increased. Now many of the dependents and demobilized soldiers
who were organized in these co-ops have backed out of them and
many of these co-ops have, therefore, never been consolidated.
Another problem in the co-ops is that the members do not want
partly disabled or female workers, and, on the other hand, many
dependents feel that the State should provide for them. (No. 1004,
March 10, 1955, Supplements. "Actively Organizing Servicemen's
Dependents for Mutual Aid and Co-op Work." U.S. Consulate
General. Survey of China Mainland Press.) The proper allocation
of labor in the Northwest remains a critical problem.

N
2. Chinghai

*175 By December, 1954, 575 agricultural producer co-ops had
*668 been formed, and this constituted 9.12 per cent of all households.
474 The number of mutual aid co-ops was not given but it was reported
452 that 69.7 per cent of all households had been cooperativized to
[476] some extent. There were also 159 supply and marketing coopera-
tives, 148 credit cooperatives, and 12 handicraft producer co-ops.
Long term low interest loans have been extended to poor peasants
to encourage them to join farming co-ops. The first allocation
totalled over 138 million yuan (U.S. $5,598). The interest rate
is 0.4 per cent monthly and the repayment period is spread over
five years. Besides these individual loans to poor peasants, there
have been additional ones to enable the peasants to build small
water conservancy works and buy new types of farm tools. All
totalled, state loans amounted to more than 750 million yuan
(U.S. $30,426) for 1955. (Far Eastern Economic Review. Dec. 1,
1955. pp. 686-87.)

N
*668 In a provincial report by Chan Kuo-sheng, Secretary General
of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, on work
241
185
*175
433

4. Sinkiang

473 Industrial development in Sinkiang is perhaps the fastest
175 in the entire Northwest. As early as 1950, four Sino-Soviet
177 joint-stock companies were established in Urumchi, of which
three were industrial plants. They were: (1) Sino-Soviet Nonferrous Metals Company, (2) Sino-Soviet Rare Metals Company, (3) Sino-Soviet Petroleum Company and (4) Sino- Soviet Airlines. All the Soviet stocks were reportedly transferred to China at the end of 1954, but the Soviet technicians have remained there to help train the Chinese workers.

668 After the Communists took over, the Sinkiang Petroleum
175 Company has been greatly expanded. Its crude oil output in 1955 is
315 said to have been sixty-three percent higher than in 1954, and
473 deep testing wells were being sunk in five new districts in the
Gobi Desert to investigate their oil reserves. The five districts are located in the Turfan and Dzungaria Basins in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

175 Another important industrial plant in Sinkiang is the July
288 First Cotton Mill, which began production in 1952. In early
1955, 16,500 spindles and 600 looms were added, which will double the mill's cloth output. The total number of spindles was then over 30,000 and of looms, one thousand. This is the first modern textile mill built in Sinkiang, and it supplies the thirteen nationalities there with a rich variety of fabrics manufactured from the cotton grown in the province itself.

471 According to the province's initial plans, the investment in
capital construction during 1955 is to be increased by over sixty percent as compared with 1954. A total of twelve construction jobs are to be newly built or rebuilt. Preparations are under
471 way for these works. Among the new projects are a modern
339 cement factory, a sulphuric acid factory, a small hydraulic
381 power plant and an oil pressing mill. The cement factory was
[377] expected to have its first stage of construction completed in
[258] 1956. When completed, this factory will save the state a total
of ten million yuan each year in the cost of transporting cement from China Proper. When the sulphuric acid factory starts production, it will supply all the raw material needed for printing and dyeing works by the July First Cotton Mill.

471 The eight units to be rebuilt in 1955 include the Liu-tao-wan
316 Colliery, the Sinkiang Machine Works, the Ceramic Factory,
392 and the First Cement Factory. When the underground tunnel of
339 the Liu-tao-wan Colliery is rebuilt, it will be possible to
323 produce more coal for the industries and local residents of
Urumchi. The output of modern farming tools will be increased when the Sinkiang Machine Works is rebuilt. After a set of automatic equipment is added to the glass workshop of the Ceramic Factory, there will be nineteen additional kinds of new products to supply the market.

N S and is used mainly for wrapping. The annual output of the white
463 flax paper is about 966,870 bundles, and that of black flax paper
289 is 3,982,480. Part of this is exported to Szechwan, Hankow and
[439] Anhwei.

N (c) The "improved" paper. It is produced and consumed
[433] mainly in Kansu, at the rate of some 300,000 bundles per year.

S (d) The "mulberry-skin" paper. It is produced and consumed
[433] mainly in Sinkiang, at the rate of some 565,977 bundles a year.

N (4) Bamboo articles. A side-line of farmers, they are made
463 in many places, especially in Hua-hsien and Han-chung, in
322 Shensi and Min-hsien, in Kansu. The annual output is estimated
433 as follows: (1)farming implements, 29,280 piculs, (2) sieves,
132,300, (3) large bamboo baskets, 480,000, and (4) small
bamboo baskets, 27,000.

N (5) Straw hats. Also a side-line of farmers, they are made
463
433 in many places, especially in Feng-hsiang, Wei-nan, Lin-tung,
[294] and Chang-an, in Shensi. The annual output in Shensi alone
exceeds 1,377,900 hats.

N (6) Brooms. They are made mainly in the districts near
[412] Mount Chung-nan, such as Mei-hsien and Chang-an. The annual
output exceeds 800,000 brooms.

N (7) Straw mats. They are produced mainly in Sui-te, Shensi,
[285] Chang-i, Kansu and Ninghsia City, Ninghsia. The annual output exceeds 3,000,000 pieces.

N (8) Wooden rakes. One of the main farming implements in
[412] the Northwest, they are made mainly in Chang-an, Pu-cheng
and Tung-chuan, Shensi. The annual output is about 88,000
pieces.

N (9) Iron utensils. They are produced mainly in Pao-chi and
[326] Feng-hsiang in Shensi, and Tienshui in Kansu. The annual out-
[415] put is about 76,000 counts.

S (10) Carpets. Carpet-making is one of the main handicrafts
463 in Sinkiang. The carpets come in various sizes, up to eight by
286 sixteen feet. The annual output exceeds 10,000 square feet. Of
[433] that quantity, some six thousand square feet is exported to
[439] India, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia and the rest is sold locally
or to other provinces in the Northwest.

N 6. Evaluation and Prospects.

*668 For the time being, the Communists seem to have concentrated
433 on two things in industrializing the Northwest, one being the
[288] cotton industry in Shensi and Sinkiang, and the other being the
[315] oil industry in Kansu, Sinkiang and Chinghai. From the economic
S point of view, these developments are not unnatural, because
● 668 Shensi and Sinkiang have been famous for their raw cotton, and
433 the oil reserve in China is largely located in the Northwest.

[288] While the present industrial development in the Northwest
[315] may not appear so impressive, this area will probably become

N
*668 one of the most important industrial areas in China for three
433 reasons. First, the Northwest, especially Sinkiang, has shown
S great promise in mineral deposits. The Communists have sent
• 668 out thousands of geologic prospectors to this area, and reports
433 of new discoveries have frequently been publicized by the Com-
(135) munist papers, (see the section on Mineral Resources). Second,
the geographical location of this area is such that it would be
the ideal location for China's new industries from the strategic
N point of view. Last, as this area borders on Soviet Russia, it
S (197) would be more convenient from the standpoint of accepting
technical aid from Russia.

S Based perhaps on the above-mentioned reasoning, the Com-
668 munists have paid special attention to the future development of
433 this area. In Sinkiang, for instance, before the Communists took over, there was very little industrial production. But in 1952, the total industrial production in Sinkiang amounted to New JMP$39,075,400, not including the value of handicrafts, which amounted to New JMP$135,598,000. In terms of percentages of the 1952 production in Sinkiang, the industrial production accounted for 5.71 percent of the total, and the handicrafts accounted for 19.81 percent. According to plans, by the end of 1957, the value of industrial production in Sinkiang will be increased to New JMP$292,758,500, or 749 percent of that of 1952. If these plans are carried out, industrial production will account for 22.64 of the total production in Sinkiang and handicrafts will account for 15.09 percent of the total; the planned total production for 1957 would be New JMP$1,293,227,200.

N
*668 in understanding the long-run economic potential of this region,
489 it is equally true that there must have been some other reasons
433 forcing them to develop this remote region more swiftly than they
might otherwise have done, investing in it sizable amounts of much
needed capital backed by considerable forced labor. Other factors,
both internal and external, should therefore be taken into consideration. In the first place, Communist China had made a tremendous
effort to shift the center of its gravity from the coastal regions
into these relatively empty lands bordering Soviet central Asia,
perhaps partly as a result of the United Nations embargo and the
Korean War. Secondly, the forced pace of development in the
Northwest might be partly a defense measure. During the War
in Korea it became clear how vulnerable Manchuria was to bombing attacks. Had the United Nations chosen to do so, most of
Manchuria's industrial complexes could have been destroyed.
N But in the Northwest, factories, railways and mines were far
[648] safer than anywhere else in China. Moreover, this area would
assure maximum secrecy for projects which Red China and Russia
were reported to have been jointly undertaking. ("I Saw Communist China" by Robert Guillain in the Saturday Evening Post, June
2, 1956. p. 114.)

N
*668 Following on the heels of the railway construction work, a
433 huge oil refinery at Lanchou was built. It is also reported that
[382] between Lanchou and the site of the refinery, a road was constructed more than twice as wide as Fifth Avenue in New York
[491] city, and a large hill thickly covered with houses was completely
N [498] leveled to make the road straight. At Lanchou the railway yard
under construction contained fifty kms. of tracks, with modern
equipment such as turntables, grain silos, refrigerating plants
and the like, all brought from Russia. Along the wide road, the
beginning of what is called New Lanchou has arisen. In Sinkiang,
S a new city was born in Urumchi, where giant factories have been
668 built, including the Sinkiang Non-ferrous Metals Co., the Sin-
433 kiang Petroleum Co., the Sinkiang "August 1st" Iron and Steel
327 Plant, the Sinkiang Machinery Plant, the October Motor Car
328 Repair and Assembly Shop, the Urumchi Automatic Electric Plant,
382 and the like. This accomplishment in industrial construction and
39 future plans of industrial development are indeed very much tied
[489] up with communications development.

N Communist China may very well focus its principal attention
*668 on the Northwest during the period of its second Five Year Plan
185 scheduled to begin in 1958, just as the first Five Year Plan concentrated on the Northeast. The Northwest might then play a
433 major role in the economic relations between China and Russia,
[648] and be industrialized to a level comparable with Manchuria.

It may therefore be concluded that so long as there are both
internal and external pressures, and the "lean-to-one-side"